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Abstract
Play is a common, yet elusive phenomenon. Many definitions of play and explanations
for its existence have been brought forward in various disciplines such as psychology,
anthropology, ethology and in the humanities. As an activity apparently serving no other
purpose than itself, play can be simply considered a pleasant pastime. Yet its equation
with fun has been challenged by artists and scholars alike. Being in a playful state does
not warrant extrinsic motivation or being conscious of an external purpose. However,
play creates meaning, and scientists are pursuing functional explanations for it. These
conflicting observations are contributing to the ambiguity of play and they raise questions
about the limits of the complexity that present discourses are able to reflect.
This thesis presents a comprehensive, transdisciplinary approach to describe and under-
stand play, based on systems-theory, constructivism, cybernetics and practical exploration.
Observing play in this way involves theoretical analysis, reflection and critique as well as the
practice of design, development and artistic exposition. By constructing, re-contextualising
and discussing eight of my own projects, I explore the distinction between theory and
practice through which playful systems emerge.
Central to my methodology is the concept of distinctions as a fundamental method of
observation. It is introduced itself as a distinction and then applied throughout this thesis,
in order to describe and discuss phenomena of play from a wide range of different
perspectives. This includes paradoxical, first-person and conflicting accounts and it
enables discourses that cross disciplinary boundaries.
In summary, the three interrelated contributions to knowledge in my research project are:
I contribute to the emerging field of game studies through a comprehensive systems-
theoretical description on play. I also provide a methodology in which theory and practice
inform each other through mutual observation, construction, reflection and critical evalua-
tion. Finally, I present eight projects, including a playful system developed in a speculative
approach that I call anthroponeutral design. These results represent a novel transdisci-
plinary perspective on play that offers new opportunities for further research.
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Introduction
[...] so what the hell is play, anyway?
Scott G. Eberle (2014)
The Cold War
My adolescence took place during the fading stretch of the Cold War. While I was heading
to school each morning, I felt the scenario of a nuclear conflict towering over me. Then
came AIDS, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Chernobyl, and then apparently the end of history
(Fukuyama 2012). As a teenager during this time, I had many problems, among them a
very particular one. As much as I tried, I could not picture myself as an adult.
While some of my classmates were already planning careers, families and homes, my
mind was constantly drawing blanks. Despite daydreaming a lot, I could not figure out the
idea of adulthood which I pinned to the age of 34. My main difficulty was to image myself
doing what grown ups supposedly are doing during the week, which is going to work to
earn a living. My high school education was suggesting a future where my days would be
spent in some kind of office, working for someone, having holidays and weekends off. All
this I was not able to imagine at all. No stretch of my otherwise limitless imagination did
the trick.
In retrospect, this is a question that still puzzles me. In the meantime I have spent time
in offices and I have worked as an employee, while avoiding both of those situations as
much as possible. I have had different strategies for this such as studying longer than
expected, working part time, becoming self-employed or doing a PhD. But perhaps the
most significant aspect of this journey is that I have been professionally concerned with
play during the last 15 years of my career.
Play has been described through its opposition to work (see Play vs. Work (p. 51)), yet the
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relationship is much more complicated, as the following chapters will reveal in detail. I have
been exploring games and play through my work as game designer, researcher, lecturer
and consultant. While I was creating and researching games and playful experiences, I
was working with play and I was also playing while I worked.
My PhD project and the resulting thesis are expressions of my desire to understand play
and work at a fundamental level. This understanding must remain incomplete — it keeps
emerging by theoretical examination, through discourse and with practice. This thesis
represents a snapshot at a particular point in time. I hope that it will be useful for the wider
academic community to continue the journey.
Research Context
Both work and play are ubiquitous phenomena without a specific academic homestead.
Various disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, ethology, pedagogy and the human-
ities have produced theories to explain or to describe play. Work is studied within the field
of human factors and ergonomics and in the wider context of economic theories.
As I will discuss in the following chapters, the existing efforts have resulted in inconsis-
tent and incommensurable accounts about play. This “ambiguity of play” was famously
acknowledged by Brian Sutton-Smith (1997), but so far his diagnosis is still in search of
solutions. Although we engage in play from early childhood onwards, we face difficulties
when we try to analyse and understand it. The current methodological and ideological rifts
between the various academic and practical disciplines are too wide.
Any theory capable of describing a multi-faceted phenomenon such as play cannot be
bound to the perspectives and problems of one specific field. Yet it cannot ignore the
contributions of the established disciplines. Game studies, an interdisciplinary field that
has emerged from media studies during the last two decades, has tacitly embraced play
as a fully-fledged subject of research (Mäyrä, Lammes, et al. 2015; Mäyrä, Arjoranta, et al.
2016).
The context of my work, published during the course of this project (see Published Work (p.
9)), suggests that this thesis can be located within the game studies (Järvinen 2008) (see
also Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). There is a caveat, however, and this is connected with
the history of this new discipline. From its inception, an almost exclusive focus on games
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as media artefacts rather than as media for play has been delaying the development of
game studies as a field. This has resulted in long-standing disputes, particularly in the
narratology vs. ludology debate (Frasca 1999). I believe that the observation of games
and play from a systems-theoretic perspective provides some reason for hope that these
debates are a matter of the past and that the field can move on (compare Ludus vs.
Narratio (p. 85) and A Third Culture? (p. 149)).
First of all I argue that any viable approach for describing play in a comprehensive manner
has to be transdisciplinary (Blassnigg and Punt 2013). This means, it has to be capable
of describing and transcending established disciplines. In other words, it must be able to
observe observers. To achieve this, the underlying theory has to be sufficiently abstract,
complex, and universal. This rules out mono-thematic approaches, say, describing play
from a child development perspective (Martin and Caro 1985) or theories that operates on
purely biological (Burghardt 2005b) or ideological levels (Nash and Penney 2015).
Those necessary qualities, I claim, can be found in specific areas of general systems
theory, especially through a critical appreciation of the work of Niklas Luhmann (1996).
A systems-theoretic perspective does not claim a privileged relation to truth — it is a
particular perspective. However, as I will set out in the next chapter, it is capable of
observing play in its many possible meanings and facets. It can deal with contradictory,
self-referential and paradoxical descriptions (see Paradoxa of Play (p. 69)). According
to Luhmann, to succeed in a systems-theoretic interpretation, it has to provide adequate
Anschlussfähigkeit, options for continuing the discourse about games and play within the
academic community and beyond (see Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)).
Research Questions
I pursue three related questions in this thesis.
Fundamentally, I aim to answer the question “what is play?” from a systems-theoretic
perspective by describing and designing playful systems. I contend that a distinctions-
based approach based on radical constructivism and systems theory as a method of
investigation adds to our current understanding of play.
Secondly, I ask, how can the interplay between theoretical and practical work inform each
other towards such an understanding? How does practice inform theory and how does
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theory inform practice? How are playful systems designed? Which directions can their
design take and what are the requirements to provide a comprehensive description of
them?
I also have been considering the speculative research question “can machines play?” as a
vehicle to drive my research and practice.
Methodology
The research context of this thesis is rooted in methods that I locate in the realm of art
practice and the humanities: artistic research, prototyping, speculative and experimental
game design, literature review, phenomenology, philosophical analysis, critical reflection
and exposition of practice (Schwab and Borgdorff 2014). My adoption of empirical and
engineering disciplines such as artificial intelligence is based on Michael Mateas’ idea of
expressive AI. Mateas describes it as “a new interdiscipline of AI-based cultural production
combining art practice and AI research practice” (Mateas 2001). I diverge from Mateas
however, regarding his emphasis on artistic success governed by audience response (see
Mateas and Schwab: Artistic Research (p. 38)).
In particular, my work is not empirical in the sense of (social) sciences (compare Play and
Discipline(s) (p. 151)) nor intended to create artefacts for external, commercial purposes
(and I would include artistic success in this category). Rather, I conceive the games
and playful experiences I have created as artistic laboratories where design, preparation,
exposition and reflection constructs, observes and questions knowledge.
This includes a project like neurotic, my rather unsuccessful attempt to capture certain char-
acteristics of a biological system (see Project: Neurotic (p. 100)). It is among the projects
I describe in this thesis, because its research character has revealed Anschlussfähigkeit
in the system-theoretic sense, opportunities to continue (see Research Context (p. 2) and
Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)).
KlingKlangKlong, on the other hand, is explicitly designed to be indifferent towards the
question of whether its players are humans or algorithms1 (see Project: KlingKlangKlong
(p. 110)). The distinction between human and machine is crossed deliberately and playfully.
The other projects adhere to the same principle: they interrogate distinctions by crossing
1The discussion in which sense a machine can or cannot play is covered extensively in chapter Human vs.
Machine (p. 97).
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their respective boundaries.
Spiel 1 explores the space created by the distinctions serious vs. playful and fictional vs.
real (see Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57)) while Non-Sense of Place (see Project: Non-Sense of
Place (p. 130)) explores different system vs. environment distinctions. Hostile Environment
Facility Training (see Project: Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40)) deals with the
theme of difference and distinction itself, distinction vs. identity. These experiments and
projects are constructions at the intersection of playful experiences, constructivism and
systems theory.
In the iterative process of theory-construction, design, implementation and critical eval-
uation, my projects began to inform my theoretical work while the theory informed my
projects. The shift from human players to anthroponeutral design in KlingKlangKlong is
representative for these processes of updating, refining and questioning in the design of
playful systems (see Discussion (p. 114) and Anthroponeutral Design (p. 157)). Publica-
tions, conferences, my secondment, and continuous practice (see Published Work (p. 9))
became artistic observatories using the lens of distinctions.
Contribution to Knowledge
In this thesis, I aim to contribute to the studies of games and play with regard to three
aspects:
The primary contribution is to present a comprehensive systems-theoretic description of
play. My approach builds upon constructivist and second-order cybernetic foundations, in
particular Spencer-Brown’s calculus of distinctions and Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis
(see Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15)). I will apply a specific system-theoretic approach to
a wide range of phenomena of play, derived from the theory of social systems by Niklas
(Luhmann 1996). Based on my reading of current literature, as of today this approach is
original and has not been considered before in this scope (compare Related Work (p. 13)).
Luhmann’s method of describing systems is based on distinctions, not identities, which
allows multiple entry points into the theory, e.g. system vs. environment, medium vs. form
or operation vs. observation (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 1997).
While my approach to describe play (see Play vs. Non-Play (p. 49)) largely draws from
Luhmann’s work, it does depart from it in significant ways. Whereas Luhmann excluded
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machines from participating in social systems, I believe that both technological and social
developments warrant a re-examination of this exclusion (see Human vs. Machine (p.
97)). More fundamentally, my treatment of play does not focus on social systems but on a
general distinction-based and systems-theoretic perspective.
My second contribution is the construction of a bridge between this theory and the practice
of game and play design. Its starting point is following the speculative question “Can ma-
chines play?”, which echoes Alan Turing’s question “Can machines think?” (Turing 1951).
Machines, including mechanical entities, robots and computer programs, presumably do
not have an intrinsic concept of play. Yet we accept artificial and virtual entities as play
objects and partners. This raises the question: in which sense can a machine play?
Furthermore, how does one design playful interactions not only with a machine but for
machines and humans alike – a speculative approach that I call anthroponeutral design
(see Anthroponeutral Design)? I critically examine previous attempts at modelling play
and propose a number of directions for designing playful systems, relocating established
system boundaries between machines, games and humans.
The third contribution is the demonstration of my practice. To this end, I present several
projects that play with systems-theoretic distinctions. These projects are the mobile
multiplayer experiences KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)) and
neurotic (see Project: Neurotic (p. 100)), the performance Spiel 1 (see Project: Spiel 1 (p.
57)), the Imperfect VR workshops (see Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74)), the exhibition Non-
Sense of Place (see Project: Non-Sense of Place (p. 130)) composed of three projects
Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (see Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for
Plymouth (p. 135)), CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (see Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge
(p. 130)) and Speed Gardening Guerrilla (see Project: Speed Gardening Guerrilla (p.
138)) and the interactive installation Hostile Environment Facility Training (see Project:
Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40)). Except for my two earlier games Spiel 1
and Speed Gardening Guerrilla, I designed and developed these projects during my PhD
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project beginning in April 2014.
Structure of the Thesis
The title of this thesis is “Designing Playful Systems” but it will be necessary to visit these
three concepts in reversed order: initially “System”, then “Play”, and finally “Design”. This
is because the latter concepts build on a theoretical understanding of the former. Therefore,
I begin with a discussion of distinctions and subsequently move towards systems, play,
virtuality, machines and finally to the distinction between theory and practice. Distinctions
themselves will be introduced as a distinction, namely the one between distinction and
identity. This approach diverges from the usual manner of demarcating the boundaries of
a topic via definitions found in the literature. Definitions will re-appear as observations on
a dynamic map, not as rulers of entrenched conceptual territories.
My practice, on the other hand, originates from the design and construction of systems that
exhibit playfulness. Creating games and playful experiences has a long cultural tradition
and a wealth of design methods is available in the literature. This established body of
knowledge presupposes a design that targets human players. I have critically questioned
established design concepts throughout my project and propose a set of directions for
designing playful systems in the final chapter.
These conceptual structures result in movements in both directions, where practical
experiments juxtapose the theoretical strands of the thesis. The nature of printed text
makes it necessary to linearise one’s thoughts whereas a hypertext would have been more
appropriate. I aim to remedy the exposure for the reader by alternating sections where I
observe my own practice with the theoretical parts within each chapter.
For each of my constructions, I provide a description of the project, its development
process and its history of exposition. Finally, I discuss and evaluate the contribution of
each project for this thesis. To aid the navigation, I frequently include cross-references
between sections that should be most useful in the electronic version of the thesis.
The individual chapters are organised as follows:
Chapter 1, Distinction vs. Identity, introduces the theoretical and practical basis for my
distinction-based approach. Section Project: Hostile Environment Facility Training (p.
40) illustrates the fundamental distinction while the rest of the chapter covers relevant
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background in systems theory, second-order cybernetics and radical constructivism as
well as in practice-based approaches. The chapter also aims to clarify differences to
related theories such as social constructionism.
Chapter 2, Play vs. Non-Play, contains a description of play from a systems-theoretic
perspective. I observe play through the lens of distinctions such as play vs. work and I
navigate through a series of them to make sense of the ambiguous and paradoxical nature
of play. Spiel 1 (see Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57)) plays with the concept of serious games
and with the distinction between play and purpose. Two further aspects of play that have
evolved during my project are treated in more detail in the following chapters.
Chapter 3, Virtual vs. Real, discusses aspects related to play that deal with the concept of
reality. This concerns distinctions between fiction, reality, potentiality and virtuality and also
involves the distinction between medium and form. The Imperfect VR workshop series
(see Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74)) discusses questions about virtual reality in a practical
manner.
Chapter 4, Human vs. Machine, lays the ground for the conceptual bridge between theory
and practice. It takes its origin from Alan Turing’s question “can machines think?” and
poses the speculative research question “can machines play?”. This chapter is the most
speculative in the sense that it locates playfulness outside the established realms of
play and games. I discuss two projects, neurotic (see Project: Neurotic (p. 100)) and
KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)) as examples for the design of
playful systems.
Chapter 5, System vs. Environment, shifts the focus of observation from the phenomenon
of a playful system to its environment. It also contains Non-Sense of Place, an exhibi-
tion of three of my projects addressing the distinction between system and environment:
CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge, Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth and Speed Garden-
ing Guerrilla (see Project: Non-Sense of Place (p. 130)).
Chapter 6, Theory vs. Practice, visits the notion of academic disciplines and highlights
developments in experimental game and play design and related artistic and scientific
areas. Here I summarise the concept of designing playful systems as research and provide
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directions for future research and practice.
Published Work
I have published ideas in various stages of development in the course of my doctoral
project, in the form of articles and presentations at conferences. These publications are
complemented by exhibitions of my practice that I developed or re-contextualised for my
PhD.
“On the distinction between distinction and division”, published in Technoetic Arts (Straeu-
big 2015c), introduces the distinction-based reasoning discussed in chapter Distinction
vs. Identity (p. 15). A specific application of this method to epistemological questions
concerning video games is the topic of my talk Do Playful Systems Know That They Play
presented in 2016 at the Philosophy of Computer Games conference in Malta (Straeubig
2016c).
Some thoughts about the distinction between games and art, addressed in section Games
vs. Art (p. 63) are reflected in my review of Brian Schrank’s Avant-Garde Videogames:
Playing with Technoculture, that appeared in Leonardo Reviews Online, September 2014
(Straeubig 2014a). An update of my thinking about the art system in the context of
developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning is contained in the short paper
Do Machines Produce Art? No. (A Systems-Theoretic Answer). I presented my views on
this topic at ISCMA 2019 in Hong Kong (Straeubig 2019).
Some of my research into the distinction between virtual and real, described in chapter
Virtual vs. Real (p. 73), is based on my talk How to Perceive the Virtual Image? On the
Distinction Between Virtual and Real, delivered at the Transimage conference in Plymouth
in July 2016 (Straeubig 2016d). An essay about In the Eyes of the Animal, the artwork by
Marshmallow Laserfeast that is discussed in the section Exploring the Virtual (p. 91) was
published in AMAZE Magazine, No. 4 (Straeubig 2016h), alongside with an interview I
conducted with the artists (Straeubig 2016i).
My arguments about post-human play that are developed below in chapter Human vs.
Machine (p. 97) build on my presentation Can Machines Play?, given at the Cognitive
Futures in the Humanities conference in Oxford in April 2015 (Straeubig 2015a). I delivered
an initial version of this talk at the Digital Art and Technology Visiting Speakers event in
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January 2015 in Plymouth (Straeubig 2015b).
The distinction between theory and practice, addressed in chapter Theory vs. Practice (p.
149), was the topic of the talk Towards Play Design for Machines I gave at ISEA 2016 in
Hong Kong (Straeubig 2016j). During a five-month secondment at Kin design, London,
I was able to develop this connection further by prototyping projects while continuing to
work on my thesis. To discuss and disseminate concepts and interim results, I delivered a
workshop on play in December 2015, followed by a workshop on VR in February 2016
and one on artificial intelligence and machine learning in March 2016, focussing on links
between these topics and design practice. The respective results have entered into the
chapters Play vs. Non-Play (p. 49), Virtual vs. Real (p. 73) and Human vs. Machine (p.
97) and have informed my thinking expressed in chapter Theory vs. Practice (p. 149).
Some of the introductory remarks about play as an interdisciplinary topic (see Research
Context (p. 2)) that are echoed in section Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151), are based on a
joint interdisciplinary presentation (How) Does Play Matter? A Transdisciplinary Approach
to Play and its Relation to Neurobiology, Creativity and Deception. My colleagues Chun-
Wei Hsu, Pinar Öztop, Mihaela Taranu and I delivered this paper at Off the Lip Conference
— Transdisciplinary Approaches to Cognitive Innovation in Plymouth (Straeubig, Hsu, et al.
2016).
My constructivist approach towards social systems that include human and non-human
participants, a central theme of chapter Human vs. Machine (p. 97), is reflected in the
presentation Let the Machines out. Towards Hybrid Social Systems, delivered at the
AISB 2017 Convention in Bath (Straeubig 2017a). Further speculations on the role of
games and AI, based on current developments described in section Game AI vs. Playing
Machines (p. 106), are submitted for publication (Straeubig 2020a, (to appear)). The
same goes for some thoughts on the communication between humans and machines
suggested in section New Social Systems (p. 161) (Straeubig 2020b, (to appear)).
Besides discussing topics and concerns that were emerging in my research, I presented
overviews of my progressing PhD project to academic game studies audiences at the
Researching Games Barcamp in Berlin (Straeubig 2016f), at the Doctoral Consortium at
FDG/DIGRA in Dundee (Straeubig 2016g), at the Doctoral Consortium at the Philosophy
of Computer Games conference in Malta (Straeubig 2016a) and at Off The Lip 2017 in Ply-
mouth, published as Playing with/as Systems: Short Paper, Discussion and Demonstration
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in AVANT (Straeubig 2017b). A poster of my project was exhibited alongside the Neural
Basis for Creativity Workshop in Plymouth in April 2016 (Straeubig 2016b). Furthermore, I
took part in the panel discussion “Game design for Urban spaces” during the event playin’
siegen in Siegen (Rauscher et al. 2016).
On each of these occasions, the feedback I received and the discussions that came up
about the topics emerging during my project have been of the greatest benefit. I also
attended several workshops offered during my doctoral program:
• Research Methods Workshop (April 28 - May 2, 2014): Research skills, multi-
disciplinary research perspectives, publishing and collaboration.
• Experimental Methods Workshop (June 23 - 27, 2014): Tutorials on various experi-
mental methods, ethics in experimental research, experimental design, data analysis
and presentation of research results.
• Computational Modeling Workshop (September 22 - 26, 2014): Lectures and prac-
tical tutorials on programming, neuro-comptational modelling, neuro-morphic and
bio-inspired hardware and robotics.
• Public Outreach and Social Innovation Workshop (January 26 - 30, 2015): Research
impact, public engagement and multimedia production, communicating research to
the press and to the general public.
• Project Proposal and Entrepreneurship Workshop (April 27 - May 1, 2015): Potentials
for exploitation of research ideas, intellectual property, opportunities for funding,
patenting and licensing.
• Scientific Mythologies (January 25 - 29, 2016): Creation of stories and mythologies
within the personal and collective imagination, collaborative artistic practice, short
film production.
• The Neural Basis for Creativity (April 25 - 29, 2016): Lectures on neuroscience,
neural stem cells, creativity and cognitive innovation, tutorials on EEG methods.
These opportunities have contributed enormously to my theoretical and practical progress.
Exposing my practice to the public on various occasions in the last 5 years has guided
the direction of my theoretical and practical approach and enabled me to evaluate and to
advance my work.
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Figure 1: Timeline of practical works
This overview illustrates the timeline of projects that make up the practical contributions of
this thesis. KlingKlangKlong (Straeubig 2014c), neurotic (Straeubig 2014d), the Imperfect
VR workshops (Straeubig 2016e), Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (Straeubig
2015d), CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (Straeubig 2014b) and Hostile Environment Facility
Training (Straeubig 2018a) were created during my PhD project beginning in April 2014.
In addition, I re-contextualised, developed and exhibited two older projects of mine: Speed
Gardening Guerrilla (Straeubig 2012) and Spiel 1 (Straeubig 2013c).
I presented various versions of KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)),
the first expression of a playful system at Playpublik Festival Krakow in September 2014,
at Plymouth Book Festival in October 2014, at playin’ siegen in Siegen in April 2015, at
MediaCity Plymouth in May 2015 and at Off The Lip in Plymouth in October 2016. In
collaboration with Sebastian Quack, I co-wrote the article “Playful Locative Ensembles in
the Urban Soundscape” featuring KlingKlangKlong in the context of sound art and urban
sound ensembles, published as (Straeubig and Quack 2016).
Spiel 1 (see Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57)), initially developed for a fringe theatre event in 2012,
was also showcased during playin’ siegen. Neurotic (see Project: Neurotic (p. 100)), which
spawned from KlingKlangKlong in an attempt to model a biological system, was shown at
Prototype Dublin in October 2014 and at the Plymouth-based Mediacity 5 conference in
May 2015.
The CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (see Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (p. 130)) was
shown at the Fascinate conference in Falmouth in August 2014 and Pedestrian Fitness
Initiative for Plymouth (see Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (p. 135))
during Mediacity 5. Speed Gardening Guerrilla (see Project: Speed Gardening Guerrilla
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(p. 138)), an ongoing urban game project that I developed in 2012, was played under
the title Plantación Revolucionaria at the Playful Arts festival in ’s-Hertogenbosch in June
2016. I presented these three projects in a joint exhibition titled Non-Sense of Place (see
Project: Non-Sense of Place (p. 130)) at the Balance-Unbalance conference in August
2017 in Plymouth.
The Imperfect VR workshop series started at Electromagnetic Field in August 2016 in
Guilford. Since then I have delivered a number of workshops at diverse locations like
Plymouth University, Royal College of Art, Space Art and Technology and Doomed Gallery
in London, at Vivid Project in Birmingham, at Maritime University and Donghua University
in Shanghai, and at the Social Fiction Lab in Berlin (see Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74)).
Contributors to my practical works are credited in the digital material in the Appendix that
is provided with this thesis.
Related Work
Due to the transdisciplinary nature of this thesis, it includes a substantial amount of
sources both on the subject of play and on systems theory. During my review of the
relevant literature, however, I have found only few existing sources at the intersection of
these topics.
From a related, yet different theoretical foundation are Montola (2012b) and Stenros (2015).
Their highly valuable contributions to the game studies rest on social constructionist
theories, initiated by Berger and Luckmann (1990) and further developed by Searle (1995).
In contrast, my theoretical background is based on distinctions (Spencer-Brown 2008),
second-order cybernetics (Glanville 2002), radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld 1992),
and in particular on Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory (Luhmann 1996). I will develop this
particular background, along with my practice-based approach, in chapter Distinction vs.
Identity (p. 15), where I also describe the differences from social constructionist theories.2
A more closely related approach has been undertaken by Andersen (2009). Andersen
investigates Spencer-Brown’s theory to illustrate the distinction between play and work, in
particular in the context of management games. I will address Andersen’s work in section
2In line with Stenros‘ terminology, I refer to Berger and Luckmann’s theories as “social constructionist”, to
delineate them from “radical constructivism” (von Glasersfeld 1992).
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Andersen and Stott: Play at Play (p. 37).
Stott (2015) applies Luhmann’s theories, in particular by observing art as a social system,
to play in contemporary, participatory art practice. This work, summarised in section
Andersen and Stott: Play at Play (p. 37) is also relevant to this thesis and will re-enter the
discussion in section Games vs. Art (p. 63). In (Simon 2009), a collection of systems-
theoretic thinking is specifically applied to football.
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Chapter 1
Distinction vs. Identity
Draw a distinction!
George Spencer-Brown (2008)
1.1 What Is Play?
Two children are tossing a ball back and forth on a public playground. A group of players
coordinates an elaborate raid in the Massive Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Game World of
Warcraft. An intense match between world class Go Champion Lee Sedol and DeepMind’s
AlphaGo is coming to a close. Two dogs are simulating a fight while carefully avoiding
hurting each other. A group of students constructs a spaceship from a set of wooden
blocks. A player meticulously places a matching card onto a deck in the game Solitaire.
We can characterise all these situations as play.
Play is ubiquitous — it is hardly imaginable to find any human being that has never
experienced play. But when we try to analyse the phenomenon, we face grave difficulties.
This is especially observable in academic discourse (see Research Context (p. 2)). Play
appears notoriously difficult to analyse and more so to agree upon. Some see it as the
epitome of human expression (Schiller 1795), others research the dangers of engaging in it
in a pathological way (Hilgard, Engelhardt, and Bartholow 2013). Play can be described in
terms of monetary profit (Schwartz 2007) and as the opposite of a commercial endeavour
(DeKoven 2014). It is fundamentally cultural (Huizinga 1955), yet observed in lower
animals such as fish or birds (Burghardt 2015). It is a highly social activity (DeKoven 2013)
and still it can be perfectly experienced alone (Piaget 1962).
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In the light of this multiplicity of scientific theories, how can we even account for the diverse
contributions from the humanities like Schiller’s Spieltrieb (Schiller 1795), Huizinga’s magic
circle (Huizinga 1955) or Caillois’ classification of games (Caillois 1961)? We might ask, is
it even possible to arrive at a comprehensive description of such a complex phenomenon?
I will argue that this endeavor is feasible, based on the prior example of Luhmann’s theory
of social systems (Luhmann 2012; Luhmann 2013).
Besides these observations about human and animal play described in the literature, more
recently a new set of questions has appeared. They concern novel modes of playful
involvement for non-biological entities, algorithms and robots, a topic that will be discussed
in chapter Human vs. Machine (p. 97).
In my view these findings make it impossible to just give a “working definition” of play
and move on, as it was done before, e.g. (Bateson and Martin 2013; Burghardt 2005b;
Caillois 1961; Eberle 2014; Huizinga 1955; Sutton-Smith 1999). Instead, I argue, the
situation requires an a priori critical reflection of one’s own epistemological stance and
methodology, the attitude towards what constitutes knowledge and how phenomena are
to be investigated, described and explained. I contend that we need a methodology that
eschews definitions in favour of distinctions and that combines practice and theory in a
novel way.
In the course of this chapter, I aim to make this claim explicit by presenting its general
background and by putting forward concrete theoretical groundings. Before that, I want to
shed more light on the problem of how we can describe play.
An inescapable premise for any discourse about any phenomenon is that we have to use
some medium of communication. Within an academic context, this medium is predomi-
nantly language.1 Therefore, it makes sense to look at the linguistic usage of the word
“play” in time and across cultures. Huizinga undertakes such an analysis in the second
chapter of his classic study Homo Ludens (Huizinga 1955, p. 28-45). Firstly, he notes
that languages are widely different in how they denote play and how many terms are
available. Some common traits between language families can be identified, for example
in Sanskrit, Romanic, Germanic and the Anglo-Saxon languages, early terms for play
are rooted in expressions of rapid movement and dance. One may speculate that this
was how play was mainly perceived, in children’s play as well as in rituals, festivities
1I say “predominantly” because there are other media such as artworks, which will be discussed later.
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and sports-like competition. In Dutch, German, English and Japanese, the word “play”
can denote mobility within a restricted space, as in the expression “this hinge has some
play”. This has motivated Salen and Zimmerman to metaphorically define play as “free
movement within a more rigid structure” (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, p. 304). They
further categorise play into three subcategories: play the context of a game, general ludic
activities and anything undertaken in a playful state of mind.
The Latin word “ludus”, used by Huizinga to characterise human culture in general, has a
wide variety of meanings within the semantic field of play and games, like non-seriousness,
chance, semblance, contest and practice. The Latin terminology is in use until today, and
the adjective “ludic” is used to denote attributes pertaining to games and play.2 (Frasca
1999) has coined the term “ludology” to designate the “discipline that studies game and
play activities” independent of a specific medium. However, Frasca also states his intention
“to explore video games and cybertexts as games”.3 Subsequently, the usage of “ludology”
has focussed on the scholarship on video games (Frasca 2003).
The Greek language, unlike Latin, knows a few different expressions that stand for play:
the rarely used dÔrw, the suffix -inda which stands for children’s play, and the opposites
paidia (paidi), derived from childishness and amusement and agon (g¸n), which denotes
competitive and antagonistic activities.
What can we conclude from these linguistic observations besides noticing etymological
differences? In English for example there are different words for game and play, in contrast
to languages like Spanish (juego/jugar), French (jeu/jouer) or German (Spiel/spielen).
Although one wouldn’t assume that a French-speaking scholar of ludology would be less
able to distinguish between connotations of the activity and the structure (or process)
than her English colleague, a common language to describe these different phenomena
precisely appears to be desirable. The idea that the concepts of a language do determine
expressiveness has motivated Roger Caillois to introduce a comprehensive classification
of play. Caillois uses a mix of Greek and Latin terms, freely borrowing from their traditional
meanings while sorting them into the following four “fundamental categories” (Caillois
1961, p. 12):
2In German language, the word “Lude” means “pimp”, bearing similar connotations as “playboy”.
3The term “cybertext” refers to Aarseth (1997). Aarseth, in turn, refers to Wiener (2007) in his concept of
nonlinear cybertext, ergodic literature, in which the reader has to exert a certain effort in order to decipher a
mechanically arranged text. Hypertext, interactive fiction, the I Ching and adventure games are examples for
ergodic literature in that sense.
17
• Agôn: competition between adversaries including combat
• Alea: giving up agency in favour of independent decision, games of chance
• Mimicry: play as make-believe like role-playing
• Ilinx: play which creates bodily sensations such as vertigo through rapid movement
Caillois adds a second dimension to this schema. “Paida” is the equivalent of free play, the
unregulated, improvised activity, while “ludus” denotes play that overcomes challenges are
within the rule-bound structure of a game. By providing a taxonomy, Caillois apparently
provides a tool to precisely categorise play. If we support a logical positivist position, this
would be a desirable result, as in this view the boundaries of language are the limits of our
understanding (Wittgenstein 2007).
If we follow Huizinga however, observing play not only as a phenomenon expressed in
language but rather something at the core of language itself, as evident in philosophical
dialogs, in poetry, conundrums, jokes, metaphors and language games, then we begin to
sense a more playful quality of play. With play, we are likely to encounter what Douglas
Hofstadter (1999) calls “strange loops”. Strange loops occur when we find ourselves
moving up or down linear, hierarchical structures (logical systems, taxonomies, theories,
explanations) and then unexpectedly arrive at our starting point. They can be observed in
phenomena that are recursive, paradoxical and self-referential.
They are inherent in strict logical structures like the Barber’s paradox, an imaginary
situation where inference leads to unresolvable contradiction or Gödel’s self-referencing
theorem that states the irreconcilability of expressiveness and consistency in formal
systems (Gödel 1931). They appear in artworks such as Escher’s Drawing Hands4
(Escher 1948) and the apparently endless rising canon in Bach’s Musical Offering (Bach
1747). They also can be observed in biological systems, for example DNA encoding
for proteins that construct DNA. Hofstadter discusses how strange loops have resisted
attempts to eliminate them from science (Hofstadter 1999, p. 684-718) and I claim that we
can find them at the core of playfulness.
The playful quality of Gödel, Escher, Bach is also present in Suits’ philosophical treatment
of play, by inviting Aesop’s Grasshopper along with a parade of colourful characters to
4A concrete embodiment of a strange loop is the Moebius strip, which can be created by taking a strip of
paper, twisting it by 180 degrees and joining its ends. Travelling a straight line along the strip becomes an
endless journey that periodically revisits the starting point.
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discuss, quarrel about and illuminate the concepts of games and play (Suits 1978).
Our first encounter with play has already raised doubts about the feasibility of a reliable
definition, one that practitioners across different languages and cultures would accept.
Wittgenstein, after giving up on the idea of establishing a correspondence between
language and reality, takes a step further by pointing out a principal limitation of any
language in defining a particular semantic content (Wittgenstein 1958).
So what is the meaning of “play”? Wittgenstein maintains that for the term “game” the
various meaningful references of a word resemble each other in the way families do: one
can identify common traits among the members but there is no way to locate precise
definitory boundaries. The question for “the” meaning becomes less meaningful, and we
are again caught in a strange loop.
Concerning the matter of definitions, Suits rebuts Wittgenstein’s pessimistic assessment
and strives to produce a definition of a game, albeit in a dialectic and playful way. According
to Suits, playing a game “is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory
goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use
of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules
are accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]” (Suits 1978,
p. 41). Thus, a game puts artificial obstacles between a goal and a player who is willing to
accept that she has to use sub-optimal means to reach the goal. Suits then continues to
defend this definition against various counterarguments.
Suits’ entertaining parable is certainly not the first attempt in securing a definitory boundary
for games. Science and humanities have been wrestling with definitions and explanations
of play for quite some time. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many
biological and social scientists put forward theories about play (Ellis 1973; Levy 1978):
Explanations about why humans and animals play range from a surplus of energy (Spencer
1855), instinct (James 1890), task compensation (Escalona 1943), relaxation (Patrick
1916), catharsis (Menninger 1960), assimilation (Piaget 1962), self-expression (Mitchell
and Bowen 1923) and social necessity (Huizinga 1955) to psychoanalytic accounts (Erik-
son 1993), the pursuit of optimal levels of stimuli and arousal (Berlyne 1960) and exercising
competence /effectance (White 1959).
Two more recent hypotheses from the field of learning theories, namely the training of
motor skills and preparation for unexpected situations, have garnered some experimental
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substantiation (Pellis, Pellis, and Bell 2010), but the subjects of their research were rats,
not humans.
Some cited theories clearly contradict each other: for example, the assumption that
play serves to compensate for otherwise un-playful tasks (Escalona 1943) and play as
understood by Pellis, Pellis, and Bell (2010) as a form of training for those tasks. One way
to resolve these contractions, as will be discussed in the next sections, is to add more
information, such as historical context, discipline or interest to the description. According
to Huizinga, theories and explanations that do not contradict some others, cannot claim
completeness, as “If any of them were really decisive it ought either to exclude all the
others or comprehend them in a higher unity” (Huizinga 1955, p. 2).
Huizinga, who stresses the central role of play for the development of culture, asserts
that a multitude of cultural phenomena like the mythos, poetics, sophistic philosophical
rhetoric, contests and matches, the absurd and the fantastic, even some forms of war
belong to the sphere of play. He defines play as “[. . . ] a voluntary activity or occupation
executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted
but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy
and the consciousness that it is “different” from ordinary life” (Huizinga 1955, p. 28).
Huizinga’s work has been characterised as a significant point of departure for the game
studies (Raessens 2012). On the other hand he is criticised for a colonial attitude towards
non-European peoples and for a linearising historical stance (Anchor 1978). Critics also
find fault with the broad application of the play concept to cultural phenomena ranging
from jurisdiction to pre-modern warfare. This criticism does not stop at Huizinga alone but
culminates in a scathing attack against the humanities in general (Tanghe 2016).
Also, the notion of the “magic circle”, an ontologically separate space in which play takes
place, albeit peripheral for Huizinga, has been the subject of fierce debates (compare
Is Play Real? (p. 73)). Caillois explicitly takes issue with Huizinga, and his attempt
at categorising and defining play can be read as an excoriating response. According
to Caillois’ definition, play is free as opposed to obligatory, separate in space and time
from non-play (which is Huizinga’s concept of the magic circle), uncertain, unproductive
in creating neither goods nor wealth (see Play vs. Work), governed by rules that are
alternatives to ordinary laws and make-believe (see Virtual vs. Real) (Caillois 1961).
Besides Caillois vs. Huizinga, another example of academic disagreement clearly illus-
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trates the problem with definitions. This is the dispute between Brian Sutton-Smith, the
eminent game theorist, and Burghardt, the likewise esteemed ethologist and specialist
in animal play. Sutton-Smith, who engaged in a lifelong study of psychology and cultural
history of play and games, concludes that despite all definitory efforts, play remains
inherently ambiguous. His answer to this challenge is to cast play in terms of cultural
rhetorics. A rhetoric, in Sutton-Smith’s account, is a description that intends to persuade
and that is shaped by the interest of a particular group or discipline. He identifies seven
of them, classified into ancient (fate, power, identity, frivolity) and modern (progress, self,
imaginary) Western rhetorics (Sutton-Smith 1997).
The first rhetoric is progress, which is the way play is rationalised and explained by science
(compare Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). Another one is fate, an ancient rhetoric that
locates play in the realms of gods, chance, and destiny. Play as power reflects historical
accounts of agonal elements visible in contests and sports. Celebrations, festivals and
rituals affirm cultural identities and build communities, another ancient rhetoric of play.
The rhetoric of play as imaginary is connected to storytelling, drama and literature and
questions the reality of society (compare Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)), whereas play from
the perspective of self is about the subjective experience of it (compare section Paradoxa
of Play (p. 69)). Finally, play as frivolity represents a counterbalance to seriousness (see
Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)), even an “[. . . ] opponent to the seriousness of all the other
rhetorics” (Sutton-Smith 1997, p. 201).
For Burghardt, the scientific practitioner explicitly interested in a working definition of play,
Sutton-Smith’s approach “does not solve any real issues about play” (Burghardt 2005a,
p. 9). In Burghardt’s somewhat forlorn response, one can almost feel a wall of despair
standing between the sciences and the humanities (see A Third Culture? (p. 149)).
Burghardt also offers his own definition of play as follows: “Play behavior is recognized by
five criteria. Playful activities can be characterised as being (1) incompletely functional in
the context expressed; (2) voluntary, pleasurable, or self-rewarding; (3) different structurally
or temporally from related serious behavior systems; (4) expressed repeatedly during at
least some part of an animal’s life span; and (5) initiated in relatively benign situations”
(Burghardt 2005b, p. 382). In addition, Burghardt postulates four necessary conditions for
play in animals: sufficient available energy resources, an absence of danger and stress,
the presence of adequate stimulation and the facility for complex behaviour. Play in his
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view then becomes a phenomenon that develops amidst a surplus of resources.
Sutton-Smith later commits to a definition of play in an essay he describes as “A footnote
to The Ambiguity of Play”: “Play, as a unique form of adaptive variability, instigates an
imagined but equilibrial reality within which disequilibrial exigencies can be paradoxically
simulated and give rise to the pleasurable effects of excitement and optimism. The genres
of such play are humor, skill, pretense, fantasy, risk, contest, and celebrations, all of
which are selective simulations of paradoxical variability” (Sutton-Smith 1999, p. 253).
This explanation appears to me almost playful in its obscureness, which fits with the
general speculative and ironic tone of Sutton-Smith’s essay. But it is questionable that this
particular definition would solve Burghardt’s concerns either.
Eberle (2014) calls it “circular, incomplete, and difficult to unpack”, and he notes that the
concept of variability hints towards play as an emergent process rather than a thing. Eberle
then defines play himself from two angles. One is through an analysis of six elements
which he identifies as anticipation, surprise, pleasure, understanding, strength, and poise.
The other is from a demarcation of its opposite, namely from the question what play is not.
These opposites are listed as obsession, shock/terror, excess, indifference, heedlessness
and abstraction. This dialectical movement finally arrives at Eberle’s definition: “Play is an
ancient, voluntary, ‘emergent’ process driven by pleasure that yet strengthens our muscles,
instructs our social skills, tempers and deepens our positive emotions, and enables a state
of balance that leaves us poised to play some more” (Eberle 2014, p. 231).
This first glance at previous research about play has already resulted in a multitude
of partial and irreducibly conflicting theories and definitions. Even in the face of an
apparent abundance of voices, I would describe the situation as a deficiency of theory.5
It is impossible to apply a comprehensive description of play which suggests that it is
necessary to clarify epistemological issues first.
Here and in the following sections, I am arguing why “definitionist” attempts must fail to
provide a comprehensive description of play. I claim that this is not because any of the
particular definitions that are brought forward turn out to be flawed, but rather because in
principle no phenomenon that spans individual, social and cultural realms, as opposite to
pure theoretical entities within formal systems, can be defined.6 The problem is rooted in
5This assessment can hold because theories, as constructs of knowledge, are not additive (Kuhn 1962).
6We are used to accept, even to require definitions as preconditions of proper academic analysis. “How do
you define play?” is the first question I often get asked, and my answer begins with “I don’t define play, but I
observe it through distinctions.” This qualification, detailed in the current chapter, turns out to be crucial, as a
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the very idea of a definitory approach itself.
In the next section I will focus at the question of how we can possibly arrive at an answer
to a question such as “what is play” and return to the topic of play proper in the following
chapter Play vs. Non-Play (p. 49). First, I will translate the observations described above
into conditions for a comprehensive description. Then I will look for suitable theories and
approaches to practice that are capable to provide such a description.
1.2 Definitions vs. Distinctions: What Is “Is”?
Let me take a step back and pretend for a moment that the present discussion is not about
play, but about a phenomenon “X” (to avoid all conceptual associations). In the previous
sections I would have outlined how there may be multiple explanations and definitions for
X arising from various disciplines, some conflicting each other, while others appear to be
commensurable. Scientists and some cultural scholars aim to define X, while others, like
Sutton-Smith, are rather sceptical towards this approach.
What constitutes the problem about various attempts at definitions for X regardless of the
details of definitions themselves? It is that a definition marks a referential identity between
the concept to be defined (definiendum) and the defining statement (definiens), expressed
in the structure “X is (defined as) Y”. As Audi notes, definitions are analytic tools to secure
both necessary and sufficient conditions (Audi 2002).
In formal proof theory (Negri and von Plato 2008), where the goal is to deduce a theorem
from a set of axioms, definitions provide shortcuts. They allow to replace each occurrence
of Y by X, thereby reducing the effort to explicitly enumerate Y each time. This principle of
substitution is at the core of a definition. It therefore has to draw a sharp line around what
is to be defined: the definition must separate X from non-X. But it also identifies X with Y.
It also follows that if two definitions contradict each other (X is Y1 and X is Y2 and Y1 is
incompatible with Y2), then we have to reject one of them in order to substitute the other
one.
These aspects of a definition are inseparable. We cannot get rid of any one of them
without the definition losing its essence. Definitions are defined this way, a strange loop in
Western logic and the formal sciences that have adopted definitions and categorisations
mere refusal to specify one’s terms in my opinion would be not an acceptable methodology.
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(Lakoff 2012) as their dogmata, largely unchallenged by the knowledge-producing systems
(Luhmann 2009, p. 271-361).
In section What Is Play? (p. 15) I have described how Wittgenstein’s critique — via the
concept of family resemblance — attempts to loosen the definitory boundary by replacing
it with a set of weaker relations. This approach, however, stays firmly within identity-based
approaches. Despite all (post-)modern critique, game studies scholars keep insisting
on definitions (see for example Bergonse (2017) and Arjoranta (2019)). This ignores
fundamental challenges, such as the deadlock of definitions in the wake of paradoxical
findings. If play is an activity whose purpose is to practice motor skills, then play is rather
not a vehicle to escape from reality. Except it would be both at the same time, in which
case, from the perspective of evolution, we could ask what went wrong in terms of adaption
towards a more efficient mechanism.
David Myers (2017) demonstrates a particular method for observing video games. His
approach is to select a number of distinctions, cross to the respective other sides, and
observe games from there. Myers generally acknowledges paradoxical phenomena of
games. However, the essentialist opinionated ductus accompanying his particular selection
of observation tools, comprising narratives, gameplay, toys and simulations, among others,
reduces the usefulness of this account. Claiming to deliver the “definitive guide to what
video games are” carries an ontological entitlement that is, to say the least, questionable.
To get out of the “identity trap” and make progress in investigating play, I claim, we need to
operate differently. Before I drop definitions and categorisations of play as epistemological
tools and replace them with a more fundamental mechanism, I will summarise my findings
so far in form of seven requirements for a comprehensive description of play.
1.3 Requirements for a New Paradigm
Having raised some issues associated with attempts at explanations and definitions of
play, I now want to begin to ask how we might arrive at a comprehensive description of
play. In particular, I propose seven conditions that any comprehensive description of play
should fulfil7. This will allow a search for suitable candidate theories and help to delineate
7This section contains is a revised version of (Straeubig 2017b). The linear nature of language and the
sequence of argumentation makes it necessary to present these conditions in a completed state at this point.
However, they result from multiple iterations between reviews of literature, theoretical construction and my
practice
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inadequate ones.
The first condition is an adequate level of abstraction: The description has to be abstract
and general enough to cover the wide range of phenomena that are observable as play:
free play between children, the ritual of a sports match, non-human (e.g. animal) play,
the drama unfolding during a game of chess, meta-rules emerging from a multi-player
online battle, unpleasant, forced, and dark play (see Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67)), or
the experiential quality of a playful encounter between adults. These and many other
phenomena have to be considered in a description of play. As this requires a high grade
of abstraction, I contend that it must have a simple, universal foundation.
The second condition is a sufficient level of theoretical complexity: the description must
be expressive enough to account for the complexity of the phenomenon observed. This
complexity comes as an abundance of relations between elements, which requires making
conscious decisions about which perspective to inhabit. In Luhmann’s words, “Complexity,
in this sense, means being forced to select; being forced to select means contingency;
and contingency means risk” (Luhmann 1996, p. 26). We trade in the risk to perturb (see
Maturana and Varela: Perception Is Distinction (p. 32)) existing academic conversations
against the prevalence of historically generalising explanations of the kind “play is getting
rid of surplus energy” (Spencer 1855) or current postmodern accounts like “play is capital-
ism” (Nash and Penney 2015). To analyse the latter through a critique of video games as
“the aesthetic form of rationalization” (Pedercini 2014) we need to observe the distinction
between play and games (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)). We can therefore reject Pedercini’s
account with the help of Suits’ observation that despite superficial similarities manifest in
themes or mechanics of games, games are exactly the opposite of rationalisation. They
represent the aesthetic form of unnecessary effort8 (see What Is Play? (p. 15)). Increasing
the number of distinctions in one’s observation, in accordance with von Foerster’s ethical
imperative (see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)) allows to observe
complexity with higher precision. 9 This does not mean that all distinctions are equally
useful. If Hans (1981) claims that everything is a form of play, he then has to explain a
phenomenon like work as a special kind of play, and start drawing distinctions between
these special kinds instead of observing the phenomena themselves (compare Play vs.
8Pedericini notices this contradiction but keeps insisting that “the act of playing, especially a computer–
assisted, cybernetically–biased variety, can cultivate the capitalist mindset and value system” (Pedercini 2014)
(see also Play vs. Learning (p. 56)).
9Note that this and the previous condition act in an antagonistic manner. A high level of abstraction pulls in
the direction of simplicity. High complexity pulls in the opposite direction.
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Non-Play (p. 49) and Counterpoint: Machines Play (p. 118)). Monocausal explanations,
be it play, capitalism or evolution, inevitably run into intellectual acrobatics.
The third condition for a comprehensive description of play is that it must account for
paradoxical and contradictory findings and it must endure the presence of strange loops.
Is play the biological function to practice useful behaviour (Pellis, Pellis, and Bell 2010), or
is it the ambiguous phenomenon that is best described in the form of cultural rhetorics
(Sutton-Smith 1997)? Are we biological systems observing play as biological behaviour?
Or is playfulness in the mind, along with reasoning about playfulness? To make sense
of contradictions, one can add context to the description. In particular, one may choose
to not only describe the conflicting observations but also the observers that are involved.
If animals play and if ethologists postulate play as a biological function, we can observe
and explain this fact because ethology is based on functional explanations (see Play vs.
Purpose (p. 54)).
Condition number four postulates that it must be possible to express observations about
play from a first-person perspective (McGinn 1996): Any description that excludes sub-
jective experience and relies solely on observation from the “outside” (third person per-
spective) remains incomplete. This entails that scientific accounts that purely insist on
objectivity, empirical data, measurement and replication may be a necessary but certainly
not a sufficient component of a comprehensive description of play. When we cannot grasp
the multiple facets of play based on scientific methods alone, non-objective approaches
such as introspection (Wiener 1990) and stochasticity (Stanley and Lehman 2015) are to
be taken seriously as well.
From the previous four requirements immediately follows a fifth one: any comprehensive
description of is necessarily transdisciplinary: To fulfil conditions for expressiveness,
abstractness and handling contradictions, we must be able to look beyond any singular
discipline that is tied into its specific methodologies and research goals. This entails that
there cannot be an all-encompassing, mono-thematic explanation rooted within a specific
discipline, ideology or theory like biology, child development or Marxism.
In his attempt at a definition of play, Sutton-Smith states that he hopes to achieve con-
silience, convergence of sciences and humanities, by “creating a homogeneity of defi-
nitional layerings” (Sutton-Smith 1999, p. 239). As hinted at above, I do not share the
teleology of unification, but intend to observe various phenomena of play from different
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angles to find out more about them and contribute to a deeper understanding. A trans-
disciplinary approach appears to be useful in this respect because it does not strive to
level, reduce or deny observations from different fields. Transdisciplinarity instead requires
one to acknowledge disciplinary foundations and methodologies while developing a critical
stance towards them (Blassnigg and Punt 2013). I will pick up the context of disciplines
again at a point when I will be able to summarise my findings (Play and Discipline(s) (p.
151)).
I also posit the necessity for a sixth condition: the description has to bridge theory and
practice. In analogy to Magritte’s famous point about referentiality (Magritte 1929), this
postulate stresses that communication (including writing) about play cannot exhaust what
it is to be playing. This entails the first person perspective which I have called for in the
fourth condition: by playing, designing, playtesting and tinkering, the phenomenology of
play unfolds in the individual mind prior to any written or verbal communication. Thus what
I denote as “description” must include aspects of both theory and practice. Considering
the previous condition, it is imperative to observe a multitude of practical approaches,
without prerogative for any particular, say scientific, methodology. This includes experi-
mental methods, empirical science, prototyping, play and game design practice, critique,
computational models, speculative design, and experiential aspects (see Paradoxa of Play
(p. 69) and Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)).
The label I have given to my methodology is research informed practice or equally practice
informed research (see Meta-thetical Dialog (p. 165)). The reason for this will emerge
through the discussions of the practical projects including in this thesis (see Project:
Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40), Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57), Project: Imperfect VR
(p. 74), Project: Neurotic (p. 100), Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110), Project: CO2rnwall
CO2 Challenge (p. 130), Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (p. 135) and
Project: Speed Gardening Guerrilla (p. 138)) and it will be contextualised in section Play
and Discipline(s) (p. 151).
My research informed practice includes descriptions that are demonstrations, interac-
tions and playful experiences which I have designed, played and exposed (Schwab and
Borgdorff 2014), creating a small, multimodal, intertextual (Kristeva 1980) cohort of mate-
rial to make use of in this thesis. Language as a medium of communication is necessarily
restricted to a secondary observation of something that is inherently experiential — the
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phenomenological encounter of the player in her first-person perspective itself. Thus, an
indispensable mode of learning about play is playing. This introduces the next paradox,
when we consider play unique with respect to the absence of an external purpose from a
first-person perspective (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)).
Finally, a seventh condition transcends the boundaries of any singular act of communi-
cation. Anschlussfähigkeit (connective capability) is a term borrowed from Luhmann’s
theory that denotes an intrinsic characteristic of social systems (Luhmann 1996). Such
a system, which operates with communication, ceases to exist immediately if there are
no follow-up events responding to previous events. A conversation dies from a lack of
responses, an institution gets shut down, a theory is forgotten. To enhance the probability
that communication can continue, a comprehensive description of play must therefore
ensure its connective capability (for example, by continuously publishing articles). However,
the necessity of further communication does not imply favourable assessment: critique,
even a blunt rebuff, is an appropriate continuation for descriptive discourses, if it does not
lead to the silencing of the criticised.
In this section I have shifted the observation from play itself to conditions that I deem nec-
essary for a comprehensive description of play, derived from observations about previous
identity-based approaches. Now I am prepared to assemble in the following sections the
practical and theoretical background capable of delivering on these requirements.
1.4 Spencer Brown: Draw a Distinction
“The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed
or taken apart”, writes George Spencer-Brown (2008) in Laws of Form , an ontological
statement with biblical connotations. In the story of creation, we learn that God created
the universe within 6 days merely by drawing distinctions.10 Distinctions are fundamental
not only for a deity but also, as Spencer-Brown contends, in the rather human “desire to
distinguish” (Spencer-Brown 2008, p. 69). In the course of the book, the reader is guided
through a series of instructions, beginning with the first imperative: “draw a distinction”.
The outcome of this process is the construction of a calculus of forms with applications in
logic and mathematics.
10In Christian narrative, the initial distinction can be found in the Old Testament in the first chapter of the
Genesis: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth” (Collins Staff 2011).
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By drawing a distinction and indicating one of its sides, two states are created, one of which
is marked while the other remains unmarked. From that basic operation, Spencer Brown
constructs a calculus that can be used to express mathematical and logical statements.
It has been discussed if Spencer-Browns calculus is nothing more than an isomorphic
recast of Boolean algebra (Cull and Frank 1979). However, I do not follow a mathematical
path into Spencer-Brown’s calculated play with arithmetic and algebra (see for example
(Banaschewski 1977)). Instead, I will focus on the form itself, the operations of distinction
and indication and on the characteristics that make them suitable to solve the problems
associated with identity-based approaches (see What Is Play? (p. 15)). To indicate
anything, we must first draw a distinction. The distinction separates the space; the
indication marks the side of the observer’s attention.
What is the distinction between a definition and a distinction? On first examination they
seem structurally similar, as both draw a boundary and the indication marks a concept
just as the definition does. However, a definition cements its boundary. Something either
falls inside the definition or it is outside (something “is A” or “is not A”).11 The boundary
becomes impassable without changing the definition. There is no other side to cross into.
While a distinction separates and connects its sides at the same time, a definition is only
interested in its inner side.
That crucial quality of distinctions — as I am using them — is that they do not resist
crossing to the other side while leaving the distinction intact. The token that signifies the
distinction for me first and foremost signals an invitation to cross the distinction. I will follow
this mode of operation throughout this thesis, playing with distinctions.
1.5 Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics
First order cybernetics, publicised by Norbert Wiener in 1948, introduces the notion of
dynamical systems that are regulated and are regulating themselves by inner and external
feedback loops. Synthesising these concepts enabled Wiener to describe the behaviour
of a system through its elements (Wiener 2007). The resulting performance may still be
complex and unpredictable, requiring stochastic means of analysis.
Second-order cybernetics was born not much later, during the 1960s (Mead 1968; von
11A proposal for a logic that includes a third (rejection) value can be found in (Günther 1962).
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Foerster 1995). Mead envisioned cybernetics as a common language for political and
scientific systems and as a self-referential tool for complex systems. Maturana and von
Foerster introduced a fundamental entity into the investigation in addition to the observed
system, that is the observer itself (Glanville 2002).
At the same time, observers and observed retain their status as “black boxes”, initially
opaque systems that are coupled through the observation (Ashby 1956). Black boxes can
be opened, but then new black boxes appear (Glanville 1982).
Thus, in the framework of second-order cybernetics, we are observing observers (Glanville
2002). Pickering, observing major figures of British second-order cybernetics, has identi-
fied another quality of second-order cybernetics he calls “ontological theatre”. According
to Pickering, ontological theatre is a mode to engage with the world in a performative
manner, as opposed to the causal, homogenous nature of mainstream science (Pickering
2011, p. 17-33).
Ashby regards cybernetics as a glue between disciplines because it is able to construct
isomorphisms between concepts (Ashby 1956). As I have argued in Straeubig (2015c)
the glue can be provided by distinctions, as they hold both of their sides together (see
Spencer Brown: Draw a Distinction (p. 28)).
A further expression of cybernetic thinking is von Foerster’s ethical imperative: “Act always
to increase the number of choices” (von Foerster 1973, p. 227). This is an interesting dif-
ference to Kant, who postulated ethical behaviour as conforming to a universal principle.12
The latter confirms identity, the former creates variety.
The dependence on observers in second-order cybernetics leaves us with an epistemolog-
ical challenge. How can a resilient point of view be established, if all perception, human
and non-human, consists in a recursive web of mutual observations?
1.6 Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms
For a long period of philosophical thinking, Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, rooted in scepti-
cism, provided a secure ontological mounting point (Descartes 1998). Later Kant (2007)
identified time and space as final certainties. But these positions have long been under-
12Kant’s maxim is quoted as “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law” (Kant 1993, p. 30).
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mined in postmodern positions that claim universal explanatory pattern in phenomena
such as capitalism (Nash and Penney 2015) or declare an era of post-truth (see Reality vs.
Truth (p. 88) and Discussion (p. 131)).
Nourished by growing doubts about the naïve assumption of an objective reality (see The
Meaning of “Meaning” (p. 87)), various new schools of thinking emerged during the 20th
century that in some form assume a constructed nature of reality. The general notion of
constructivism originates in the work of Jean Piaget, who has become a central figure
in pedagogic thinking. Piaget has largely contributed to our knowledge about play and
learning in the context of the development of children (see Play vs. Learning (p. 56)).
Influenced by Piaget, Seymour Papert established at MIT a methodology of learning
through making, a practice that is situated, embodied and aware of the environment
(Papert and Harel 1991; Ackermann 2001).
Another direction of constructivist thinking formed in the 1970s under the label “Radical
Constructivism” (von Glasersfeld 2005). It has a good deal of personal and thematic
overlap with second-order cybernetics. Among its main representatives are Heinz von
Förster, Ernst von Glasersfeld and Paul Watzlawick. Prominent topics include evolution,
self-organisation, complexity, systems and the concept of autopoiesis. A difference to
cybernetics with its interdisciplinary (compare Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics
(p. 29)) and practical character (see Theory vs. Practice (p. 149)) lies in the role of
radical constructivism as an epistemological theory. Central to this philosophy is the
assumption that any contact with reality is necessarily a construction by an observer.
Radical Constructivism does not deny reality as such but rather is agnostic about it.
However, constructivist epistemology discards assumptions about an outer reality being
represented by mental events. Instead, reality itself is constructed through observations
and communication (Watzlawick 2011). Each individual organism or mind constructs
its own reality through perceptions and prior to any social interactions. This position is
“radical” in the sense that it posits perception as an action, not a passive reception of an
external world impinging on the senses. Constructions occur not only within the social
sphere but already on the level of biological systems. An example is the frog’s eye that is
evolutionally optimised to perceive movement (compare Maturana and Varela: Perception
Is Distinction (p. 32)), resulting from a complex interplay of structure and function between
a system and its environment (Oakley and Speiser 2015).
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This is a different proposition than “Social Constructionism”, the theory brought forward
by (Berger and Luckmann 1990). Raskin (2002) provides a detailed excursion into
the differences between these schools of thought. Social Constructionism popularised
the thesis that reality is constructed on the level of social systems, in the systems-
theoretic formulation of Luhmann: through communication. This idea is the fundament
of contributions by Montola (2012b) and Stenros (2015) previously mentioned in section
Related Work (p. 13).
This very brief survey of the vast constructivist landscape ends with the assessment that
my position is influenced by the epistemology of radical constructivism on the theoretical
side while I am embracing the practical approach of Papert’s constructionism (see also
Summary: Puzzling (p. 46)). One important aspect is the question: What are systems
actually constructing when they construct a reality? The answer is: themselves. This
appears to be another strange loop that I address in the following sections.
1.7 Maturana and Varela: Perception Is Distinction
The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, both connected to
cybernetic (see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)) and radical constructivist
circles (see Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms (p. 30)) developed their constructivist
biology in the 1970s.
Their central observation is that living systems are constantly (re-)constructing their own
elements, which includes the organisation of their own sensory apparatuses (Maturana
and Varela 1980). This is the meaning of “autopoiesis”, a term coined by Maturana in
difference to “allopoiesis”, where an external process or entity produces an item.
Both Maturana and Varela have strived to extend their epistemology beyond biological
systems. Their research suggested that experience is not a passive act, but that the
perceiving subject is actively constructing its perception. This led Maturana to the assertion
that from biological principles alone the assumption of a given “objective reality” cannot
hold. Autopoietic systems self-organise through their recursive network of operations,
while any impact from the environment (compare System vs. Environment (p. 123)) is
perceived as an irritation (Maturana and Pörksen 2004).
In line with the cybernetic and constructivist approaches mentioned above, the episte-
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mology of Maturana and Varela rests on the concept of an observer.13 Yet if an observer
constructs reality, her internal structure must limit what she can and cannot experience:
this is the postulate of structural determinism:
“[. . . ] due to the nature of autopoietic organization itself every change that an organism
undergoes is necessarily and unavoidably determined by its own structure which embodies
its organization” (Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 120).
The capacity to distinguish a light vs. dark boundary, for example, is built into the retinal
cells. Their structure, developed through an evolutionary process, determines what can be
seen and therefore perceived (von Foerster 2003). This example shows that perception is
a perception of distinctions. Furthermore, it confirms that perceptions made by similarly
structured biological systems are by and large similar, while, as Thomas Nagel noted, we
cannot even come close to experience the world of a creature that is constructed differently
(see Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)).
Thus structural determinism explains why realities, while constructed individually, are
largely compatible between individuals. The second part of the answer rests on the
process of interpersonal reinforcement through communication.
This, however, poses a problem, as communication is a phenomenon quite different
from biological processes: it involves meaning. It constitutes a gap in Maturana and
Varela’s philosophical thinking, which is still rooted in biological principles. To observe play
comprehensively, including phenomenological, aesthetic, social and political aspects, a
universal theory of systems is required. Enter Niklas Luhmann.
1.8 Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning
Encountering the term “system” in modern discourse is akin to a consultation with some-
thing liminal and impalpable. This is not surprising, given the abstraction of the subject
and variety of system theories that have sprouted in the twentieth century — see (Arnold
2014) for an overview.
Also, for a long time systems theory has been dominated by the notion of complex
systems. Complexity theory as a branch of applied mathematics (Arora 2009) establishes
13Variations of this idea have come up in various other contexts, such as the observer effect in quantum
physics (Feynman and Davies 2011, p. 115-138) or in Gadamer’s hermeneutics (Gadamer 2004).
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quantitative theoretical results while statistical methods are concerned with the reduction
of complexity. Computer science can be seen as a laboratory for complexity by creating
dynamic, interactive simulations and systems, including artificial intelligence (Russell and
Norvig 2010), artificial life (Cagnoni, Mirolli, and Villani 2013) and artificial social systems
(Salge 2012; Kollman 2012; Miller and Page 2007). Various notions and models of complex
systems are developed in the sciences, ranging from physics, chemistry and biology
(Strogatz 2014; Bonchev and Rouvray 2005; Salthe 2003) to psychology (Guastello,
Koopmans, and Pincus 2009), economics (Schredelseker and Hauser 2008) and the social
sciences (Byrne 2014). Theories of complexity do not form a singular, coherent body of
science, but a (complex) network of theories and observations, loosely connected through
common characteristics like collective, emergent behaviour, signalling and information
processing and adaptation (Bar-Yam 1997; Mitchell 2011). In Luhmann’s theory, a system
is complex when it cannot actualise each of its elements simultaneously and some of them
have to remain potential (compare Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)).
Theories of complex systems rest on the distinction between the system and its elements,
between the whole and its parts. To be able to distinguish between different systems,
however, another distinction has to come into play, the one between the system and its
environment (see also System vs. Environment (p. 123)). Luhmann’s system theory
adopts system vs. environment as the relevant distinction (Luhmann 1996) based on
earlier ecological concepts by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Bertalanffy 1950; Bertalanffy 1968)
and Talcott Parsons (2017). This enables the observation of systems as autopoietic
entities that react to environmental effects with self-irritation: “Irritations arise from internal
comparison of (initially unspecified) events with the system’s own possibilities, especially
with established structures, with expectations” (Luhmann 2012, p. 66-67). Systems then
keep operating on their irritations with their own operations.14
Luhmann distinguishes between biological, psychic and social systems. Cells, organs,
brains, organisms and ecosystems are examples of biological systems. They represent
individuals in the sense of Huxley (1912), that they cannot be cut in part on risk of losing
their specific characteristic as systems.15 These systems operate with transcription of
DNA, activation potentials, and transport of pheromones.
14Thus the term “irritation” does not have the irritating connotation it has in everyday langue. An alternative
translation I would suggest is “perturbation”.
15As Huxley (1912, p. 144) notes, there are species like the flatworm that can be divided and will regenerate
themselves in an autopoietic operation.
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Psychic systems, or minds, on the other hand, operate with thoughts, intentionality and
meaning (the topic of meaning will come back in section The Meaning of “Meaning”
(p. 87)). Their special attribute is that they can only be observed from the first-person
perspective. Everyone has exclusive access to their own mind, which is a completely
different phenomenon from the observation of the brain through imaging techniques by
a scientist. This is not to postulate a distinct materiality of the mental as it has been
suggested in the so-called Cartesian dualism (Descartes 1998), but to concede that minds
must be observed through different distinctions than biological processes. Minds also
operate in an autopoietic manner: thoughts beget thoughts, intentions conflict with each
other, doubts are resolved or they proliferate.
For Piaget, the mind constructs and adapts to its own reality but it still can reach out to
things: “These two aspects of thought are indissociable: It is by adapting to things that
thought organizes itself and it is by organizing itself that it structures things” (Piaget 1952,
p. 8). Autopoietic systems, however, are closed under operations that are dealing with
the irritations from their respective environments (see Maturana and Varela: Perception Is
Distinction (p. 32)).
The same goes for social systems, which in turn are different from minds and brains.
Social systems communicate. Examples are: a discussion, a mailing list, a social network,
a game taking place, a protest march, a scientific publication including its production,
dissemination and reception, a research group, a religious community, art, economy and
law as subsystems of society, and society itself. In a mode between open and closed
systems, social systems are operationally closed, which is the same as to say that they
operate autopoietically by re-constructing their own elements of communication.
We can then observe play as communication through social systems in terms of cultural,
political, economical aspects, in biological systems by observing physiological processes
present during the activity, and as psychic systems from the first person perspective. A
question that arises is how different systems are capable of interacting. It is undeniable
that a mind is dependent on the brain, a playing brain activates neurons in certain areas,
which causes the production of hormones within glands that correlate with the player’s
feeling of excitement. Other changes to the biological system such as the influence of
drugs or an injury will affect the operation of the mind, as irritations that are met with
system-immanent operations (see above).
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This principle is reflected on the level of different social systems as well. Say, for example,
that an ongoing football match is interrupted by a streaker, an unclothed person that is
crossing the field. A few seconds ago the players were “in the game”, the team on the
offence pressing towards the much-needed equaliser, the other team resolutely defending
its goal from the oncoming strikers. Now the situation has changed drastically: the game
is interrupted, security personnel are chasing the intruder, the audience reacts audibly
with a mixture of amusement and impatience. The game, as a social system, structures
its intrinsic communication between the involved players, referees, rules, statutes, league
tables, and reactions from the audience. This does not include the streaker who, despite
kicking the ball into a goal, would not be able to score. Instead, the ball is considered
“out of play”, play is stopped by the referee, and it has to be restarted with a dropped
ball. Yet the same action by the streaker could be completely ignored if the referee
decides no “interference with play” took place. All this is determined through game-
immanent communication between the referee, the players, and the rules, where the
appropriate procedures are laid down (The International Football Association Board 2018).
A structurally similar, yet completely separate subsystem of society then takes care of the
interrupting offender, based on criteria outside of the game like a previous criminal record
or the defendant’s readiness to confess.
This observation of systems is grounded on distinctions instead of on identities. In
particular, Luhmann adopts George Spencer Brown’s concept of distinctions (see Spencer
Brown: Draw a Distinction (p. 28)) as the fundamental operation of observation. Luhmann
explains how a distinction separates and connects at the same time: “The concepts of
distinction and form do not imply negation. The other side remains presupposed when
something determined by that side is indicated” (Luhmann 2000, p. 36).
A significant accomplishment of systems theory is that it offers the opportunity to observe
these systems as conceptually distinct, resisting the urge to reduce or unify them. There-
fore, we can win selectivity in our observations as requested in section Requirements for a
New Paradigm (p. 24). In addition, a general theory of (social) systems itself constitutes
a (social) system, and therefore the theory must provide a sufficient abstraction and
complexity to observe itself – with all the possible paradoxes and theoretical problems
such as the question of ontological genesis that follow. This is the realisation of strange
loops, not in a meta-theoretical sense but built into the theory itself. Luhmann’s work is
constructed on its premise: a theory that is able to observe itself through distinctions.
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There are two ways in which I diverge from Luhmann’s systems-theoretic framework. One
is scope — whereas Luhmann himself has focused his investigations on social systems to
describe the whole of society, I will focus on the single phenomenon of play while dancing
between different types of systems (biological, psychic, social). The second point concerns
the role of machines. Whereas Luhmann observed the machines he encountered in his
time as allopoietic systems that are not coupled to minds and therefore not capable to
participate in social systems (Luhmann 1996, p. xxi), I will argue in chapter Can Machines
Play? (p. 97) and in section Autopoietic Machines (p. 157) for the invitation of machines
into social systems (Straeubig 2017a).
The literature about games and play that I have surveyed has by and large treated systems
from a complexity and first-order cybernetics viewpoint (compare Von Foerster: Second
Order Cybernetics (p. 29)), especially under aspects of games as rule-based systems
and systems of control, e.g. (Fullerton 2008, p. 111-140), while ignoring second order
cybernetics and the system vs. environment distinction. Salen and Zimmerman (2003,
p. 48-55) mention it while referencing Bertalanffy, but they depict the environment as an
element of the system. Most notably, Ian Bogost’s invention of a theory based on a concept
he calls “units” is founded on a grave misunderstanding of modern systems theory.16
In the next section, I discuss two further contributions that observe aspects of play from a
distinction-based and social system perspective, respectively.
1.9 Andersen and Stott: Play at Play
Tim Stott (2015) investigates play elements in performative contemporary art. He discusses
artworks such as Frisbee House by Carsten Höller (2000), Stadium by Maurizio Cattelan
(1991) and Platform by Sophie Warren and Jonathan Mosley (Warren and Mosley 2006).
16Bogost (2006, p. 4) writes about systems theory: “The first form of complexity was conceived in the 1940s,
as biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s systems theory. Systems theory focuses on the interrelation between
parts of a system as the primary basis for understanding that system.” As I show in this section, this constitutes
a misrepresentation of Bertalanffy‘s system vs. environment oriented approach. The confusion goes on a bit
later (Bogost 2006, p. 6) ”Sociologist Niklas Luhmann extends the same privilege to social systems, which he
claims regulate themselves by ’creating and maintaining a difference from their environment, and [using] their
boundaries to regulate this difference.‘ In Luhmann’s systems theory, communication is the basic unit of social
systems. System operations are thus totalizing structures that seek to explicate a phenomenon, behavior,
or state in its entirety. Unlike complex networks, which thrive between order and chaos, systems seek to
explain all things via an unalienable order.“ In this claim, Bogost gets the system vs. environment distinction
right, but his remarks about ”totalizing structures“ and ”explain all things via an unalienable order” are far
from anything that Luhmann has written. Bogost completely fails to identify the constructivist, cybernetic,
observer–dependent background of the theory. Rather, he goes on and develops a full ontology from this
misreading of systems theory.
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Those examples serve Stott as a canvas to apply systems theoretic thinking to participatory
art to arrive at a formal critique of playful participation. Less formally, Claire Bishop has
called socially engaged participatory art “artificial hells” (Bishop 2012), claiming that
activation of the audience in participatory art keeps a distance “[..] art and the social are
not to be reconciled, but sustained in continual tension” (Bishop 2012, p. 278).
These tensions can be analysed further, especially if art as a social system is accessible
to a coherent and consistent observation (Luhmann 2000). Stott makes Luhmann’s theory
of social systems and second-order cybernetics available for an observation of play in
the context of performative art. In a similar manner, Andersen applies Spencer-Brown’s
theory of distinctions to illustrate the distinction between play and work, in particular in the
context of management games (Andersen 2009).
I have included both Andersen and Stott in section Related Work (p. 13) because they
observe particular aspects of play from similar perspectives and with similar tools as I
do, yet both contributions are different in scope and depth. I discuss themes and issues
surrounding both approaches further in sections Play vs. Work (p. 51) and Games vs. Art
(p. 63).
A further aspect of my PhD project is the integration of theory and practice. This will
become evident in the following chapters, where I describe the evolution of my projects
during this PhD. The culminating topology as a strange loop (compare What Is Play? (p.
15)) is revealed in section Theory vs. Practice (p. 149) by reflecting on this distinction.
The two initial sources of inspiration for framing my own practice are the topic of the next
section.
1.10 Mateas and Schwab: Artistic Research
In section Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29), I have characterised cyber-
netics as a field encompassing both theories and practice, with many of the protagonists
working on both sides of this distinction. This mode of knowledge production is echoed
in my own research informed practice /practice informed research, which is inspired in
particular by two approaches: Michael Matejas’ expressive AI and Michael Schwab’s
Exposition of Artistic Research (EAR).
According to Mateas, the practice-based method is different both from the classical
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scientific methods and from the arts, yet it is informed by both areas. He calls his
methodology “expressive AI”, noticing that “AI-based art is not a subfield of AI, nor affiliated
with any particular technical school within AI, nor an application of AI. Rather it is a stance
or viewpoint from which all of AI is reconstructed” (Mateas 2001, p. 4).
Constructive, performative and transformative qualities are in stark contrast to the focus on
task competence in the AI mainstream that rooted in computer science and engineering
(Hernández-Orallo 2014). I am embracing and extending Mateas’ approach by adding
three points to it. First, in my investigation I open up the topic from AI to an exploration
of playful systems, which includes observations about artificial intelligence, in particular
in chapter Human vs. Machine (p. 97) and through my project KlingKlangKlong (see
Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)). The second addition is to break up the dichotomy
between arts and sciences and to replace it with a transdisciplinary approach that includes
and transcends a wider range of disciplines including contributions from the humanities
(compare Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)).
Thirdly, Mateas reveals a quite conservative attitude towards art: “If the audience is able to
participate in the poetics defined by the artist, [. . . ] then the piece is successful” (Mateas
2001, p. 3). I contend that in post-modern times, criteria for “successful” art cannot deny
anymore to acknowledge art as an autopoietic system (Luhmann 2000). This is further
discussed in sections Games vs. Art (p. 63) and Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106).
It also leads to a second practice-based inspiration for my project.
Michael Schwab, who established the Journal for Artistic Research (JAR) (Schwab 2011)
and the associated Research Catalogue (RC), has proposed exposition as a mode of
artistic research. This methodology is based on the concept of “expositions” – in particular
online objects admitted into the catalogue “that are meant to expose practice as research”
(Schwab and Borgdorff 2014, p. 92). The procedures described for exposition require
elaborate considerations, for example, the distinction between simple media and works
(Schwab and Borgdorff 2014, p. 94-97).
As with Mateas’ approach above, I have adapted and appropriated the concept by including
expositions in any form and medium that are meant to expose practice as research. Each
of the eight projects included in this thesis (see Project: Hostile Environment Facility
Training (p. 40), Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57), Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74), Project: Neurotic
(p. 100), Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110), Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (p. 130),
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Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (p. 135) and Project: Speed Gardening
Guerrilla (p. 138)) have gone through an instance of exposition, the majority of them
multiple times. The forms and places of exposition, however, have varied extensively: from
an art gallery in London to the streets of Krakow and from various university workshop
rooms to a play festival in Siegen, as documented in the respective sections. I have been
constantly iterating the exposition of my research and research through exposition while
moving through my project.
I will continue to reflect on the distinction of theory versus practice in section Towards Play
Design as Research (p. 154). First let me dive into the practice of distinctions by looking
at an example of a project that is based on the distinction between distinction and identity.
1.11 Project: Hostile Environment Facility Training
”Since 2012, the Government has established its “hostile environment” policy,
affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, so-called “legal” and
“illegal” immigrants, refugees and British citizens.
We believe that hostile environments are for everyone. We all can be a bit
more hostile.”
(Straeubig 2018b)
The Hostile Environment Facility Training (HEFT) (Straeubig 2018a) is a fictional training
event that takes part in a bland room furnished with tactical vests, flood lights, barbed wire,
metal barriers and surveillance cameras. The room is initially dark except for a glowing
button located on a plinth.
To start the training, visitors have to press the button. This triggers a sequence of three
short instruction videos projected against a wall of the room. The videos feature two
unspecified officials, “Agent A” and “Agent B”, that present exercises for creating hostile
environments. The goal of the first exercise is to practice hostility veiled in politeness.
Players are encouraged to apologise by saying “sorry”, but not meaning it. This is
demonstrated by one of agents first yelling at the other one, then half-heartedly apologising
in a passive-aggressive manner. In the second video, players are instructed to march,
which is also demonstrated by the agents. In Foucault’s description, marching, understood
as communication, constitutes “a bodily rhetoric of honour”, the body as a signifier of
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power yet at the same time docile and to be formed (Foucault 1995, p. 135-136). The
final exercise consists of rearranging the metal barriers in the room in order to keep some
unspecified “others” out. This video then descends into slapstick, with a sequence of still
images depicting both agents toying in various poses with the metal barriers.
After each video, the floodlights switch on automatically, bathing the room in harsh light,
while elevator music (Lanza 2004) plays. These breaks are supposed to give the audience
the opportunity to practice their own hostility, based on the training instructions received in
the video. At the end the floodlights switch off again and the room returns to a dark and
quiet state, waiting to be activated by the next player.
During one iteration of HEFT, which takes about 15 minutes, the flood-lighted room, the
uniformed agents, the props as symbols of surveillance and exclusion and the physicality
of marching and rearranging the barriers in a tight space are designed to create a form of
playful unease. This is juxtaposed by the ironic affirmation of hostility, some over-the-top
acting and the elevator music playing during the training.
1.11.1 Development
I developed the concept of HEFT based on discussions at the Playbour: Work, Pleasure,
Survival co-creation workshop held in London in April 2018 organized by Dani Admiss
and Ruth Catlow (Straeubig 2018a). In the workshop we had touched on different aspects
of the distinction between play and labour (see Play vs. Work (p. 51)). One of the topics
revolved around ways to create playful artistic responses to government policies such as
the “hostile environment” policy, announced under Home Secretary Theresa May in 2012
(A Guide to the Hostile Environment 2018).
HEFT was then commissioned by the curators Dani Admiss and Ruth Catlow and devel-
oped by me as an interactive piece for Furtherfield Gallery, an art exhibition space located
in Finsbury Park, London. I chose to pursue the topic of hostile environments further by
elaborating on the idea of an affirmative stance towards hostility. I wrote and designed
the piece, designed the room, wrote the film scripts, played one of the agents, and pro-
grammed the logic to control video and floodlights via wireless sockets on a Raspberri Pi
microcomputer.
Originally, I had planned to fabricate the props, including a metal detector acting as a
symbol for a hostile/controlled passage, in cardboard material. Then I discovered during
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my research that the entrance of Banksy’s event space Dismaland had been styled in
exactly the manner that I had envisioned (Banksy 2015). To avoid the impression of having
copied from that work, I discarded the initial concept and went on with genuine materials
(omitting the metal detector for budget reasons). Nevertheless, Dismaland was a major
inspiration. Even from the distance of available documentation, e.g. (Cawston, Manco,
and Cockshaw 2016), the aesthetic and atmosphere portrayed by performers and facilities
at Dismaland has been radiating the “playful unease” that I was aiming for.
1.11.2 Exposition
Figure 1.1: Hostile Environment Facility Training video
Furtherfield Gallery, London presented HEFT as part of the exhibition “Playbour — Work,
Pleasure, Survival” on six consecutive weekends in July and August 2018. A private view
was held on July 13, 2018.
1.11.3 Discussion
In Hostile Environment Facility Training, the player is given the task to practice the creation
of their own personal hostile environments. The piece therefore frames hostility from
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Figure 1.2: Hostile Environment Facility Training at Furtherfield Gallery
a first person view instead of empathising with the victims of these policies (compare
Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)). Through this reversal of perspectives and with an over-the-
top affirmation of hostility, I aim to create a space for the players to reflect on their own
emotions and on their personal interpretations of the phenomenon of hostility.
The term “hostile environment” invites a literal reading of the project as being concerned
with the distinction between system and environment (System vs. Environment (p. 123)).
And indeed it represents a critique of the eponymous government policies that comprise
a wide range of measures designed to deter “illegal immigrants” by limiting or denying
access to services concerning schooling, higher education, health system, banking,
housing, social support and employment. Home secretary Theresa May declared in 2012
that the rationale behind the policy is “The aim is to create, here in Britain, a really hostile
environment for illegal immigrants” (Kirkup and Winnett 2012).
The keenness and a passion for detail of the bureaucratic efforts appear remarkable
— even obtaining a driving license was made more difficult, and new criminal offences,
including “illegal working” were introduced (Taylor 2018). Moreover, according to the
National Council for Civil Liberties A Guide to the Hostile Environment (2018), elaborate
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systems of spying, detention and deportations were put into action in various branches of
the administration.
However, one of my motivations behind this work comes from a more personal direction.
The themes of Hostile Environment Facility Training (HEFT) are an attempt to reflect on
my own observations about cultural manners, expected behaviour and the experience of
a deteriorating political climate in the UK. They come from personal impressions as an
immigrant, amplified by the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum in
2016. Thus, the question of distinction vs. identity (see Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15))
develops another meaning, one that is rather personal and less abstract.
In this interpretation, identity is related to a desire for homogeneity and attempts at
exclusion whereas playing with distinctions presents the opportunity to cross boundaries
freely, observe what is on the other side and possibly return to the previous territory along
with new insight. In this sense, I understand HEFT as a political commentary, one that
celebrates distinctions and diversity, although in the mode of satire and dark play (see
Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67)). The distinction between identity and distinction, introduced by
theory in section Spencer Brown: Draw a Distinction (p. 28) receives a concrete, personal,
political form. Referring to Foucault, one could call the hostile environment a prison, solely
created to discipline and punish (Foucault 1995), referring to Goffmann, a case of spoiled
identity, stigmata created through hostile exclusion (Goffman 1990a).
These aspects are complemented by inspiration from artworks that went into the narration,
aesthetics and design for the performance. Papers, Please by Lucas Pope (2013) is a
game where the player finds herself in the situation of an immigration officer, balancing
necessities of daily life with decisions about approval or rejection. The game is cast
in a retro-cartoon style that catches the atmosphere of the former Iron Curtain. Other
influences came from the bleak, reduced stage design of Lars von Trier’s Dogville (von
Trier 2003) and from the over-the top acting and outfit of Machina Ex’s Right of Passage
(machina Ex 2015), a participatory live performance that lets inhabitants, wardens and
bureaucrats collide with each other in a fictional refugee camp.
During my research, I used pictures of border agents, fortifications and other examples
of hostile design and defensive architecture. These concepts predominantly denote the
implementation of a range of measures to drive away homeless and other unwanted people.
This includes the rigorous enforcement of zoning laws, classical music in underground
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stations, slanted and separated benches in parks and at bus stops, structures to prevent
locking bicycles, metal grids covering ventilation shafts and spikes installed in pavements.
“While some forms of defensive architecture forcibly exclude street homeless people [. . . ]
others employ milder techniques of physical or auditory manipulation to render particular
spaces less ‘attractive”’ (Johnsen, Fitzpatrick, and Watts 2018, p. 1117).
Artists have engaged in critical responses to these phenomena, including the documen-
tation silent agents by Julius-Christian Schreiner (2018) and the installation Labyrinths
by Jason Wee (2017), that presents crowd-control barriers in cultural contexts (Comaroff
2017). Lorenzo Pezzani, a practice-based researcher of cross-Mediterranean migration,
asserts that “the process of making (mainly urban) space unliveable for some bears an
eerie resemblance with the ways in which other, more ‘natural’ environments have been
turned into spaces of hostility for migrants” (Pezzani 2018). Pezzani understands the
concept of the hostile environment as being extended to geopolitical dimensions.
By contrast, the small room in which HEFT takes place is designed as a playful interactive
hostile environment, with glaring halogen lights, muzak and the props that are present
in the room: (fake) surveillance cameras, metal barriers, barbed wire and tactical vests.
Every prop is provided both as a tool and as a toy: a tool in the context of visitors being
compliant with the instructions given in the videos, and a toy, because they are actually
free to use the props in any way they like, with no actual surveillance present.
As an interactive experience, by and large the idea to design for affordances is a guiding
consideration (Gibson 1977). As I discovered during the making of this project, this can
turn out to be difficult in practice. The room features vests that can be put on, and most
crucially the players have to start the experience by pressing the illuminated button. As
I was present at the private view and at some occasions during the exhibition, I could
observe visitors that were waiting patiently in the dark for something to happen — the
glowing button was not recognised as an invitation to press it. In this case the intended
transformation from an art space (located within an actual hostile environment) into a
(fictional) hostile environment training centre could not take place without interference from
the artist (compare Actual vs. Potential (p. 83) and Virtual vs. Fictional (p. 84)).
By taking the site of the installation into consideration, a different system vs. environment
reference can be observed. Furtherfield Gallery is located in Finsbury Park, and the
immediate vicinity is home for many rough sleepers. The park also hosts vast commercial
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events during which large parts of it are cordoned off, with the same sort of crowd control
barriers that I used in the piece, private security staff and drug-sniffing dogs. This also
occurred during the preparations of HEFT, which provided a surreal, hostile environment
around the location of my playful one.
In the final shot of training videos, the audience is addressed again: “Now it’s your turn”.
The experience itself does not offer further explanations but leaves its interpretation open
to the players. Both as a game and in a political context, maybe the only winning move is
refusal: not to play along with the instructions or not to play at all (see Discussion (p. 59)).
1.12 Summary: Puzzling
In this chapter I have introduced a particular methodology: observing play through dis-
tinctions. I have postulated seven requirements for a comprehensive description of play
and laid out an appropriate theoretical background rooted in specific cybernetic, construc-
tivist, systems-theoretic and practice-based theories and traditions. I have also illustrated
the fundamental distinction between distinction and identity through my project Hostile
Environment Facility Training that plays ironically with the notion of identity.
Now I am able to arrange the individual puzzle pieces described in this chapter that make
up my methodology: Spencer-Brown contributes distinctions as a fundamental methodol-
ogy, second-order cybernetics supplies a high level of abstraction, the idea of observers17
and von Foerster’s ethical imperative, and Maturana and Varela introduce systems that
reproduce their own elements. From radical constructivism I take the idea that knowledge
is constructed, and from Papert’s constructionism that this involves creating objects to think
with: these are my projects, concrete, specific counterweights to abstraction. Luhmann
provides the extension to social systems as systems of communication that are to be
distinguished from minds and biological systems. Andersen and Stott have applied similar
systems-theoretic ideas to management games and performance. Mateas and Brooks
demand new approaches to AI, while Pickering fuses ontology and performativity. And
Schwab constitutes exposition as an empirical method in artistic research.
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I will put these puzzle pieces together into an
17Sutton-Smith (1997) is already observing observers through the lens of rhetorics (intentions); therefore
I am sometimes observing an observer observing observers, a complex matter indeed as indicated above.
With the methodology discussed throughout this chapter, however, I believe that this kind of complexity can
be rigorously described.
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epistemological tool to observe both play and the pieces themselves. It is then possible to
examine their fitness towards fulfilling the requirements stated in section Requirements for
a New Paradigm (p. 24). With these fundaments in place, the initial question about play
can be asked again. So let me start anew and draw a distinction.
47
48
Chapter 2
Play vs. Non-Play
What we are moving into is [...] the Ludic Century, an age that is characterized
by play.
Eric Zimmerman (2011)
2.1 Da Capo: What Is Play?
In the previous chapter, I have brought up the problem of play as a problem caused by
definitory approaches. This was highlighted by the two incommensurable positions of
Sutton-Smith (1997) and Burghardt (2005a).
With the conceptual framework of distinctions and higher order observers established, it is
now possible to describe Sutton-Smith and Burghardt as representatives of the different
ways that social and natural sciences observe, one through explanations, the other
through descriptions (Seiffert and Radnitzky 1989). More precisely, Burghardt’s position
appears within Sutton-Smith’s rhetoric of progress (compare What Is Play? (p. 15)), while
from Burghardt’s perspective, Sutton-Smith’s ambiguity cannot provide a definition (see
Definitions vs. Distinctions: What Is “Is”? (p. 23)). Both positions appear in a deadlock.
Sutton-Smith’s description of rhetorics as vehicles of persuasion (echoed by Ian Bogost
for the medium of video games (Bogost 2010)) is nothing but the introduction of observers
(compare Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)), although in an unnecessarily
implicit and abstract manner. From the postulate of observers it follows that Burghardt’s
goal cannot be fulfilled; there cannot be a neutral standpoint, from which someone would
be able to state the objective meaning of play. With Schulz von Thun (1981) every act
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of communication can be construed as a rhetoric in Sutton-Smith’s sense, as it always
has a persuasive component: the sender is in some way appealing to the receiver of the
communicative act.
Instead of separating play from non-play by definitory boundaries we can now start looking
at distinctions between play and different forms of non-play and cross these distinctions
freely. Before I do that I want to mention an attempt to remedy the situation depicted in
section What Is Play? (p. 15) suggested by Thomas Henricks (2008). He interrogates play
through a number of questions about its nature, moral stance, functionality, rationality and
finally about the degree of freedom in play compared to other human activities. Pursuing
these queries, he arrives at a proposed classification for the wide variety of meanings
attributed to “play” (Henricks 2008):
• Play as a certain activity
• Play as a pattern of behaviour
• Play as a spirit towards a behaviour (playfulness)
• Play as an individual action
• Play as a pattern of interaction between multiple players
• Play as quality of experience
While this kind of analysis can be considered useful to sort the various definitions and
explanations into different categories, Henricks’ underlying philosophy remains within a
general framework of identity. He also starts with the question “What is play?” followed by
a collection of contradicting and incommensurable answers (compare What Is Play?). Like
Sutton-Smith, Hendicks has to resort to a method that paradoxically leads to fragmentation
and division. Henricks attempts to deal with this ambiguity by “celebrating this diversity” of
the concept, yet he believes “that the differences between contemporary treatments of
play are perhaps not as great as they appear and that a more unified or integrated view of
play is possible” (Henricks 2008, p. 176).
Rather than challenging this view, I argue that pursuing essentialist accounts of play is not
a desirable endeavour in itself. Such a reductive approach can only succeed by eliminating
the diversity of positions brought forward by different observers. Burghardt’s way of
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insisting to resolve conflicting accounts of play by definition is paradigmatic for scientific
approaches. 1 In contrast, I will pursue the goal of observing play from a multitude of
perspectives. According to Heinz von Foerster’s ethical imperative (compare Von Foerster:
Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)), increasing the number of choices creates variety. In
order to acknowledge diversity, instead of reducing the number of possibilities, we must
allow different voices.
In the next sections I am following Spencer-Brown’s imperative (see Spencer Brown: Draw
a Distinction (p. 28)) to observe the phenomenological landscape of play, as well as other
observers, through the lens of distinctions. As postulated in (Spencer-Brown 2008), to set
the procedure into motion it is necessary to draw an initial distinction and then continue
from there.
2.2 Play vs. Work
In the introduction to this thesis, I have outlined the personal background behind my
research (see The Cold War (p. 1)). In particular, I have depicted my failure to comprehend
the idea of work, which set my motivation for the initial distinction. I will therefore start this
chapter with the distinction between play and work 2. To observe this particular distinction,
I begin on the side of play. There are many, but not arbitrarily, many possibilities to continue
in a meaningful way. Here I choose to revisit Huizinga’s definition of play, discussed in
section Discussion (p. 114): “Play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within
certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely
binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy and the
consciousness that it is ‘different’ from ordinary life” (Huizinga 1955, p. 28).
With these observations in mind there are different options: One is to query Huizinga’s
characteristics in turn and notice, for example, that people do work voluntarily. This means,
the voluntary quality of play cannot be a sufficient condition. But is it a necessary one? By
crossing the play vs. work distinction we then can continue with the discussion of Marx’s
concept of work or the practices of forced labor and slavery (Komlosy 2018). Yet other
approaches to work are available that characterize it in a purposeful and fulfilling manner
(Whitmyer 1994).
1I will return to discuss disciplinary contexts in section Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151).
2See Discussion (p. 114) for a discussion about the (non–)relevance of order with regard to observing
distinctions.
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I want to come back to the initial question: How can we characterise play as opposed
to work? Is there a distinction that demarcates the territory of play from the territory of
work, however complex and convoluted this boundary may be? As an example, what
is the situation of a professional chess player who is taking part in a tournament? The
tournament comes with prize money, and the player earns their living from this income.
Is she playing or working during the matches of the tournament? If the presence of
money implies that she is working, neither gambling nor any sports event with some form
of remuneration would be considered as play (Schwartz 2007). There are games like
poker that are commonly played for money, a game that I would consider being lacking in
excitement without the added thrill of stakes. I also claim that this cannot be said about
chess. On the other hand, if the professional is indeed playing, that would mean that
play cannot be defined by the absence of external rewards. Professional acting, sports
and e-sports, commercial streaming, taking part in game shows and various forms of
playbour (see below). There are numerous examples where the act of playing itself is
being remunerated.
Conversely, the absence of payment in exchange for an activity does not necessarily
indicate play. I have mentioned forced labour above. Other counterexamples include
work therapy in psychiatric hospitals, volunteering and the vast area of unwaged labour,
so-called “house-work”, often carried out by women, that was rendered invisible by the
codification of work in the 19th century (Komlosy 2018).
From this discussion it becomes apparent that rather than viewing monetary reward as a
criterion of play vs. non-play, it could make sense to introduce the distinction between paid
play vs. unpaid play. This would create a new pair of categories, however, and we would
then be faced with the same kind of challenge: to define and describe what constitutes
the difference between them. In other words we would be developing a taxonomy. As
described in section Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29), there is another
approach available, and that is to take the observer into consideration. Then the apparent
paradox vanishes. The taxation of the chess player’s prize money defines the activity as
work, while the chess player might experience pure play.
This analysis requires a second order observer who observes the other observers and their
respective system references. The distinction is not between paid vs. unpaid activity but
between work observed by the economic and political system vs. the intrinsic experience
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of the player. Both observers, tax authority and player, can insist on apparently conflicting
observations as long as their system references are kept intact. Otherwise, a conflict arises
if the tax collector tries to convince the player that her interaction during the tournament
has to feel like work or if the player maintains that she shouldn’t be paying taxes justified
by her personal play experience.
I contend that this approach would help to clarify some of the misunderstandings that
are currently present in situations where work and play interfere. Phenomena such as
Gamification, the application of game elements in non-game contexts (Deterding et al.
2011) have raised fierce controversies, with proponents (McGonigal 2012; Werbach and
Hunter 2012) and critics (Bogost 2011) alike. A point of critque is that gamification obviously
serves external purposes (Llagostera 2012). Does this mean that game elements become
ethically tainted in non-game contexts? A greater diversity of second-order observers
seems to be helpful in order to gain a deeper understanding of the debate (Fuchs et al.
2014; Fizek 2016).
A related yet different concept is called “playbour” and it takes a more critical position
towards the distinction between play and labour. Its origin are observations of a largely
non-commercial and voluntary game modification (“modding”) scene being commodified
by the games industry (Kücklich 2005). With gig economies on the rise, digititized service
brokering growing and work relationships being fundamentally re-defined, various new
forms of precarious digital labour are developing (Scholz 2013). In the context of virtual
worlds such as World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 2004) a new proletariat of
“work-players” are providing services for other players (Nakamura 2009).
“The supreme accomplishment is to blur the line between work and play” is a quote
ascribed to the British historian Arnold J. Toynbee by Langer (2014, p. 133). In contrast,
I am asking what conclusions can be drawn from looking more precisely at the play vs.
work distinction? I see confirmation for my thesis that neither play nor work can be defined.
Therefore classical approches such as Huizingas’s or Caillois’ descriptions (compare What
Is Play? (p. 15)) are not sufficient to make sense of phenomena such as gamification and
playbour. Perhaps this is also due to the specificity of the distinction. It is then helpful to
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discuss a more general question: does play have any purpose at all?
2.3 Play vs. Purpose
Bernhard Suits’ answer to this question is affirmative. He claims that any activities without
a purpose would constitute random movements (Suits 1978, p. 91). Play isn’t random,
and therefore it must have a purpose, Suits concludes. If we accept this premise, then the
question is how purpose and play relate to each other.
As Johan Huizinga (1955, p. 2) notes, many theories about play share the commonality
that “play must serve something which is not play, that it must have some kind of biological
purpose”. The question arises whether a purpose is an intrinsic quality of play or rather
an artefact of the observer (compare Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29),
Reality vs. Truth (p. 88) and Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). Drawing attention to games
of chance in particular, Caillois characterises these kinds of play as unproductive and in
a literal sense uncreative: “Property is exchanged but no goods are produced” (Caillois
1961, p. 5). This can be read as a description of capitalism, where the accumulation of
profit has decoupled from the creation of goods and services (Chang 2011, p. 231-241).
Drawing a distinction between betting and gambling on the one hand (Schwartz 2007)
and speculation with volatile financial instruments like stocks, options and futures on the
other reveals common phenomena (Grall-Bronnec et al. 2017; Shin et al. 2015) as well
as common traits in the players (Jadlow and Mowen 2010). However, capitalism asserts
that money in itself is not without purpose (Durand 2017). As a game element that adds
an external purpose, money therefore allows players to avoid the horror vacui of frivolous
idling.3
Burghardt (2010, p. 10) calls play “seemingly purposeless behaviour that is enjoyable”.
This point of view shows that in order for science to observe phenomena such as play,
games and art (see Games vs. Art (p. 63)), it becomes necessary to introduce a
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic purpose, which relates to the epistemological
gap between the first person and third person perspective (compare Paradoxa of Play
(p. 69)). For Burghardt, play must appear “seemingly” purposeless, because natural and
social sciences observe behaviour with the a priori assumption of some purpose. This
3In Luhmann’s theory, money has a communicative function. It represents a symbolically generalised
medium of communication, allowing payments and prices to universally signal value expectations (Luhmann
2008).
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becomes apparent through Tinbergen’s four questions (Tinbergen 1963), paraphrased as
follows: “What is it for? How does it work? How did it develop (ontogenesis)? How did it
evolve (phylogenesis)?” (Bateson and Laland 2013).
I have asked, if play could not have any purpose at all (Straeubig, Hsu, et al. 2016). This
question distinguishes two distinctions: intrinsic vs. extrinsic purpose and autotelic vs.
heterotelic behaviour. Autotelic activities, a concept developed by Csikszentmihalyi in the
context of research on flow (see Presence vs. Immersion (p. 127)), are activities that are
done for their own sake (Csikszentmihalyi 1997, p. 117).
Not only play but contemporary art have been characterised as autotelic (compare Games
vs. Art (p. 63)), which does not sit well with some ethical positions. “Don’t waste your time”
is not only the mantra of concerned parents directed at their video game playing children,
but also advice from stoic philosopher Seneca (2004). This assumes a view of life that is
obliged to focus on outcomes, in form of the doctrines of utilitarianism or protestant work
ethics that have been first amplified and then superseded by industrialisation (Komlosy
2018). However, not everyone is convinced of the utilitarian prerogative, as Nietzsche
famously quibbled: “If you have your why? for life, then you can get along with almost any
how? Man does not strive for happiness; only the English do that” (Nietzsche 2008, p. 6).
Kršiak notes that in the light of “biologically non-purposeful” activities, extensions to
ethological models are required in order to adequately describe humans (Kršiak 2011).
Bateson and Martin (2013, p. 13) propose to draw a distinction between the broad biological
category of play and what he calls “playful play”. This aggregates two distinctions that I
have introduced earlier, psychic vs. social systems (see Luhmann: Distinctions Create
Meaning (p. 33)) and first person vs. third person perspective (see Requirements for a
New Paradigm (p. 24)).
This combination implies that in order to observe playfulness, I have in principle two
choices: I can experience it myself, by joyfully playing or by creating playful experiences,
where I am playing throughout the process of making as well. This is the immediate,
privileged access of the first person perspective. The second option is to observe others
and to make sense about their inner experience, moods, and feelings while they play
(compare Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). One may measure the flow states of players
(Chen 2007; Nacke and Lindley 2008) or examine the clinical potential of virtual reality
(Riva, Wiederhold, and Mantovani 2019). In these cases, the third person perspective
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involves biological or social systems and the immediate access to the phenomenon of play
is lost. Developers interested in creating — in the double meaning of the word — rewarding
experiences are increasingly adopting scientific research in their game design methods
(Sherry et al. 2006; Rigby and Ryan 2007; Przybylski, Rigby, and Ryan 2010; Koster
2013; Lankoski and Holopainen 2017). On the other hand there are artistic responses
that critique that telos of utility. Brian Schrank (2010) shows that various projects such as
Space Giraffe by Jeff Minter (2007), Untitled Game by Jodi (1996–2001) or Farbs’ ROM
CHECK FAIL (Farbs 2008) have critiqued the doctrine of play as a pleasant experience
with humour and deconstruction. In response to Bateson and Martin (2013) and Suits
(1978), I conclude that play does not necessarily carry lusory attitude, joy or positive mood
as a purpose (see also Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67)).
Proponents of play go further by crossing the theory vs. practice distinction and practicing
play for its own sake. For example, the New Games movement has promoted, designed,
collected, staged and published a wide range of inclusive, experimental and adventurous
games and playful experiences, challenging existing concepts about play. New Games
were promoting cooperative, non-competitive principles as well as playful competition,
represented in the slogan on the cover of (Fluegelman 1976): “Play Hard. Play fair. Nobody
hurt”. Bernie De Koven, one of the main figures of New Games has continued this “playful
path” all his life and inspired countless others on the way (DeKoven 2013; DeKoven 2014).
A counterpoint to the idea of frivolous play are serious games, activities that add an
external purpose to game mechanics (Dörner et al. 2018). Often the envisaged benefit of
a serious game is learning (see next section). My project Spiel 1 (see Project: Spiel 1 (p.
57)) is a light-hearted take on serious games for peace education (Wulf 1973), whereas
documentary filmmaker Harun Farocki has investigated the outright brutal reality of game
technology in the context of military training and operations (Farocki 2009; Farocki 2010c;
Farocki 2010b; Farocki 2010a).
2.4 Play vs. Learning
In the concept of learning, the two distinctions play vs. purpose and playful vs. serious
intersect. It is often understood as a central purpose of play (Sutton-Smith 1979). Sutton-
Smith (1997) also refers to learning as the “rhetoric of progress” (compare What Is Play?
(p. 15)). This rhetoric branches out in two directions which both share the assumption
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of purpose (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)). One leads into the dark side of play, where
playing violent video games is a detriment to players’ minds (see Play vs. Dark Play (p.
67)). The other position is affirmative towards play and stresses its importance for learning.
This sentiment, developed by eminent learning theorists like Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi,
Maria Montessori and Jean Piaget is shared today by a host of researchers of pedagogy
and creativity alike (Bateson and Martin 2013; Bateson 2015; Sawyer 2003).
For the case of animal play, ethologists observe learning as the purpose for a wide
variety of play behaviour (Bekoff 1998). Two of the learning theories that were historically
proposed (Groos 1898), namely motor training and preparation for future unexpected
situations, have been substantiated experimentally (Pellis, Pellis, and Bell 2010). Even
machines are increasingly playing to adopt new behaviours (see Game AI vs. Playing
Machines (p. 106)). I want to caution against assumptions of causality between play
and learning. There is a wide range of empirically validated learning methods ranging
from rote repetition to constructivist and situated approaches (Stewart 2012). Therefore,
learning does not necessarily have to be a purpose of play, despite observations that the
two phenomena are correlated.
In the previous sections I have offered my critique towards promises and expectations
of infusing play with external, in particular educational purposes that are blurring the
distinction between play and non-play. In the next section I will continue this discussion
through my practice in the form of a fake peace education game — Spiel 1. Wulf (1973)
describes peace education as an attempt to analyse, discuss and overcome different
forms of violence and lack of peacefulness. These games have received surprisingly
critical reactions; Warwitz and Rudolf (2016) for example lists peace games along with
war games and malicious games under the “controversial games” category. What makes
games that promote the ideal of peace controversial?
2.5 Project: Spiel 1
Spiel 1 (“Game 1”) is a performance that interrogates the distinction between play and
non-play. It is arranged as an encounter between a purported scientist and an audience
member, who is subject to a fictional experiment for the purpose of peace education. The
setup consists of a table with two chairs. On the table is a laptop which is connected to a
brain-computer interface (BCI) and to a toy device that resembles a rocket launcher and
57
is capable to fire off foam projectiles. A few meters apart, a teddy bear is shackled to a
scaffold, within the target range of the rockets.
The performer, usually wearing a white lab coat, introduces the experience as a “serious
game for peace education”. The participant is then fitted with the BCI headset and is
advised to “think peacefully” for a timespan of about a minute while the device is analysing
their brainwaves. It is explained to them that in the event that “non-peaceful” thoughts are
detected, the rockets will be launched at the stuffed animal.
During the interaction which goes through ritualised stages — greeting the participant,
cleaning the headset, calibrating the device and conducting the “experiment” — the per-
former engages in conversations about the participant’s emotions, aggressive tendencies
and politics of war and peace. The mechanism, as described below, allows the performer
and the participant to watch a representation of biosignals taken from brain and muscular
activity in real time. In some of the encounters, the apparatus fires off the rockets while in
other cases the calamity for the toy is avoided. An interaction takes about 20 minutes.
2.5.1 Development
The physical setup of Spiel 1 consists of four components. The Neural Impulse Actuator
(NIA), manufactured by OCZ Technology, is an early consumer grade brain-computer
interface (BCI). It features a headband with 3 channels that measure EEG signals from dry
electrodes on the forehead. The NIA was developed to serve as a game controller in order
to facilitate faster responses to the stimuli. The rocket thrower is an USB-connected device
that can be triggered by sending a particular command. A laptop running the software and
the teddy bear fixed to a contraption complete the setup.
The BCI device transmits various bio-potentials including alpha and beta brain waves, as
well as facial and ocular muscle impulses that are sampled, filtered and divided into several
frequency bands to the host computer. These can then be further analysed as values over
time and — after a Fast Fourier transformation — as a spectrum of frequencies. Both the
frequency distribution and intensity of the signal can be used for analysis and detection
of emotional states, which is an active area of research and experimentation (Prpa and
Pasquier 2019).
I have developed the software based on an open source USB interface written in Python
by Mershon and Ng (2013). In Spiel 1 the incoming signal is used to trigger the firing of
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the rockets based on the difference between a baseline measurement that is taken in the
first few seconds of the encounter and a running average taken during the remainder of
the interaction. The mechanism has an adjustable threshold. It also allows the triggering
of the rockets manually, in case the performer decides to do so for dramatic reasons.
2.5.2 Exposition
Figure 2.1: Spiel 1 at the Glockenspielstrasse theatre event
I developed Spiel 1 for the fringe theatre event Glockenspielstrasse that took place in
Erlangen, Germany in June 2013 (Straeubig 2013c). The performer was Stefanie Heublein.
In April 2015, I staged Spiel 1 at the playin’ Siegen festival in Siegen, Germany. For this
occasion I revised the code base and also acted as the performer.
2.5.3 Discussion
When I created Spiel 1, my major intention was to interrogate the distinction between
serious games and games in a playful and ironical manner. Whereas the setup and
the purported purpose of peace education are fictional, the interaction pretends to be
serious and aims to keep the (dis-)belief of participants in suspense. While navigating the
boundaries between serious and non-serious play, both the theme of peace education
and the technical implementation of Spiel 1 are grounded in realism. As mentioned earlier,
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Figure 2.2: The target of missile strikes in Spiel 1
the use of games for peace education was met with irritation (see Play vs. Learning (p.
56)). The intermixture of play and external purposes raises questions about the interests
or intentions of the system introducing the purpose (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)).
Spiel 1 can also be understood as a playful critique of the use of Brain-Computer Interfaces
for artistic purposes. The term Brain-Computer Interface denotes a noninvasive technology
to measure and record brain activity to control a machine (Wolpaw et al. 2000). A BCI
registers potential differences from the scalp caused by electric activity of neural ensembles
(Nicolelis and Lebedev 2009).
The implementation of a BCI includes components for signal acquisition, amplification,
feature extraction and classification and translation into signals for a control interface
(Mason and Birch 2003). BCI are used in clinical applications and increasingly in consumer
settings such as neurofeedback (Marzbani, Marateb, and Mansourian 2016).
Using EEG measurements in performative and artistic settings has a long tradition, reach-
ing back to Alvin Lucier’s Music for Solo Performer (Lucier 1965). Jacqueline Humbert
(1974) demonstrated with Brainwave Etch a Sketch how brain signals from two people
could generate drawings on a screen. At documenta 14, Janine Antoni presented the
performance Slumber, where she had an EEG recording her brain waves during sleep.
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She then wove the readings into the blanket under which she slept (Antoni 1994). Brain
Study by the art collective a rose is uses networked BCI to create music (A rose is 2001).
Expo 2000, the world fair taking place in Hannover saw the project Brainball by the Swedish
Interactive Institute (Interactive Institute 2000). The setup consists of two players who are
sitting on opposite sides of a table. Both player wear Brain-Computer Interfaces and a ball
is moved by a magnetic contraption towards the player that exhibits the more excited state,
therefore asking the players to stay calm. This design subverts the usual characteristic
of a game as an activity (compare Da Capo: What Is Play? (p. 49)). “Brainball can best
be described as an anti-game. In most games success is achieved as a result of activity,
decision-making, and physical coordination. In Brainball none of these capabilities counts.
Here the goal of the players is to achieve—nothing” (Hjelm 2003, p. 29).
With a surge of consumer grade BCI devices since the 2010s, access for artists has
become easier, which has led to a proliferation of “brain art” (Nijholt 2019). However,
uncritical artistic use of this technology comes with some caveats. While EEG measure-
ments in clinical contexts have to follow strict protocols that strive to ensure that there
is a minimum of noise in the data, artists that use consumer-grade BCI devices outside
laboratory conditions are prone to measure environmental artefacts and a mixture of
biological signals (Samek and Muller 2015).
Other than deliberate applications of noise as a medium for aesthetic disturbances (Prior
2015), neglecting its role as a confounder in brain art risks mirroring the commercial
marketing of biofeedback products by a growing learning and wellness industry. In
this critique, I am crossing distinctions between science, art and economic systems
where artistic claims, scientific results and commercialization interfere. A comprehensive
understanding of society as a system of systems may provide orientation in these complex
situations (Luhmann 2012, p. 1-112).
Where art meets science there are not only potentials for misunderstanding but also
opportunities for creation. David Rosenboom, a pioneer of early artistic experiments
with biofeedback (Rosenboom 1976), writes about the excitement of these encounters:
“Thus, I want to make all the juxtapositions I can between technology and nature. To
confront the scientist and artist with each other” (Rosenboom 1970, p. 56). Rosenboom is
further citing the cybernetic and cultural developments that are taking place at that time
and concludes “that it is necessary for us to develop new ways of looking at systems”
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(Rosenboom 1970, p. 56). I argue that this development has taken place, with radical
constructivism, second-order cybernetics and in particular with Luhmann’s systems theory,
and that Spiel 1, in its mischievous manner, is drawing attention to distinctions between
artistic and scientific observations (see Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15)). Borck (2018)
reminds us that the “electrical brain4” has not only a scientific but also a cultural history,
one that observes the way scientists observe the brain. In Kittler’s words, these brains
constitute discourse networks, “technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to
select, store, and process relevant data” (Kittler 1990, p. 369).
The way I chose to deal with these conceptual challenges was to avoid claims of serious
significance, let alone of scientific validity of the BCI readings taken in Spiel 1. That is, I
am using the distinction between playful and serious (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)) in lieu
of the one between true and false. The scientific system operates based on the true vs.
false distinction (Luhmann 2009), whereas art does not (Luhmann 2000). Thus from a
mere performative perspective it would have been possible to “fake” the measurement
process. However, this would have made a different difference.
In Alvin Lucier’s performance, this difference becomes apparent by watching the artist
while he is being prepared with the electrodes as well as during the performance itself.
Lucier always keeps a straight face. The reason for this is most likely to avoid any muscular
activity that would induce noise into the measurements. Although they do not share the
same code (see Discussion (p. 114)), the artistic and the scientific become intertwined,
coupled systems.
Being aware of the limitations of the device I am using, the experimental environment and
my lack of scientific training,5 I embedded Spiel 1 within an ironic context while respecting
its technological background. Thus I implemented genuine data acquisition and analysis
algorithms to measure cortical activity based on the difference between alpha and beta
waves (Ramirez and Vamvakousis 2012). Spiel 1 does not feature advanced machine
learning algorithms, though. As a performance it does not claim scientific validity, nor is
any data used for empirical purposes (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)). The override button
that is available for the performer of Spiel 1 to manually trigger the rockets is a nod to the
dramatic affordances of the piece.
4This metaphor can be read twofold: the brain as source of electric activity observed in the EEG and the
computer as transmitter of electrical currents operating in a brain–like manner (Borck 2018, p. 245-253).
5I received some training in medical EEG measurements during my PhD project at the Neural Basis
for Creativity workshop in April 2016 at the Univerity of Plymouth. The workshop included lectures on
neuroscience, creativity and cognitive innovation as well as practical tutorials on EEG methods.
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For me, the most interesting process that emerged during the performance was the
communication with the participants.6 Despite the public situation and the playful threat to
the teddy bear to be hit by rockets, players were open about personal feelings, aggression
peacefulness and moral questions. Spiel 1 pretends to be serious although I do not intend
it to be so. Yet despite my intentions, the performance offers a space where serious
communication can take place.
There is also a third sense, in which Spiel 1 is playing with the distinction play vs. non-play,
which is highlighted by its name, which I chose deliberately to convey a false signification.
Like Brainball, Spiel 1 is an anti-game (see above), a notgame respectively (see Games
vs. Art (p. 63)). Strictly speaking it is a performance, albeit one with a notgame inside,
namely the player who tries to prevent an event from happening — the firing of the rockets.
The player cannot achieve the goal by action but rather by doing nothing.7
Spiel 1 is one of two projects that I created prior to and re-contextualised for my PhD project;
the second one is Speed Gardening Guerrilla (see Project: Speed Gardening Guerrilla (p.
138)). As with other projects on the boundary between play and performance (see Project:
Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40) and Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for
Plymouth (p. 135)), Spiel 1 oscillates between fiction and non-fiction, playfulness and
seriousness, sense and nonsense while keeping an ironical distance from its subjects. It
is therefore crossing multiple distinctions: playful vs. serious, frivolous vs. purposeful, and
in summary play vs. non-play.
2.6 Games vs. Art
The common history of art and video games appears as a history of misunderstandings.
When the late film critic Roger Ebert (2010b) categorically stated that “videogames can
never be art”, a fierce discussion ensued that spurred Ebert (2010a) to add even more
insult to injury. Newspaper columnist Jonathan Jones (2012) took the same line, basically
declaring games as entities that lack artistic authorship. In his response, game designer
Eric Zimmerman denounced art as a place for games to “stay away from” (Zimmerman
2014a).
6In the performance I discuss the visible EEG patterns with the audience and point out notable findings.
For example, a participant whose measurement showed almost a flat line revealed that he had long–term
meditation and martial art experience.
7In the movie Wargames (Badham 1983) this option is considered as the optimal move when playing
against an all–powerful artificial intelligence.
63
I am criticising these attitudes as myopic (Straeubig 2020a, (to appear)), on the grounds
that they reveal a pre-modern understanding of the art system, essentially missing the last
100 years of art history (Luhmann 2000). I think it is ironic that contemporary art critics like
Jones fail to see how their defence of “high art” exactly mirrors the attitude of the French
Academy resisting the then avant-garde of the impressionists, a movement that is now
considered the pinnacle of visual art (Thompson 2010).
While I disagree with Zimmerman’s dismissive conclusion, I believe that one of his argu-
ments is worth further discussion. Zimmerman does understand that “the art question”
(Warburton 2003) does not depend upon the inherent qualities of artworks anymore. This
was demonstrated at least since Duchamp’s virtual art experiment (Norton 1917). Both
art and games are social systems, and as such, the boundaries that determine inclu-
sion/exclusion of art as well as games are in constant re-negotiation (Luhmann 1996). It
is a particularity of art that it invites its own negation into the system (Luhmann 2000).
Therefore artworks can signal not to be artworks and nonetheless be recognized as
artworks (Kaprow 2003).
Michaël Samyn of the duo Tale of Tales makes the point in his Notgames Manifesto: “Can
we create a form of digital entertainment that explicitly rejects the structure of games?
What is an interactive work of art that does not rely on competition, goals, rewards, winning
or losing?” (Samyn 2010). In three landmark exhibitions in 2011, 2013 and 2015 at the
Cologne Game Lab, Tale of Tales and other artists such as David O’Reilly, Rebeca Merrill
and Vectorpark have exhibited a wide range of (not-)games that critique the form of games
(Cologne Game Lab 2011).
Above all, the question “are games art?” which has triggered the debates cited above
constitutes a category mistake. This becomes clear when the term “games” in the question
is replaced by “movies” or “books”: certain works can undoubtedly be identified as artworks
while others would not be considered as such. A useful distinction in this context is the one
between medium and form (Luhmann 2000, p. 102-132). Games, books and movies are
media in which widely different forms can appear: works of literature, kitsch or operating
instructions. Some of those forms are — or will be in the future — recognised as art by
the art system, while others fail. The medium itself does not determine the message, in
apparent contradiction to the widely shared bon mot by Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan and
Fiore 2008).
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It can be observed that games and art are communicating with each other as a growing
number of games is being accepted into the art system (Schrank 2014). Their cultural
impact is being acknowledged with significant exhibitions in established art institutions
like the V&A in London and the MOMA in New York. Festivals like AMAZE in Berlin,
Independent Games Festival (IGF) in San Francisco and EGX Rezzed in London provide
social glue and attract artists, developers and players alike. As a result, the discourse
around games has become more diverse and relevant regarding cultural issues (Shaw
2010; Ruberg and Shaw 2017; Muriel and Crawford 2018). This development is furthered
by debates about the aesthetic dimension of games (Catlow, Garrett, and Morgana 2010;
Sharp 2015).
Both games and play take place in art contexts, with or without a formal invitation (see
Playgrounds vs. Non-playgrounds (p. 125)). Since ancient times, play has occupied
theatres, opera houses, circuses and sports arenas (Huizinga 1955). As illustrated in
section Andersen and Stott: Play at Play (p. 37), playful performances have become
common occurrences in contemporary art (Stott 2015). Art and play also share an autotelic
quality — the absence of external purposes — expressed by the doctrine of l’art pour l’art
(Wilcox 1953) (compare Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)).
2.7 Play vs. Games
While discussing Games vs. Art (p. 63) in the previous section, I briefly skipped over the
distinction between play and games. In this section, I will catch up and illuminate aspects
of this fundamental distinction. To discuss games, I adopt points of view from cultural
studies, which observe games as media and as artefacts (see also Play and Discipline(s)
(p. 151)).
Let us consider initially play as the activity that takes place when a game is in progress.
As a designed artefact, a game gives play structure by providing a set of formal and
dramatic elements: conflict, mechanics, outcomes, objectives, rules, resources, story,
environment, characters, a premise, challenge, avatars (Fullerton 2008)8 In this practice-
oriented approach, play is one aspect the game designer has to consider, albeit a central
one (compare Towards Play Design as Research (p. 154)).
8In this description, I have left out the element of the player which becomes a topic in Human vs. Machine
(p. 97).
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However, as Salen and Zimmerman point out (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, p. 301-311),
there are two readings of the relationship between game and play. The first one is to view
play as an element of games, which is compatible with Fullerton’s description above. This
view is based on the system/element distinction (compare Luhmann: Distinctions Create
Meaning (p. 33)).
From the second perspective, however, games are a subset of play. This appears plausible,
too, because play happens not only within games but outside of them as well: on play-
grounds, in the free play of children, in all kinds of playful behaviour. From this perspective
games can be considered a special case of play, where the elements listed by Fullerton
are present. So we arrive at a paradoxical situation, with play an element of games and
game a subset of play: we are looking at a strange loop.
As I have described in What Is Play? (p. 15), paradoxical findings are noted but rarely
resolved in classical ontological frameworks. They do however provide a potential for
Anschlussfähigkeit in a dialectical manner. Thus Suits’ attempts at definitions of both
games (Suits 1978) and play (Suits 1977) are discussed by (Morgan 2008) and by Myers
(Myers 2012) who both criticise Suits, on different grounds yet with the same result: more
variants are added to the pool of existing definitions.
Not less problematic are the attempts to identify common attributes of games and play.
When Frasca notes that both games and play have rules, he is in fact describing a
distinction between external, given rules that characterise games and play rules that may
be liminal, intrinsic, emerging in a fictional world or through repeated action like tossing a
ball back and forth (Frasca 1999).
Ingold, discussing aspects of time on the background of Sassure’s analogy between
language and a game of chess, also takes note of this difference: “Once you win the game
it is finished; [. . . ] Social life, to the contrary, must continue” (Ingold 2016, p. 175). This is
reminiscent of Luhmann’s concept of Anschlussfähigkeit, except that it is compatible with
the possibility that social systems in the game’s environment, understood as autopoietically
created sequences of events do cease to continue. A game ends and the players, perhaps
out of disappointment by the losing party, do not talk to each other anymore.
It appears useful to me to cross the distinction between play and games with the one
between medium and form (Luhmann 2000, p. 102-132). We can view a game as a
medium in which forms of play can be observed. This does not preclude play to appear
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outside of games, nor does it negate other forms to appear within games (compare Play
vs. Learning (p. 56)). What it says is that games provide elements that are loosely coupled
such that forms of play can emerge. A further analysis would be concerned with the
structural qualities of those elements, for example, with the uncertainty that is provided
through game mechanics (Costikyan 2015). Instead of shoehorning play and narration
into a ranking order, it makes sense to identify elements that enable or resist storytelling
(see Ludus vs. Narratio (p. 85)).
It is also possible to reverse the direction of the medium vs. form relationship and view
play as the medium, with games appearing as forms within that medium. In contrast to the
logical conflicts induced by the part-whole relations discussed above, no contradictions
manifest themselves. Yet other paradoxa do become manifest in the observation of play.
Before I attempt to summarize these aspects, I want to draw attention to phenomena that
point against the positive and affirmative stance towards play — its dark side.
2.8 Play vs. Dark Play
In the previous sections, my discussions of play invite a largely affirmative reading, declar-
ing play as a necessary counterweight to work (see Play vs. Work (p. 51)), identifying
positive effects on learning and creativity (see Play vs. Learning (p. 56)) and postulating
play and art as the last autotelic islands in a sea of externally imposed purpose (see Play
vs. Purpose (p. 54)). But play can also have quite opposite connotations.
In this section I want to look at the other side of the coin and discuss phenomena of play
that range from unpleasant and controversial to outright harmful. Given the ubiquity of play
we can expect a certain range of “dark” phenomena. Mortensen, Linderoth, and Brown
(2015) have collected a range of investigations into controversial themes associated with
various forms of play, especially in the context of games (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)).
Johan Huizinga (1955, p. 89-104), who has been criticised for a perceived glorification of
antagonistic manifestations of play (see What Is Play? (p. 15)), claims that play includes
tournaments, ritualised conflict and even war, justified by a heroic motive of loyalty. Richard
Schechner (1998, p. 16) on the other hand stresses the significance of play as ritualistic
and creative destabilization, “wherein the play frame is absent, broken, porous, or twisted.”
Having observed the unbridled joy of players that have voluntarily submitted to the artworks
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Painstation (Reiff and Morawe 2001) and Inferno (Demers and Vorn 2015), I can testify to
the compatibility of play and physical discomfort.
Those kinds of are absent from modern debates about violence in video games, which
rather echo previous discussions about the negative impact of media such as film, comics
and novels. Debates about media violence cross distinctions discussed in the next
chapter (Virtual vs. Real (p. 73)), while the scientific judgement is oscillating between two
opposites: catharsis and imitation. Catharsis means that the exposure to violence has a
“cleansing” effect; a theory that has been ascribed to Aristotle (compare Paradoxa of Play
(p. 69)). Opponents of this idea have pointed to the harmful nature of virtual violence and
claimed causal links to sustained aggressive behaviour (Anderson and Dill 2000).
However, I claim that games are media like books or film and therefore they must be able
to express controversial and disturbing themes such as domestic violence against women
(Sinker, Phillips, and Rijke 2017). This also has consequences for crossing distinctions
between the diegetic and the non-diegetic (see Magic vs. Pervasive (p. 128)). While
scientific debates about cause and effect regarding the consumption of video games
and violence are ongoing, connections between a cultural identification as “gamers” and
antisocial behaviour can be observed. Recurring incidents of online harassment and
cyberstalking in the so-called “Gamergate” phenomenon (Mortensen 2016) show up as
a particular instance of Sutton-Smith’s rhetoric of play as cultural identity (see What Is
Play? (p. 15)). For Sutton-Smith, in accordance with Bernie DeKoven, community-building
aspects of play can be non-competitive and beneficial (DeKoven 2013). This optimistic and
welcoming stance represents one side of play as identity, festivals and as opportunities for
dropping social boundaries. Gamergate, as an epiphenomenon of playing video games,
exemplifies the hostile side of identification, an attempt to define and entrench a certain
identity of “gamer culture”, justifying violence and harassment. It has prompted academic
reactions (Ruffino 2016) as well as direct opposition9 (Alexander 2014).
Far from the level of cultural antagonism manifest in social systems, biological systems
engage in playful agonistic activities, namely in “rough and tumble play”, a widespread
behaviour observable in animals and children. It involves physical conflict while lacking
an intention to harm the opponent. Yet scientists describe its function as a preparation
for actual hostile confrontations (Burghardt 2005b). It therefore relates to the boundaries
9This evokes Huntington’s hypothesis that clashes between cultural identities are becoming the prevalent
lines of conflict (Huntington 1993). In the case of Gamergate, cultural identity emerges in virtual communities,
an effect that has been observed empirically, see for example (Rafał 2013) and (Baltezarevic et al. 2019).
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between virtual and real (compare Virtual vs. Real (p. 73)). In terms of cultural impact,
video games and AI have evolved separately and at a different pace. In the past, debates
about games were dominated by tropes of hazard (Anderson and Dill 2000) and addiction
(Griffiths, Kuss, and King 2012), until scrutiny, critique and meta-analyses began to add
some much-needed counterweights to the discussion (Griffiths and Davies 2005; Ferguson
2015; Bean et al. 2017).
Another “dark” phenomenon of play is questioning the definition of play as voluntary (see
What Is Play? (p. 15)). In contrast to external obligations, play is considered autotelic
and voluntary (compare Play vs. Work (p. 51) and Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)). In the
context of playbour in Massive Multi-User Online Role-Playing Games such as World of
Warcraft, instances of forced play have been reported (Nakamura 2009). Play, the epitome
of voluntary activity becomes forced labour, an obvious paradox.
2.9 Paradoxa of Play
Arguing from the multitude of perspectives I have been considering in this chapter, I want
to come back to the question of why I claim that distinctions, not definitions can provide
a comprehensive description of play. By travelling across distinctions, we have already
encountered many phenomena that are paradoxical, contradictory or conflict with each
other.
A central paradox of play is the distinction between first person and third person per-
spective. In other words, the fundamental difference between what I am experiencing
during play and what someone observes who is watching me play.10 The latter includes a
second-order observer, the play researcher who constructs the experimental setting and
produces scientific artefacts such as hypotheses, theories, experiments, measurements
and academic papers (compare Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). The former comprises
immediate impressions, emotions and thoughts: the phenomenology of my individual
experience.
This epistemological gap is not particular to play, and philosophy has had a long tradition
in discussing the relationship between a first and a third person perspective (McGinn
1996). Fundamentally, I do not have direct access to someone else’s mind, neither has
10A second possible path to follow at this point is the distinction between what you are experiencing vs.
what I am experiencing, which leads to questions further discussed in chapter Human vs. Machine (p. 97).
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the scientist. It remains a black box (see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p.
29)). Therefore, we must rely on taking part in communication and observing it (compare
Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)).
In section Play vs. Purpose (p. 54) I have speculated that the purpose of play is likely
to be influenced by the purpose of the observer — restating the idea of Sutton-Smith’s
rhetorics (see What Is Play? (p. 15)). Now I can state my conclusion more clearly: A child
that is put inside a laboratory is likely not playing in the same way it is playing outside of
the lab. Even if we assume that the child entering the experimental situation might forget
after some time that there is a camera in the corner of the room, that it was greeted by
someone in a white lab coat, that their parents were signing some documents, it is still
within a scientific environment, experiencing conditions that are shaped by work. The
empirical scientist prepares the situation based on a particular research question and the
anthropologist makes their observation based on a previous body of knowledge (see Play
and Discipline(s) (p. 151)).
Jeffrey Goldstein criticises research about video games and violence (see Play vs. Dark
Play (p. 67)) on similar grounds: “In laboratory experiments, no one plays. Being required
to play a violent game on demand is not play. Play is voluntary and self-directed, something
that cannot be captured in a laboratory experiment” (Goldstein 2001).
In our hypothetical situation, the child might play along and imitate play to please the
adults but it would not encounter the same environmental conditions if it would play by
itself without the experimental context (see System vs. Environment (p. 123)). For me this
represents the paradox of play: play can be only experienced when there is no non-ludic
observer or when the player is not aware of the observation. Thus the scientist is forced
to cheat11When scientific observation is present, the phenomenon is likely not to be play.
This strange loop of an observation that is affecting the observed reminds of phenomena
in quantum physics (compare Maturana and Varela: Perception Is Distinction (p. 32),
footnote).
While this issue is not limited to play, I think it is important to highlight it in the context of
a discipline that is still seeking its methodologies (see Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). I
would therefore identify the observer problem as the most significant paradox associated
with play. There are, however, other examples that have been discussed by scholars of
11The scientist also has to construct a perceived impact of the experiment in order to justify the necessity of
cheating and to obtain ethical clearance for it (see Discussion (p. 141)).
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play and games.
One is the relationship between play and games itself that I have described in section Play
vs. Games (p. 65). Other perceived paradoxa concern games proper. Jesper Juul (2013)
has identified a puzzling attitude towards failing in video games that he calls the paradox
of failure. He claims that in contrast to situations outside of games, players actively seek
failure in games and that they seem to enjoy it. Juul admits that similar observations can be
made about stories and drama, but he argues that games are special, because the player
is confronted with her own failure, failure is used for improvement and the consequences
of a video game are not tangible12 (see Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)). The observation
that people are actively seeking exposure to tragic, controversial and violent content has
traditionally been explained with catharsis, a concept that originates from Aristotle (Gilbert
1926) (compare Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67)).
Kolnai (1965) describes a slightly different perspective, claiming that games understood
as events that take place in space and time expose a paradox, because there is a conflict
between the player’s goal of sustaining the game and making an end to it by winning the
game. Carse (1987) takes the distinction between finite and infinite games further into
the philosophical and even spiritual realm. Carse distinguishes playing ordinary, finite
games from the aspiration of a playful life (compare the speculation “Everything is play” in
section Counterpoint: Machines Play (p. 118)). We can find a similar spirit in DeKoven’s
description of the “playful path” (DeKoven 2014).
Myers (2012) debated Suits (1969) who in turn critiqued Kolnai (1965) over a second
paradox of play. Their topic concerns what Kolnai calls “the vacuity of agonistic pursuit
within the game” where players fight over things that have no “real” value.13 This leads
directly to the main distinction of the next chapter: virtual vs. real.
2.10 Summary: Distinctively Playful
In this chapter I have explored the inter-relationship between play and non-play through a
variety of distinctions. Starting from the distinction between play and work, I have made
12There are many situations where playing games carries tangible consequences (compare Play vs. Dark
Play (p. 67)) and for this argument to be valid, Juul needs to construct an idealised situation in which the
game is purely played for its own sake (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)).
13There is a certain irony in the fact that Kolnai choses chess, a game that is widely played in the context of
professional sports with prizes attached as the example for a game without “real” outcomes.
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use of my systems-theoretic approach introduced in chapter Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15)
in order to observe a wide range of phenomena related to play.
Furthermore, my chosen methodology makes it possible to observe other observers,
while avoiding reductionism, a stance where play is explained from pre-existing principles
inherent in the observer. Spiel 1 has served as a playful example for my critical reflection
of the problematic notion of serious games made for pedagogic purposes.
As a recurrent theme, I have been crossing various boundaries between an inner and an
outer space: first person vs. third person perspective, intrinsic vs. extrinsic purpose, the
cybernetic black box vs. the glass box. Attempts to keep play firmly on one of those sides,
however, must be considered futile: play escapes categorisation and continuously crosses
these distinctions, playfully.
For example, consider the discussion about internal vs. external purpose (see Play vs.
Purpose (p. 54)). One might conclude that play connects us to ourselves in an autotelic
manner, while work brings external purposes to light. But we can immediately see how
play, like work, connects us to other participants within a social system. We still can
acknowledge the whimsical nature of play, yet play in itself becomes more meaningful. All
we have to do is to cross the distinction between psychic and social system.
A significant aspect of play that has not been discussed so far appears in what psycholo-
gists observe as pretend play. Huizinga (1955) and later Salen and Zimmerman (2003)
describe play happening inside a “magic circle”, where different laws govern our behaviour
than outside of the play experience. We are also reminded that play comes along with
fictional stories, with unicorns, monsters and strange universes. Therefore, it is time to
clarify the various relationships between play and reality.
Let us enter the magic circle.
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Chapter 3
Virtual vs. Real
Virtual Reality is a rather miserable idea.
Slavoj Žižek (2012, p. 3)
3.1 Is Play Real?
In the previous chapter, I have navigated through a manifold of phenomena related to play
by following a particular path through a set of distinctions. A significant aspect of play, to
be discussed in this chapter, concerns its various relations to reality.
I have touched upon ontological questions in section Definitions vs. Distinctions: What
Is “Is”? (p. 23) in the context of explaining my methodology. I started from a critique of
methods rooted in identity and definitions and then continued by observing phenomena
through the lens of distinctions, without concern about what “reality is”.1 Being/not being
can then be observed as a distinction, in lieu of an assumption of some externally given
metaphysical entity. Similarly, Luhmann (1996, p. 12) is not too much concerned about
ontological premises: “The following considerations assume that there are systems”. As
discussed in section Spencer Brown: Draw a Distinction (p. 28), the “trick” is to set an act
of observing into motion by drawing a distinction. This allows other observations to follow,
an actualisation of possibilities that in turn produces meaning, the medium in which truth,
reality and knowledge are constructed. The mind as an autopoietic system (see Maturana
and Varela: Perception Is Distinction (p. 32) and Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning
1Thus I was able to avoid an infinite regress that is triggered by the self–referential structure revealed
in that expression. “What reality is” presupposes its own target of investigation. For a discussion of that
circularity see for example (Heidegger 2013, p. 194-195).
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(p. 33)) ascribe meaning and social systems communicate within it. The evolved social
system that operates with knowledge and is concerned with the distinction between true
and false is the system of Wissenschaft, the sciences and the humanities.2
My own starting point was the distinction between virtual and real that is latent in the
concept of virtual reality. In 2016 I began to design and deliver workshops that interrogate
this distinction in practical and theoretical ways. In the following sections I will discuss this
project before returning to the question in what sense we can characterise play as real. I
will clarify different concepts of reality and non-reality and describe how truth, reality and
meaning play together. By crossing over to the other sides of these distinctions, concepts
such as imaginary, pretend play and narration will appear. Finally, I will come back to the
distinction between virtual and real.
In the following sections I will again take the position of a second-order observer (see
Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)) by looking at the distinctions that other
observers operate with, in order to identify real and non-real aspects of play. What do
concepts like actual, potential, virtual and real reveal about play and games? How do
the sciences and humanities differ in their respective approaches? Which distinctions
do they select to observe play? What is the role of the medium and how do we make
sense of fictional accounts, of make-believe and of pretend-play? Can we draw meaningful
distinctions that have been overlooked, shift our focus or revisit others? To pursue these
answers, let us enter a virtual reality.
3.2 Project: Imperfect VR
“ARE WE LIVING IN A VIRTUAL REALITY? It doesn’t matter. It is on us, the creators and
inhabitants of virtual worlds, to decide and shape the realities we are going to experience.
Are we going to consume the visions of large corporations that are keen on selling us
their latest branded outputs for entertainment? Or the creative, quirky, touching, open,
experiences that connect us to a deeper meaning of what it is to be human (or a bat3)”
(Straeubig 2016e).
The above quotation is taken from the material for my Imperfect VR project. It consists of a
2In the German language, “Wissenschaft” encompasses the sciences (Naturwissenschaften), social
sciences (Sozialwissenschaften) and the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). I am using “academia” and
“sciences and humanities” as umbrella terms for the these disciplines.
3The bat is an allusion to Thomas Nagel’s essay (Nagel 1974) (see Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)).
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manifesto (see Discussion (p. 77)), a series of workshops and an open source codebase.
3.2.1 Development
I began developing Imperfect VR in summer 2016, when I delivered the first workshop at
Electromagnetic Field, a bi-annual, non-profit community event that takes place outdoors.4
I created a presentation, handouts and code examples featuring a number of small,
interactive virtual reality scenes. The code for the workshops is written in HTML and
JavaScript. It is hosted on a web server, which can be run locally or from an address in
the internet. Part of the workshop consists in setting up a coding environment, so that
participants can continue to work on their virtual worlds later.
Since the beginning of the project, I keep updating the materials for Imperfect VR. The
code is based on A-Frame, an open source Web VR framework developed by volunteers
under the stewardship of the Mozilla Foundation.5 This framework is being updated from
time to time with new features and fixed bugs. The software also must be adapted to
technical developments and changing restrictions for Web browsers running on mobile
devices. In addition, I am examining and revising workshop materials before and after each
event, integrating discussion points, adding new references, and adapting instructions.
3.2.2 Exposition
Since 2016, I have given a dozen workshops, commissioned by various organisations,
with approximately 250 participants in total. The events in detail:
• Electromagnetic Field, Guildford, UK (August 2016)
• Off the Lip, Plymouth University, UK (October 2016)
• Royal College of Art, London, UK (November 2016)
• Space Art and Technology, London, UK (February 2017)
• Future Imperfect Symposium, Plymouth University, UK (April 2017)
• Doomed Gallery, London as part of Antiuniversity Now, London, UK (June 2017)
• Vivid Projects, Birmingham, UK (August 2017)
4https://www.emfcamp.org
5https://aframe.io
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Figure 3.1: The Imperfect VR manifesto
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Figure 3.2: A scene created for Imperfect VR
• Games and Simulation enhanced Learning (GSeL) conference, Plymouth, UK
(November 2017)
• Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, China (November 2017)
• Donghua University, Shanghai, China (November 2017)
• Social Fiction Lab, Berlin, Germany (February 2018)
• 35th Chaos Communication Congress (35C3), Leipzig, Germany, as part of the
Social Fiction Society (December 2018)
The Imperfect VR codebase is published under the open source MIT License (Straeubig
2016e). The code and learning materials can be freely used, modified and deployed under
the condition that the included copyright notice is retained.6
3.2.3 Discussion
I created Imperfect VR in a reaction to issues that I noticed in the evolution of virtual
reality: a reductionist focus on technical aspects, commercial pressure and exclusionary
conditions. The spirit of Imperfect VR is summarised in the slogan “We are not aiming for
6The code and materials are available at https://github.com/i3games/imperfect–vr.
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a perfect reality but will have fun in the virtual.” and in the Imperfect VR manifesto depicted
above.
The project aims at the distinction between consumers and creators. In his famous state-
ment “the medium is the message”, Marshall McLuhan reminds us that the introduction of
a new medium is simultaneously restructuring personal and social relations7 (McLuhan
1994). This process raises questions about ownership and control. How will the production,
distribution and consumption of VR content be organised? Who will build and control
future virtual worlds? A multi-billion industry? Some highly trained specialists? Or can it
be everyone? Will the majority of people consume this medium from corporate app stores
or will a wider demographic be able to create experiences for themselves and for others?
Game designer Robert Yang gets to the heart of this issue, when he says: “Artists and
queers and weirdos need to hit VR now, and hit hard, before VR culture ends up as
conservative as the worst of gamer culture” (Yang 2016). Yang pleads with urgency for
a diversity of voices among the creators of virtual reality, against the background of a
“gamer culture” that is grounded on excessive self-identification by a group of video game
consumers (Mortensen 2016) (compare Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67)).
This is a powerful call to arms, but where do these diverse creators come from, how
do they share knowledge, what are the social structures8 and what are the tools that
empower them to contribute? There is a historical analogy to film-making, mirrored in the
origin of Imperfect VR and its manifesto which is inspired by the Imperfect Cinema project
initiated by Allister Gall and Dan Paolantonio.9 Imperfect Cinema interrogates the idea of
imperfection, using film as research into participatory practices (Gall 2016). That project,
which created and nourished a longstanding community of do-it-yourself film-makers, in
turn is inspired by the essay “For an imperfect cinema” by Julio García Espinosa (1979).
Espinosa identifies revolutionary potential in the antithesis to technical perfection, which is
pursued and promoted by the mainstream film industry located in Hollywood.
This “emancipatory potential of imperfection” (Gall 2016, p. vi) can be applied to virtual
reality as well. I believe that it is possible despite a growing commercialisation for a wider
range of people to create their own virtual experiences. To explore this claim in practice,
7This is why the distinction between VR as a technology and VR as a medium matters. While the technology
is 50 years old (Sutherland 1968), I contend that the medium is just emerging.
8My own experience as a lecturer has led me to believe that the traditional education system is less likely
to support this kind of diversity, as both student and industry expectations as well as high barriers to entry
work against it.
9https://imperfectcinema.com
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I developed Imperfect VR as a set of workshops that enable participants to create their
own, imperfect virtual reality experience with a few lines of code. Participants usually
bring their own laptops and smartphones, while cardboard VR viewers are provided by the
hosting organisation.10 The software used in the workshop as well as the specification
for the cardboard viewers is open source (Google VR 2016). A code repository on
GitHub contains all code and artwork files as well as further resources. I do not assume
that participants have any pre-existing experience with computer programming and the
workshop announcements are carefully worded to avoid technical jargon.
At the end of each workshop, the participants have created a small VR world by themselves
and have received feedback on how to continue. In addition to teaching basic skills for
VR development, we discuss cultural, economical, political and philosophical implications
of VR, drawing from resources such as Harman’s “Brain in the Vat” thought experiment
(Harman 1973), Berger’s and Elkins’ constructivist approaches to perception (Berger 2008;
Elkins 1997) and Žižek’s critique of the distinction between virtual and real (Wright 2012)
(see Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)).
Imperfect VR is my contribution to the development of Virtual Realities (compare Experien-
tial Architecture (p. 160)), an attempt to foster a diverse ecology of creators and production
practices accompanied by critical reflection. If virtual and augmented reality will play larger
roles in the future, these are factors that I would like to see more often.11. Utilising the
medium vs. form distinction (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)) has been useful in this respect:
framing VR as a medium through which a variety of forms can appear invites curiosity,
creativity and experimentation. The attitude of imperfection that I adopted from Imperfect
Cinema was the key to fearlessly approach questions such as: What can be expressed
within this medium? Which forms are possible? What happens when one tries to break
the limitations? To discuss these issues in more depth by observing different distinctions,
a closer look at notions of reality is required.
3.3 Virtual vs. Physical
My critique of the reality of virtual reality expressed through Imperfect VR is grounded in
what I see as an over-emphasis of technological discourses to the detriment of cultural and
10Usually, a nominal fee is charged in order to contribute to the costs and to prevent no–shows.
11The distinction between virtual and augmented reality, discussed in section Virtual vs. Physical (p. 79)
does not make a difference in this context, therefore I can omit it here
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political concerns. Whereas accounts like Rheingold (1992) and Woolley (1993) hint at the
cultural utopianism with which virtual reality was perceived in the early 1990s, the present
“reality of the virtual” (compare Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)) feels mainly technology driven.
Its central concepts like mixed, augmented and virtual reality are based on purely tech-
nological distinctions, in particular on Milgram et al.’s taxonomy that aims to describe a
spectrum between “real” and “virtual” displays (Milgram, Takemura, et al. 1995; Milgram
and Kishino 1994). Augmented reality denotes the case where computer generated
objects are added to the perception of the physical surrounding, whilst in virtual reality, the
complete visual perception is computer generated. Mixed reality describes all situations
that are neither purely virtual nor purely physical, which includes augmented reality as a
special case.
While the paper by Milgram et al. describes visual displays, the authors claim that “many
of the concepts proposed here pertain as well to analogous issues associated with other
display modalities” (Milgram and Kishino 1994, p. 6). Without further explanation they then
discuss “virtual objects” and “virtual worlds”12 (Milgram and Kishino 1994).
My goal in the present discussion is to illuminate the underlying distinction between
virtual and real, which Milgram and Kishino (1994, p. 6-7) express in the following pair
of definitions: “Real objects are any objects that have an actual objective existence” and
“Virtual objects are objects that exist in essence or effect, but not formally or actually”.
Although the first definition appears tautological, it rests on the silent assumption of naïve
realism (see Reality vs. Truth (p. 88)). Thus I prefer to distinguish virtual reality (in the
technical sense) from physical reality, the perception of computer-generated images from
the perception of the physical environment.
The second definition alludes to the Aristotelean concept of potentiality. In the conjunction
of both, we can observe a pair of distinctions, real vs. imaginary (see Real vs. Imaginary
(p. 80)) and actual vs. potential (see Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)).
3.4 Real vs. Imaginary
Controversial debates like the one between Burghardt and Sutton-Smith (see What Is
Play? (p. 15)) can possibly reveal a multitude of distinctions. While opposing positions
12This indiscriminate conflation of concepts such as display, perception and world is a concern that I would
like to addres in a future inquiry.
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illustrate the most salient contradictions, it is equally worth paying attention to what is not
said, through silent assumptions, deliberate omission or other factors. With this in mind,
I am analysing the recent discourse between the philosopher David Chalmers and the
game studies scholar Jesper Juul.
Chalmers (2017) draws a distinction between virtual and real by arguing that “virtual reality
is a sort of genuine reality, virtual objects are real objects, and what goes on in virtual
reality is truly real” (Chalmers 2017, p. 1). In particular, he describes two realities where
virtual objects exist in virtual space, having virtual properties, affecting each other as well
as our perception. They also exist as digital objects in the same way that data structures
and algorithms exist within the computer. Both modalities are real, Chalmers argues,
by attributing causal powers to virtual objects, but he neglects to delve deeper into the
phenomenology of virtual experiences. Instead, he postulates that a “naïve” perceiver
would not be able to draw a distinction between virtual reality and ordinary experience
while a “sophisticated” one would be able to observe a distinction.
Juul argues with this position by stating that virtual objects are designed for particular,
limited sets of interactions that arise from the intentions of the designers to provide fictional
contexts (Juul 2019). Therefore, according to Juul, everything in VR is purely fictional.
I want to point out that in this debate both Chalmers and Juul adopt virtual reality more or
less in its technological sense (see Virtual vs. Physical (p. 79)) and that both settle on
naïve realism (compare Reality vs. Truth (p. 88)). I find more informative concepts in the
contributions of Wolfgang Welsch (2000), Brian Massumi (2002), Espen Aarseth (2016)
and in Gehmann and Reiche (2014). These authors reflect on notions of virtuality and of
reality, such as Aarseth’s ludo-hermeneutics, which draw attention to new distinctions. I
will observe some of them in the next sections, after looking at the fundamental question
about the genesis of play.
Winnicott (2010) identifies the origin of play in the space between mother and baby,
when the infant transitions between stages of development between inner and external
reality. We might say that in the phenomenology of the child, biological, psychic and
social systems begin to differentiate and it constructs its realities in and through play.
Sutton-Smith denotes these developments as “rhetorics of child play” (Sutton-Smith 1997,
p. 35-51) and “child phantasmagoria” (Sutton-Smith 1997, p. 151-172).
During their development, children engage in deliberate counterfactual play (Piaget 1962),
81
a phenomenon psychologists call “pretend play” (Jarrold et al. 1994). To pretend, one
must be able to distinguish two realities, the one that is pretended and the un-pretended
one. Does a child play before it can make this distinction? For adults, this distinction is
central to role-playing activities and games in which players construct imaginary realities by
temporally assuming different names, roles and identities (Sutton-Smith 1997, p. 91-110)
against the backdrop of their real ones. Alternate reality games (ARG) like I Love Bees
(42 Entertainment 2004) play a strange loop with reality by pretending not to be a game, a
design principle known as TINAG (“This is not a game”). An extreme form of an ARG is
depicted in the movie The Game (Fincher 1997) where the protagonist is drawn into an
elaborate play with fiction and reality. By denying their game character, alternate reality
games both create and challenge the magic circle and play with their players’ suspension
of disbelief (Szulborski 2005).
The observation that play takes place within different realities is expressed prominently in
Huizinga’s concept of the magic circle (Huizinga 1955). Game designer Eric Zimmerman
has managed to both popularise it (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, p. 92-99) and to downplay
its significance (Zimmerman 2012). In analogy to the debate concerning ludology vs.
narratology (see Ludus vs. Narratio (p. 85) and Play and Discipline(s)), the magic circle
has occupied the game studies, with both attackers (Consalvo 2009) and defenders
(Stenros 2012) on the fence.
I agree with Zimmerman that assuming an environmental boundary for play presents a
useful design concept, in particular, I would add, in the context of autopoietic systems
(compare Maturana and Varela: Perception Is Distinction and System vs. Environment
(p. 123)). However, it is crucial to understand that in particular social systems do not
necessarily represent physical, spatial or temporal boundaries, but operational closures.
This is beautifully illustrated by Rogue Game, First Play, a playful artwork by Sophie
Warren and Jonathan Mosley. Its proposition states: “Seek out an indoor sports hall
with markings of at least three different game courts or pitches overlaid. Enlist teams
of players for each game. On court assemble the players dressed to indicate team and
game. On the whistle, simultaneously all games begin. Each game is played for its official
duration” (Warren and Mosley 2012). The three simultaneously running games share
space, time and symbolic environment while operating autonomously and irritating each
other (compare Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)).
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Finally, if all cultural life is born in the space between infant and mother that Winnicott
calls the “third area” (Winnicott 2010, p. 95-103), then this area of play represents the
primordial magic circle. It is the area in which the first distinction is drawn by an awaking
mind: “[. . . ] our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first
place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please. At this stage, the universe
cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it, and the world may seem like shifting
sand beneath our feet” (Spencer-Brown 2008, p. v).
3.5 Actual vs. Potential
The second distinction that spawns from the discussion in section Virtual vs. Physical
(p. 79) is actual vs. potential. Historically derived meanings for “virtual” like strength and
virtue (Shields 2003, p. 1-17) can be understood as describing a potential to exert certain
effects in the world. Deleuze has called such effects “capacities” and denotes capacities
that are not actualised as “virtual” (Deleuze 1994).
Virtual denotes one side of a distinction, where the other side is actual. It is a distinction
within a second distinction, the one between what is possible and what is not. In contrast
to the distinction real vs. imaginary, both the actual and the virtual capacities denote
modalities of reality. In systems-theoretic terms both actual and virtual are possibilities and
it is the act of actualising these possibilities that constitutes meaning (see The Meaning of
“Meaning” (p. 87)), both for minds and for communication (Baecker 2013a).
I am therefore inclined to propose that we replace the technical notion of virtual reality
discussed in section Virtual vs. Physical (p. 79) with the idea of virtual realities, the
multitude of constructed realities that are waiting to be actualised. The former is concerned
with fidelity of reproduction, the grade to which a simulation models reality and the extent
to which it feels present (compare Presence vs. Immersion (p. 127)). Virtual realities, in
contrast, are simply the possibilities from which we select the actual reality.
The division also allows these virtualities to be expressed within fictional contexts without
running into strange self-referential loops. I will turn towards a few examples in the following
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section.
3.6 Virtual vs. Fictional
In many cultural and technological contexts, fiction and reality are interwoven, influencing
and fertilising each other. Virtual reality has inspired authors, artists and designers and in
turn the production and reception of new technology is influenced by narrative accounts.
The holodeck is a fictional device from the television and movie series Star Trek that allows
crew members to interact with holograms. It was inspired by a laboratory in New York City,
built by one of the world’s first holographers (Meet The Man Behind The Holodeck, Part 1
2014). The holodeck represents a techno-utopist version of mixed reality — as long as
the fictional technology remains functional. Despite an integrated safety subsystem, it
regularly malfunctions, creating dramatic situations for the protagonists. These incidents,
as described in (Memory Alpha Fandom Editors 2018), illustrate a host of speculative and
ethical questions.
One of the recurring topics regarding new forms of media is the danger of addiction
(Griffiths, Kuss, and King 2012; Bean et al. 2017; Griffiths and Davies 2005). Strange Days,
a 1995 science fiction thriller directed by Catherine Bigelow (1995), depicts a dystopian
view of virtual reality. In the movie, virtual reality consists of 360 degree recordings
of people’s experiences, replicating their memories and sensations in an absolutely
realistic fidelity. The hyper-immersive quality effectively acts as a highly addictive drug and
consequently the technology was made illegal.
The VR-as-drug trope is also present in Snow Crash, a cyberpunk novel written by Neil
Stephenson (2011). Snow Crash is a cyber-drug which replicates as a computer virus
inside virtual reality. However, it also can bleed (see Magic vs. Pervasive (p. 128)) into
the (fictional) reality of the novel and infect the person represented by the avatar. The
book depicts a metaverse of connected, collective virtual shared spaces. The author of
Snow Crash serves as “Chief Futurist” of Magic Leap, a technology company that offers
a mixed reality headset. Magic Leap has published its updated vision of the metaverse,
the “Magicverse” (Abovitz 2019), which in turn is inspired by Walt Disney’s mid-1960s
Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow (EPCOT) (Gennawey 2014).
Ready Player One, a novel by Steven Cline (2016) that was made into a movie by
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Steven Spielberg (2018), picks up retro-gaming and virtual reality as plot devices on the
background of a dystopian future. The nostalgia of playing retro video games can be
analysed through the tension between the fictional space of the game and the social space
of media reception (Felzmann 2010).
Multiple distinctions between fictional, real and virtual appear in the comparison of William
Gibson’s novel Idoru (Gibson 2011) with Hatsune Miku, a virtual idol developed by
Japanese media company Crypton Future Media (Zaborowski 2016). In the story, Rei
Toei is a famous virtual pop idol that is rumoured to be married to a human rock singer
in Seattle. In reality, the virtual idol Hatsune Miku, developed from a piece of speech
synthesis software, has evolved into a celebrity with an own Manga series, video games
and pop music. Hatsune Miku is known for live performances, in which the avatar is
projected onstage as a hologram. In 2018, a Japanese man was reported to have married
a hologram version of Hatsune Miku (Japan Times 2018).
Rei Toei can be characterised as a “fictional virtual” character and Hatsune Miku a
“real virtual” one, while their counterparts in this schema would then have to be called
“fictional real” and “real real”. In summary, I have arrived at multiple realities that must be
distinguished by the other sides of their distinctions, respectively.
3.7 Ludus vs. Narratio
In the previous section I have looked at the virtual through the lens of the fictional, crossing
distinctions between virtual, fictional and real. By offering my comments on a real debate
concerning fictional content, this section examines the distinction fictional vs. real from a
different perspective, originating in Jesper Juul’s characterisation of games as “half-real”.
Juul (2005) is locating the boundary between real and unreal in the distinction between
rules and fictional narrative content.
Curiously, this distinction mirrors the rift that the nascent field of game studies has been
occupied with from its inception. It is known as the narratology vs. ludology debate (Frasca
1999). The two conflicting positions can be summarised as follows: Narratologists insist
that games are instances of the narrative form, comparable to novels, comics and film.
Ludologists view video games as a special case based on their interactive, simulative and
rule-bound nature (Arjoranta and Karhulahti 2014).
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This perceived dichotomy has caused a significant amount of controversy. When Janet
Murray (1998) offered a reading of Tetris as “a perfect enactment of the overtasked lives
of Americans in the 1990s”, it created a major stir in ludologist circles (Eskelinen 2001).
The game, an abstract puzzle whose goal it is to efficiently pack falling shapes together, is
considered a prime example for the non-representative and rule based nature of games.
A third faction has emerged that takes issue with the debate itself.13 This ranges from the
assertion that the apparent differences are not valid (Simons 2007) to the claim that they
are based on misunderstandings (Frasca 2003) and from a suggestion for a unification of
the positions (Aarseth 2012) to a prominent call to an end of the debate (Murray 2013).
And indeed, one could easily argue against both positions. For one, it appears evident
that there are abstract games like Tetris, Solitaire or Chess whose narrative connotations
do not play any role in playing the game (Murray 2012). Stories that may have existed in
these games are — in Bateson’s words — differences that do not make a difference14
(Bateson 2000a). An argument against the apparent singularity of games would be that
procedural, rule-based and interactive elements can be observed in other forms of art,
like performance (compare Andersen and Stott: Play at Play (p. 37)) and generative and
conceptual15 art.16 Phillip Schweighauser notices that narratology as characterised in the
debate misrepresents a mainstream position in literary disciplines (Schweighauser 2009).
I conclude from these observations that any definition that aims to separate games from
other forms of art based on intrinsic properties of the (art-)work is bound to fail. Can
systems theory offer alternative approaches? Galanter (2003) observes generative art
from the perspective of complex systems, which stays within the realm of the artefact
(compare Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)). But higher-level observation
(see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)) enables looking at this debate by
asking about its autopoiesis and therefore about its own environment. This opens up new
perspectives on the relationships between games, artificial intelligence and the art system
(see Games vs. Art (p. 63) and Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)) and on the
13A confusing aspect here is that critics of the debate (e.g. Espen Aarseth and Janet Murray) are also
identifiable as members of one of the opposing camps.
14Bateson defined the unit of information, as “a difference which makes a difference” (Bateson 2000b,
p. 321).
15For example, Yoko Ono’s Snow Piece: “Take a tape of the sound of the snow falling. This should be done
in the evening. Do not listen to the tape. Cut it and use it as strings to tie gifts with.” (Ono 1963), cited from
(Iversen 2010, p. 98).
16A common theme between games and procedural concept art is that both utilize the tension between
algorithmic determinism and chance (compare Iversen (2010) and Costikyan (2015)).
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observation of ludic phenomena in game studies versus in other disciplines (see Play and
Discipline(s) (p. 151)).
3.8 The Meaning of “Meaning”
Pre-Socratic philosophy was concerned with the nature of reality itself, an enterprise that
has been labelled as ontology. Epistemology then takes into account the relationship
between an outer reality and inner knowledge of it (Audi 2002). One prominent example is
Plato’s claim that perceptions are literally imaginary and that truth lies in unobservable
and abstract ideas (Plato 1984, p. 312-340). In contrast, Aristotle (1998) distinguished
between virtuality and actuality and held that the material has the potential to become real.
These concepts already provide a rich landscape for twenty-five centuries of Western
philosophy discussing aspects of (non-)reality. The aim of this chapter is to investigate a
small subset in their relation to play through mutually crossing distinctions. I will therefore
skip some of the grand or voguish theories that nonetheless provide a background for
the present discussion. For instance, Kant postulates that the potential (possible) and
the actual represent different modalities that both share the same reality (Kant 2007).
Deleuze, on the other hand, proceeds from the Bergsonian concept of virtual (Bergson
2007; Ansell-Pearson 2005), and mirrors Aristotle (1998) in distinguishing between actual
and potential. While presenting different positions, these theories still share a definitory
stance, their commitment to set down what these concepts “actually are”. In sections
Definitions vs. Distinctions: What Is “Is”? (p. 23) and Requirements for a New Paradigm (p.
24) I have indicated that these efforts inevitably run into strange loops and that they can
be replaced by constructivist approaches that rely on second order observation instead.
That means that we can opt out of a naïve realism, the metaphysical assumption of an
objective reality that “just exists”. By considering the act of perception instead, reality is
to be understood as a phenomenon that is mediated through the senses. As discussed
in chapter Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15), Maturana and Varela describe perception
in organisms as an active process of an autopoietic system rather than the passive
experience of a reality as such (Maturana and Varela 1980). The school of radical
constructivism took these ideas further, claiming that every contact with reality requires an
agent capable of actively constructing the world (see Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms
(p. 30)). Both Berger (2008) and Elkins (1997) describe perception in terms of knowledge,
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cultural mediation and construction of meaning. John Berger concisely summarises these
accounts: “We only see what we look at” (Berger 2008, p. 8). Heinz von Foerster concurs
by contributing what he calls the aesthetical imperative: “If you desire to see, learn how to
act” (von Foerster 1973).
A place where we can learn to act is Gestalt psychology (Smith 1988), which transfers the
idea of self-organised minds into the practical realm, both into perception and into creation
in design and art (Seyler 2013). As an example, the figure-ground organisation can be
seen as a special case of the operation of drawing a distinction (see Spencer Brown: Draw
a Distinction (p. 28)): the selection is bistable and the operation of crossing the boundary
fluctuates with assigning the borders to either side (Rubin 1921).
Meaning also distinguishes psychic and social systems, which operate with meaning, from
biological ones, which do not. An illustration: in an ongoing game (a social system), two
minds (psychic systems) are involved, autopoietically forming and processing expectations,
thoughts, intentions, while the game communicates. The systems are separate yet
structurally coupled: if one of the involved minds would stop operating, the social system
would cease to exist. These minds are neither elements nor subsystems of the social
system; instead they are located in the environment of the conversation. Minds themselves
therefore do not communicate, and they do not transfer information. Rather, they are
self-organised, actualising and de-actualising expectations by selecting from potential
ones (Luhmann 2002, p. 169-184).
This goes back to the discussion in section Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p.
33). In Luhmann’s terms, meaning is construed as the medium in which systems operate
with the distinction between actual and potential. Meaning itself, as a distinction, has
the particular property that the other side of this distinction has meaning as well. Even
the meaningless and the non-sensical have meaning, which can be playfully expressed
(Luhmann 2002, p. 79-93).
3.9 Reality vs. Truth
Another strange loop emerges from a self-reflective angle (compare A Third Culture? (p.
149)), by further investigating the question of how statements about reality such as those
asserted in this chapter acquire meaning. In other words, how is it possible to separate
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true statements from false ones, for example, when I talk about play in this thesis? When
I write “play is real” or “play is virtual”, is there an expectation that these observations
in principle can be falsified (Popper 1989), and if so, by which means? The answer is
surprisingly diverse, as multiple concepts of truth have developed within sciences and
humanities.17
Theories of correspondence go back to Aristotle. They define truth as a particular re-
lation between beliefs or judgements and reality, based on the assumption that mental
states represent reality18 (Russell 2015, p. 100-108). If true propositions depict reality,
analytical treatments of language can represent the foundation of knowledge (Ayer 1959).
During the 20th century, this approach has come under increasing pressure. Wittgenstein
(2007) famously tried to construct a correspondence between language and reality but he
renounced this philosophical direction later (Wittgenstein 1958).
In response to growing epistemological problems connected with the assumption of
correspondence, various alternatives have been proposed. A particular effort was made
to eliminate paradoxes like “This sentence is false”. Tarski (1944) proposed a solution
that draws a distinction between object language and metalanguage. It allows statements
about truth only in the metalanguage. When I say “all cats are grey in the dark” (Sharman
1874), I am talking in the object language, while the retort “this is wrong”, would belong to
the metalanguage. A sentence like “This sentence is false” which includes both language
levels would be forbidden — it would be semantically impossible. Tarski’s contribution was
originally in the field of formal languages, and indeed it appears artificial. His ontology
constructs two realities, one that the object language talks about and a different one in
which truth and falsity can be discussed. I have stressed earlier that the capability to
observe paradoxes is an essential requirement for a comprehensive description of play
(see Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)).
A more radical solution is to claim that the use of “true” and “false” is redundant (Ramsey
1927). In contrast, Strawson (1950) proposed a theory of performance where asserting
truth or falsity goes beyond the transmission of information. Instead, it constitutes an
expressive act in which speakers affirm their positions. This view is subsumed within
systems-theoretic concepts of communication which require the participants to distinguish
17Here I am summarising truth–criteria as discussed by Seiffert and Radnitzky (1989, p. 369-375).
18I have labelled this assumption “naive realism” (see Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms (p. 30) and
The Meaning of “Meaning” (p. 87)). This concerns positions that accept reality as objective, externally given
and non–constructed.
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between information and message (Baecker 2013b). Pragmatic theories, e.g. (Peirce
1905) observe truth solely by its capability of producing effects in the world (in Deleuzian
interpretation capacities to affect and be affected (Deleuze and Guattari 1987)), thereby
avoiding references to elements of psychic systems. This view is compatible with con-
structivist epistemology (compare Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms (p. 30)). It also
directly relates to Peirce’s pragmatic understanding of the Virtual as something that has
practical consequences “by its virtue”. It is however in contrast to the notion of the Virtual
as a potentiality that is not actualised (compare Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)). The hostile
environment described in section Discussion (p. 42) is virtual in Peirce’s sense, as it is
a phenomenon that affects people lives. But in the Aristotelean (and Deleuzian) sense
discussed in section Actual vs. Potential (p. 83) it is not virtual, as it has been chosen as
an actual political measure by the British government.
This is a clear contradiction, a particular problem for theories of coherence which measure
the truth of a statement by its fit into related statements. Instead of bridging to a meta-
physical realm of reality, the criterion is internal consistency. Difficulties arise, because
completely fictional worlds can be — practitioners like Schell (2015) even argue they
should be — internally consistent. Thus it is possible to speculate about the epistemologi-
cal status of Nathan Drake, the protagonist of the Uncharted games (Straeubig 2016c), or
to discuss the physics of Star Trek (Krauss 1997). Fictional contents bleed into the real
world in various ways, through alternative realities (compare Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)
and Magic vs. Pervasive (p. 128)) or, for example, by contemplating the question if the
game Pokémon Go (Niantic 2016) can be considered feminist (Assuncao 2018) in terms
of Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (Latour 2005; Latour 1998).
Theories of consensus define truth as the agreement of a majority or at least of a significant
number of proponents. If enough people decide to construct a reality from the Star
Wars franchise by declaring their religion as Jedi, for example, the established political
and religious social systems are forced to address this irritation (compare Luhmann:
Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)). Possamai (2005) analyses this phenomenon of the
Jedi census as an example of hyper-real religions, in other words: simulacra of simulation
(Baudrillard 1994, p. 121).
Whereas constructing truth by consensus seems fitting in postmodern conditions (Feyer-
abend 2010), the lack of objective grounding raises another set of problems. Psychological
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experiments demonstrate how group pressure caused people to agree to objectively wrong
answers (Asch 1951), although there is evidence that this result does not describe psycho-
logical but sociological effects (Bond and Smith 1996). I will pick up on the significance of
the environment in chapter System vs. Environment (p. 123).
3.10 Exploring the Virtual
I have started this chapter with a critique of virtual reality through my own practice and
went on to discuss the distinction between virtual and real by visiting different meanings of
“virtual” and of “real”. Yet I arrived at the meaning of “meaning”: a strange loop that appears
to emit the virtual odour of Magritte’s pipe (Magritte 1929). Armed with an understanding
of virtual reality as a medium that is capable to convey meaning, I now return to the side
of practice and observe scientists and artists that are making use of VR as an instrument
of exploration, in particular to query and challenge the distinction between distinction and
identity (compare Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15)).
The Machine To Be Another by BeAnotherLab (Bertrand et al. 2014) is a playful take on
human perception based on the distinction between Alter and Ego, the participants in
communication (Luhmann 1996, p. 137-175). The visual input of two persons wearing
VR headsets and cameras directed at their own bodies is swapped by routing it into
the respective other headset. The participants are encouraged to touch themselves,
experiencing the mismatch between their visual and haptic perception. Ego is directing
Alter’s gaze and vice versa while they both feel their own bodies. Here, the players and the
virtual reality apparatus constitute a socio-technical system with the virtual as a medium
through which the players’ perception is guided. With their artist-driven, interdisciplinary
research, BeAnotherLab is investigating issues such as the refugee crisis, mother-child
relation and psychological disorders (Bertrand 2019).
In the context of virtual reality, the question of empathy has been discussed extensively,
especially after it was touted as “a machine that makes us more human” by Chris Milk
(2015). And indeed there is a growing body of research into the question of whether
specifically designed virtual experiences can enhance the ability to understand and
sympathise with feelings of other people. Archer and Finger (2018) present short 360-
degree videos in a VR headset, on a desktop and for control in form of text and images.
Then they collect self-reported items that they attempt to relate to empathy: a sense
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of presence, the ability to take another perspective, and the likelihood of taking action
after the experience. In their experiment, the factors that were positively correlated with
immersion were: novelty, pleasant visuals, focus on one protagonist, and trust in the
narrator. They also found a correlation between the level of immersion and the subsequent
motivation to take action. Both modalities in virtual reality received a higher empathic
response than the illustrated text, which in turn positively affected memory and curiosity
about the subject. However, the perceived interactivity and presence did not show a
significant difference between the headset and the desktop variant.
Similar results from Herrera et al. (2018) confirm that immersion in virtual reality can
promote empathy. They report longer-lasting positive attitudes and a significantly higher
willingness to take action compared to perspective-taking tasks, which ask participants to
imagine being someone else in specific situations. Shin (2018) links pre-existing traits,
presence and flow to empathy and embodiment whilst van Loon et al. (2018) stress the
importance of presence and target specificity. The latter experiment found no increase in
pro-social behaviour, however, which challenges the correlation between empathy and
congruent action. Note that in these scientific studies, the distinction that Archer and Finger
(2018) label “immersive versus non-immersive format” is purely technical: head-mounted
vs. desktop-based virtual reality. We know nothing about the storytelling, or the visual and
auditory qualities of the experiences. This would require to cross the distinction between
art and science or between theory and practice (compare Theory vs. Practice (p. 149)).
Francis et al. (2017) analyse moral actions through the example of the trolley problem (Foot
2002), comparing a VR version with a text-based questionnaire. In the Trolley Problem,
participants face a dilemma where they can push a man in front of an approaching train to
save the lives of a group of people on the tracks. The outcome is a higher propensity for
utilitarian responses in VR, pushing the man over the bridge, than in the questionnaire
condition. Variants of this thought experiment have been studied extensively. They also
are applied to ethical questions about autonomous cars (Keeling 2017). Despite their
apparent fictional nature, (im-)moral actions in games have raised significant concerns
and controversies (see Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67)).
Despite the corroborating evidence, the idea of VR as a vehicle for empathy has attracted
criticism, notably by Bloom (2016). However, Bloom is attacking the prevalent notion of
empathy itself, suggesting traits such as reasoning, kindness, self-control and compassion
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as preferable alternatives. In this approach, he draws a conceptual distinction between
immersing oneself in somebody else’s shoes (“emotional empathy”) and a rational, mea-
sured responses (“cognitive empathy”). In line with the studies cited above, emotional
empathy is biased towards individual fates, in lieu of being able to empathise with a larger
population and the greater good. Furthermore, according to Bloom, empathy can cause
distress, pose a risk factor for burnout and “lead people to avoid situations that would
trigger such distress” (Bloom 2017, p. 28).
Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, goes further
in his critique by drawing a distinction between virtual reality, which he characterises as
an artificial digital reproduction of the ordinary experience of reality and the reality of the
virtual, bringing Lacanian psychoanalytic analysis into play. His outspoken verdict of virtual
reality as “a rather miserable idea” (Žižek 2012, p. 3) rests on the argument that a more
interesting direction than simulating reality in an artificial medium is to investigate the
effects and consequences — the reality of the virtual (see Actual vs. Potential (p. 83) and
Reality vs. Truth (p. 88)).
We can attempt to step into somebody else’s shoes, I argue, and the “other” does not
necessarily have to be human. This is demonstrated by the VR artwork In the Eyes of
the Animal by Marshmallow Laser Feast (2016). Here a distinction is drawn between
the modalities of human and animal perception. Marshmallow Laser Feast aim to create
an immersive environment for humans that transfers animal perception into a virtual
experience (Straeubig 2016i). While the depiction of the perception of the individual
animals in this project is based on sound research, the results are shaped by artistic
interpretation.
In a widely discussed essay, Thomas Nagel (1974) asks: “What is it like to be a bat?”.
Nagel’s answer contains a strong argument against objective, reductionist views of con-
sciousness: it is impossible to know. While we are able to imagine being bats, we cannot
experience the experience of another creature in its full extent. A bat primarily perceives
the world through echo-location with its highly sensitive sonar. Its entire sensory apparatus
and its brain are radically different from ours; and so, presumably is the inner life of a
bat. This echoes Maturana’s thesis of structural determinism (see Maturana and Varela:
Perception Is Distinction (p. 32)).
In the Eyes of the Animal is designed as an immersive experience: when we put on
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the helmet, we enter a virtual environment that allows us to explore the perceptions of
the inhabitants of the forest. However, Nagel’s argument has not been refuted. We do
get a glimpse of what it is to be an animal, but we are not confronted with a realistic
experience. Still, Nagel’s on-point scepticism should not be read to discourage artists and
designers from exploring the perception of “otherness”, be it sensory, psychological or
conceptual. On the contrary, for every objection, the art system invites an “even more so”
(see Games vs. Art (p. 63)). Jane Gauntlett’s In My Shoes represents such an attempt
to “communicate the incommunicable” (Gauntlett 2011). She thematises an assault that
left her with traumatic brain injury, coma and epilepsy. Labyrinth Psychotica by Jennifer
Kanary Nikolov(a) (2016a),19 also described in her thesis (Kanary Nikolov(a) 2016b),
confronts the viewer with psychosis, while Notes on Blindness: Into Darkness by Arnaud
Colinart (2016) explores the “world beyond sight”. It is based on the audio diaries of John
Hull (2013), who lost his sight in the early 1980s.
Other projects like the audio-only game Papa Sangre by Somethin’ Else (2010) and the
immersive environment Haptic Field by Chris Salter and TeZ (2016), as well as artists like
Peter Weibel, Ruth Schnell and Anke Eckardt experiment with virtuality, digital synesthesia
and perception (Gsöllpointner 2015). When we even cross both the boundary from art
towards science and the one from human to animal experience, we can even arrive at
experiments that construct a virtual reality for fruit flies (Dombeck and Reiser 2012).
All these projects operate with the first person perspective, communicating perceptions
through perceptions. In Luhmann’s theory, this is the mode of communication of art-
works (Luhmann 2000). On the other hand, art is also a social system. On this level,
NeuroSpeculative AfroFeminism by Hyphen Labs (2017) challenges the predominantly
western mainstream of VR production through the lens of speculative design, feminism
and afrofuturism (Dery 1994). It also reminds us that virtual reality is a medium, and
located in its environment are other social systems within a wider culture.
3.11 Summary: Half-real
Given that the questions about truth and reality discussed in the previous sections touch
on traditional ontological and epistemological problems, I cannot expect to “solve” the gaps
and contradictions between the manifold constructions of reality. In chapter Distinction
19This spelling of the artist’s name is deliberate.
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vs. Identity (p. 15) I have laid out foundations for observations of play that are based
on distinctions, constructivism and observation. The goal of this chapter was rather to
observe the conceptual landscape and notice the strange loops on the way20 (see What Is
Play? (p. 15)).
Using distinctions as instruments, I have observed how I and others observe play in its
relation to realities and non-realities. To include the first and third person perspective, as I
have called upon in section Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24), I augmented “an
observing science” (Glanville 2001) with an “observing practice”. My point of departure
was a critical and practical investigation into the concept of virtual reality through a series
of workshops based on an attitude of imperfection. I then examined virtual reality beyond
its narrow technological interpretation and investigated a complex conceptual landscape
where issues of perception, fictionality, imagination and truth could be discovered through
the lens of distinctions. In particular, I have looked at the following concepts: virtual, real,
actual, potential, imaginary and fictional and discussed some differences they make for
play.
In the next chapter I will change the perspective again and shift the observation to — as
some would say — the central aspect of play21 that I have largely omitted so far, the player.
20Having used terms like “objective truth” and “evidence” in this chapter, it is likely I have created more of
them.
21With the constructivist methodology laid out in chapter Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15), there are no innate
central concepts. Each aspect of play can become central for an observer simply by selecting it. This is
analog to a successful characterisation in a film script, where secondary characters should not know that they
play a lesser role, according to (Howard and Mabley 1996, p. 63-65).
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Chapter 4
Human vs. Machine
Man only plays when in the full meaning of the word he is a man, and he is
only completely a man when he plays.
Friedrich Schiller (1795)
4.1 Can Machines Play?
Is play the culmination of human essence as Schiller had proclaimed? How can this
declaration be reconciled with play behaviour observed in animals? And finally, in which
sense do non-biological entities — like machines1 — play? In this chapter I observe a new
set of distinctions by turning my attention towards the playing subject.
To explore my speculative question as to whether machines can play, I will first cross
the distinction between humans and machines with the distinction between playing and
thinking. On May 15, 1951, Alan Turing (1951) delivered a talk on BBC Radio 3 with
the title “Can Digital Computers Think?”. In this talk, as well as in the paper “Computing
machinery and intelligence” published one year earlier, Turing (1950) not only discusses
whether machines can think, but he also suggests a particular way to find an answer.
Acknowledging the difficulties that arise when trying to define “machine” or “thinking”, he
instead suggests the staging of an “Imitation Game” as a criterion for machine intelligence.2
1I will be using the term “machines” to denote non–biological entities including physical apparatuses as
well as algorithms and I will indicate where this difference makes a difference, for example in the context of
embodiment.
2Turing describes a situation in which an interrogator is in a conversation with a man (A) and a woman (B),
whose identities are hidden. The man is instructed to cheat, while the woman gives honest answers. Through
the exchange of written or typewritten questions and answers alone, the interrogator tries to identify who is
who. Turing then suggested to replace the man with a computer: “We now ask the question, ‘What will happen
when a machine takes the part of A in this game?’ Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the
97
During the second half of the twentieth century, Turing’s question became seminal in the
emerging disciplines of cognitive science and artificial intelligence.3 While the adequacy
of the Turing Test has been challenged from various angles (Hayes and Ford 1995; Searle
1980) and many alternatives have been proposed, I believe in the unabated value of
Turing’s methodological approach: to explore and operationalise a research question while
avoiding to base it on definitions (compare Definitions vs. Distinctions: What Is “Is”? (p.
23)). Gigerenzer and Goldstein, tracing the history of the mind-as-computer metaphor,
stress the central role of tools in the genesis of scientific theories about the mind. In
their tools-to-theories heuristic they describe how scientific tools like techniques, methods,
apparatuses and algorithms initiate new scientific metaphors and concepts and that these
concepts are more likely to be accepted if the scientific community is also using the tools
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996) (compare Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)).
In the 1950s computers were not the “smart” ubiquitous devices we carry in our pockets
today, but bulky, room-sized machines that rattled and hummed with electromechanical
relays and glowing vacuum tubes. Although the early “electronic brains” already demon-
strated superhuman powers in mathematical calculations, the association of those curious
contraptions with more general cognitive capacities must be considered a lot more imagi-
native than it would be today. And while the debate about how to evaluate the progress of
artificial intelligence is ongoing (Hernández-Orallo 2014), a majority of experts in the field
show confidence that the construction of machines with general “human like” intelligence
can be achieved within a foreseeable future (Müller and Bostrom 2014). While Turing’s
question “Can Digital Computers Think?” has not been answered yet to the complete
satisfaction of all AI researchers, it has inspired researchers and facilitated academic
debates for decades (Saygin, Cicekli, and Akman 2003).
This fruitful development prompted me to think about an analogous question applied to play
and playful behaviour. Therefore, I am going to speculate about whether machines can
play (and to explore what that question means), mirroring Turing’s line of argumentation
(Turing 1951). Accordingly, I will initially offer two immediately obvious answers that are
contradicting each other.
The first answer is that machines can play; as evident from each game of chess that we
game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions
replace our original, ‘Can machines think?”’ (Turing 1950). This procedure is known as the “Turing test”.
3The term “artificial intelligence” was introduced by John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky at the Dartmouth
conference in 1956 (Gardner 1998).
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play with a computer. It seems almost an irony that a major area of application for artificial
intelligence has been the creation of opponents and non-player characters for computer
games: the science of artificial thinking is concerned with artificial playing (see Game AI
vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)). Play, understood as a pattern of social interaction, accepts
machines as playmates, not only machines imitating humans but also humans imitating
machines (Standage 2003). When we play with a computer, actual cognitive capabilities,
let alone consciousness, are not required for the machine — the experience (or illusion) of
intelligent behaviour is sufficient, just like in Turing’s imitation game.
The second immediate answer to our question is negative. Machines, as far as we
understand them, lack the sensual, the emotional, and the aesthetic dimension of human
experience, which includes the experience of playing or being playful. In analogy to an
argument from Thomas Nagel’s thought experiment about the phenomenology of a bat
(compare Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)): as long as the machines are not structurally
indistinguishable from us, they will never be able to experience “what it is like to play”
(Nagel 1974).
In the Western cultural tradition, this standpoint is highlighted in Friedrich Schiller’s char-
acterisation of play as the essential quality of a human being, quoted at the beginning of
this chapter. In his treatment of play, according to Sam Gill, “Schiller avoids the trap of
so many modern understandings of play by appealing to a common understanding that
it is neither subjective nor objective, that is, play is not distinguished as state of mind or
attitude, nor as a particular set of actions or objects” (Gill 2012). Instead, Schiller explains
play through the Spieltrieb, a play drive that serves to reconcile the other drives, mediating
between sensation and rationality. Sutton-Smith (1997, p. 127-150) objects that Schiller’s
“rhetoric of the imaginary” does not encompass most forms of play deemed mundane from
its idealistic perspective.
It is important to note that the two opposed answers given above can be traced back to the
fundamental division between the third person perspective and the first person perspective,
which is at the heart of the philosophical debate about the mind (see Paradoxa of Play
(p. 69)). Judging from observable behaviour, we concede that machines are capable of
playing, while from their imagined subjective experience we deny machines to be playful.
This leads to the intuition that a full understanding of play might have some characteristics
of the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1995).
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How could a condition for the possibility for play look like from a systems-theoretic per-
spective? I argue that the machine must be able to act as an observer and to draw
distinctions between itself and the other and between message, information and under-
standing (Baecker 2013b). On this foundation, a machine that is able to observe and to
form expectations (see Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)) will also be able to take
participate in communication. While for Luhmann psychic systems are independent yet
structurally coupled with social systems (Luhmann 1996, p. 210-277), I believe that in
general minds (as well as brains) are not a necessary condition for participating in social
systems (compare New Social Systems (p. 161)).
This means that we can begin to shift our attention away from speculating about conscious
machines (Kurzweil 2014) and from trying to build bottom-up biologistic simulations in the
hope that something will emerge (Eliasmith 2013). Yet the latter is exactly what I attempted
to create — and failed to achieve — in my project neurotic, which I will discuss in the next
section.
4.2 Project: Neurotic
Neurotic (Straeubig 2014d) uses a model of spiking neurons that generates sound using
the physical locations of the players. It shares the technical basis with KlingKlangKlong,
the locative experience I designed for human and non-human players (compare Project:
KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)). KlingKlangKlong is a laboratory of ideas that lead me to
the concept of anthroponeutral play design, a methodology that explores the distinction
between humans and machines by making it invisible (see Anthroponeutral Design).
Conceptually, neurotic was an attempt to play with ideas about the brain. As discussed
below, ultimately I did not pursue this direction further. However, it has informed my
research into biological systems and their relevance to my developing ideas about play.
4.2.1 Development
I developed neurotic by adding an implementation of a model of biological spiking neurons
based on Izhikevich’s model described in (Izhikevich 2003) to KlingKlangKlong. At first I
re-implemented the original Matlab code in Processing and validated the output visually.
To implant the spiking neuron behaviour into the virtual players, I then translated the code
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to JavaScript and integrated it with the existing modules.
In KlingKlangKlong, an event is triggered when the timeline of the sequencer hits a player’s
virtual position (compare Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)), generating one of three
preconfigured synthesised sounds. In neurotic, the timeline stimulates the artificial neurons
instead. Sound is then triggered by the firing patterns of the neurons.
During the development of neurotic I encountered a number of technical challenges.
Despite the simplicity of Izhikevich’s model, it adds significantly to the strain on the limited
computational resources of the browser-based application running on a smartphone.
4.2.2 Exposition
Figure 4.1: Neurotic at Prototype Dublin
I showcased neurotic at Prototype, an experimental games festival curated by Hilary
O’Shaughnessy that took place in Dublin in October 2014. Neurotic ran for the course of a
weekend in the context of other playful interventions, talks and urban games. I presented
it again at the Mediacity 5 conference in May 2015 at the University of Plymouth.
I set the project up as a self-service interaction, available during the whole time of the
festival. I provided a set of instructions on a printout and installed a tablet that ran the
web-based neurotic app. To start the experience, participants scanned a QR code or
entered the application’s web address into the browser on their smartphones. Then they
went outdoors and engaged with the emerging dynamic system.
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Figure 4.2: Neurotic at Mediacity 5, University of Plymouth
I also participated in the experience while I observed players interacting with neurotic.
Some players were seeking to create musical structures, while others were meta-gaming,
chasing each other through the centre of Dublin. As a participant myself, my own observa-
tion, for example moving after players, inevitably changed the pattern of the soundscape.
Often I steered toward players to determine if they were virtual or physical. As my interface
was the same as all the other players, I could not determine if players were human or
virtual, and I had to identify human players by spotting them in the street.
4.2.3 Discussion
Do brains play? Or, from the perspective of a brain, how does it experience play? Does a
brain enjoy playing? Questions like these may come to mind, when we try to understand a
biological system.
During the course of developing neurotic, I was pursuing different threads of inquiry.
One direction was to research into the neurobiology of play, especially Jaak Panksepp’s
approach to locate play in the deeper structures of the brain4 (Siviy and Panksepp 2011).
Another fundamental source of inspiration comes from artistic projects, here in particular
from The Fragmented Orchestra by Jane Grant, John Matthias and Nick Ryan5 (Grant,
4I think that I had misread Panksepp at that time, because I understood his thesis as play being more
fundamental than other basic functions, however now I would summarise his theories that play as well as
other basic affective neurological functions are located in deeper parts of the brain than previously assumed.
5Both Dr. Matthias and Dr. Grant are supervisors for this thesis.
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Matthias, and Ryan 2008a). An integral part of this project is the Neurogranular Sampler
(Grant, Matthias, and Ryan 2008b), a virtual instrument that processes input signals
through the model of a spiking neural network to activate a granular sampler (Miranda and
Matthias 2005). Unlike other, more abstract models used in machine learning techniques,
spiking neural network models add expressiveness as they operate on the spatio-temporal
relations of nervous excitation (Gerstner and Kistler 2002). Their simulation, however,
requires significant computational resources (Izhikevich 2004). A particular model devel-
oped by Izhikevich is able to produce different firing patterns that have been observed in
neutrons from a small set of parameters (Izhikevich 2003). The Neurogranular Sampler
and neurotic both use this model, independently implemented and with different results.
My second aim was to foster the understanding of play from a transdisciplinary perspective
(compare Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)). The CogNovo doctoral program has
exposed me to a wide range of theories, methodologies and practices through several
week-long workshops with representatives of various disciplines (see Published Work (p.
9)).
As a result of discussions with three of my fellow doctoral candidates, Pinar Oztop, Chun-
Wei Hsu, Mihaela Taranu and I co-authored a common paper about play (Straeubig, Hsu,
et al. 2016). In our paper we observe play from perspectives of neuroscience, deception,
creativity and systems theory. Each part is written by one of us and closes with some
fundamental questions about play.6
Our first question is about the significance of research in play. If play is biologically more
fundamental than non-play, resonating with Panksepp’s deep structure hypothesis, we
ask, should cognitive science and artificial intelligence focus more on play as areas of
research? In particular, the field of machine learning has seen rapid development in
this area which I will discuss in the remainder of this chapter (see Game AI vs. Playing
Machines (p. 106)).
Another question is concerned with the relationship between play and creativity. How are
they related? Can play be uncreative? Is it possible to bring these two highly complex
constructs closer together (compare Play vs. Learning (p. 56))?
If play always has a purpose, which biological, psychological or sociological benefit would
6As those questions reflect larger threads of investigation in this thesis, they are presented here in an
edited and commented form compared to the original paper.
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play that involves unpleasant, dangerous or otherwise detrimental behaviour entail (see
Play vs. Dark Play (p. 67) )? On the other hand, how can we interpret the hypothesis that
play has no function apart from itself (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54))?
Questions like these, arising from transdisciplinary processes, by first observing and
discussing disciplinary findings, and then reframing them from different perspectives, have
guided my research. Moving from the social system level to the biological one (compare
Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)) requires the adoption of significantly
different distinctions that pertain to phenomena like synaptic transmitters, firing patterns
or the connectome. To convey information, these differences must make a difference
(Bateson 2000a), a principle that also applies to my practical approach. Therefore the
question can be asked: in which respect did neurotic make a difference for my project?
I had been struggling for some time to find adequate approaches towards incorporating
the brain as a subject of my research in play. Spiel 1, my playful performance that operates
with brain signals, is a satirical take on scientific and moralistic purpose in the context of
serious games (see Discussion (p. 59)). Neurotic, on the other hand takes the direction of
simulating a biological system. Technically, it extends KlingKlangKlong by planting a small
number of spiking neurons into the virtual players. Apart from that difference it did add not
a new quality to the system.
Conceptually, the project took me deep into specialisation — it did not produce sufficient
Anschlussfähigkeit for investigating play in a comprehensive manner as discussed in
section Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24). Thematic connections like plasticity,
noise and polychronisation already had been pursued before (Matthias 2013). The
integration of this fundamental biological model into my existing project however did
not create a “difference that makes a difference”, besides quickly draining the players’
batteries.
In the meantime, my project had already taken a direction that called for observing and
designing for a more general set of distinctions, such as system vs. environment and
virtual vs. real. Instead of looking through a microscopic lens zooming in on a specific
aspect of play, I began to zoom out into a macroscopic view, looking at a multitude of
aspects, albeit through a specific methodology.
Referring back to section Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33), this allows an
answer to the initial question in this section. From the systems theory perspective, the
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answer is unambiguous: it would be a category mistake to claim that a brain can play. It
can’t. Brains do not experience anything. These heavily innervated organs are biological
systems that operate with electrical signals and chemical processes. A neuron fires or it
doesn’t, a synapse is transporting transmitters, a glial cell supports the neuron by taking
care of its nutrient cycle. The brain doesn’t play, and it doesn’t think either (Noë 2010).
Representatives of cognitive neuroscience that put the brain at the center of their ontology
might find this observation disappointing (Eliasmith 2013). Yet we gain the ability to observe
distinctions between biological, psychic and social systems. This allows us to progress
towards a comprehensive description of play without recourse to simple metaphysics or
reductionism7.
For me, neurotic was for me an important step towards non-human play, an attempt to play
with the idea that play can be observed on the level of biological systems. It was inspired by
research into neuroscience, but it has contributed to my investigation of playful experiences
in non-human entities. During its development, I was beginning to challenge my own
system-theoretic assumptions through a practical yet speculative approach (Dunne and
Raby 2013). I was asking questions such as “What would be a playful experience for a
neuron if it could have one?” and “How would I design one?”. By following these questions
I was creating a virtual space for design (compare Virtual vs. Physical (p. 79)) in which I
could revisit and revise my assumptions discussed in Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15).
In the end I did not come up with games designed for neurons. Instead I took away three
realisations that would guide my further work. Firstly, the anthropomorphising language of
science plays a crucial role for an observer. When neurons are described as excited, the
technical term describes an electrical activity (Izhikevich 2007), however for me it is almost
impossible to avoid reading a emotional quality into it. In response, I began to reflect on
biological metaphors and developed a stance towards superseding anthropomorphism
which I have called “anthroponeutral”, in distinction to the term “anthropocentric” (see
Anthroponeutral Design (p. 157)).
A second understanding that began to develop in this phase concerns the relation between
theory and practice. My projects took on the role of tools to inform my theoretical work
while the theory would inform my projects. This became clear to me in the process of
moving from game design to design for artistic research (compare Mateas and Schwab:
7In section Counterpoint: Machines Play (p. 118), I will engage in some metaphysical speculation in the
context of the likewise speculative research question if machines can play.
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Artistic Research (p. 38)). I started to observe and construct my practical work, my writing
and the existing literature as artistic laboratories through the lens of distinctions.
This topology of concepts can again best be described as a strange loop (see What Is
Play? (p. 15)), in which practical projects re-appear in theoretical distinctions and vice
versa. The material for this loop, imagined in its physical manifestation is constructed from
Brooks’ Nouvelle AI, Matejas’ expressive AI (see Mateas and Schwab: Artistic Research
(p. 38)) and Schwab’s artistic research through exposition (see Schwab: Artistic Research
and Exposition). In a traditional sense neurotic is a dead-end project that I would have
considered a failure, yet it has contributed to a large extent to the direction of my overall
project, more than some of my more developed projects. 8
The third insight led me to critically re-examine Luhmann’s categorisation of machines,
biological, psychic and social systems (see Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p.
33)), and in order to understand play in a comprehensive manner, I had to ask what it
means to take part in social systems of play. By bringing a distinction of distinctions into
play, system vs. environment as opposed to system vs. element, it became clear to
me that instead of investigating parts of a system (such as neurons), I would observe
systems (such as machines) that were in Luhmann’s schema located in the environment
of social systems. I saw the rapidly shifting roles of machines with respect to play (see in
particular Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)) as an encouragement to pursue this
route. During this process I shifted my investigation from the question ”can neurons play?
to “can machines play?”. This perspective of play provides the context for the next section,
in which I will ask about the role of the non-human player.
4.3 Game AI vs. Playing Machines
One of the two contradicting answers to the question of whether machines can play that I
gave in section Can Machines Play? (p. 97) was based on the observation that humans
and machines have been playing together for a long time. Mechanical automata, toy
robots, scary puppets appearing on ghost trains, pinball machines, chess-computers
and non-player characters in video games are just a few examples of the wide variety of
machines that have been involved in human play.
8I am discussing further aspects of the distinction between theory and practice, especially its relation to
academic disciplines in chapter Theory vs. Practice (p. 149).
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Norbert Wiener had pondered the question of how to construct an automaton that plays
chess on a level between merely abiding by the rules and the theoretical optimum. Wiener
(2007, p. 193) thought that the machine should offer an “interesting opposition to a player
[. . . ]”, while adapting to different strengths of its human opponents. Thus the cybernetic
opponent, as depicted by Wiener, is designed to challenge the player, not to solve an
algorithmic optimisation problem. In the words of Andrew Pickering (2011), it stages an
ontological theatre: performative, not representative. This is different both from cognitive
sciences that attempt to represent the human mind and from engineering which constructs
game playing agents based on the goal of optimisation (Shannon 1950; Simon and Chase
1988).
Seventy years after Wiener’s conceptualisation, a thriving subset of AI research is con-
cerned with computer games (Yannakakis and Togelius 2018) while a subset of this subset
is concerned with the construction of believable opponents that provide “interesting oppo-
sition”. These approaches operate both on the level of behavioural (Karpov, Schrum, and
Miikkulainen 2012) and functional (Schrum, Karpov, and Miikkulainen 2012) descriptions.
Their criterion still tries to measure how believable the non-human players appear to the
human players (Hingston 2012). This is in essence the same practical approach that a
game designer would pursue (Schell 2015).
We can understand these efforts as literal translations of the Turing test (see Can Machines
Play? (p. 97)) into the environment of games (Livingstone 2006). Both processes display
structural similarities (Hingston 2009) which are related to attempts in modelling creativity
and learning in artificial intelligence.
Zook, Magerko, and Riedl (2011) describe an implementation of pretend object play
(compare Real vs. Imaginary (p. 80)) with their cognitive architecture SOAR. The system
distinguishes between a “pretend domain” and a “real domain” which share common
structures for communication and reasoning. It is based on the theory that “pretend play is
‘metarepresentational’, in such a way as to require the pretender to represent their own or
another’s representation of a counter-factual state of affairs” (Jarrold et al. 1994).
In sections Play vs. Purpose (p. 54) and Play vs. Learning (p. 56), I have observed the
distinctions play vs. purpose, playful vs. serious and autotelic vs. heterotelic. Adding more
distinctions, human vs. machines, third person vs. first person perspective (see Paradoxa
of Play (p. 69) and System vs. Environment (p. 123)), I am now able to describe machines
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that are learning in the eyes of their researchers while they are playing in an autotelic
manner as systems within a playful environment9.
Mnih et al. (2013) go a step further into the cognitive domain by requiring the computer to
detect and learn the mechanism of the game through observing raw pixel values. Their
“deep learning” architecture is based on multiple layers of self-organising artificial neural
networks (Hinton, Osindero, and Teh 2006). The output of the network is a value function
estimating future rewards. This enables the system to play not only a specific game but a
range of different ones. The questions then become: What is the system programmed to
do? Is it programmed to play? Is it programmed to learn? Or even: is it programmed to
draw distinctions?
Mnih’s result is part of a remarkable development in game-playing AI. After achieving and
surpassing human-level play in Backgammon and Chess, the game of Go, previously
thought as combinatorially out of reach for some time, was conquered by a combination
of stochastic search and self-optimising learning strategies (Sutton and Barto 2018).
Subsequent iterations of the algorithm dubbed Alphago (Silver, Huang, et al. 2016),
AlphaGo Zero (Silver, Schrittwieser, et al. 2017), and Alphazero (Silver, Hubert, et al.
2018) beat the previous ones without recurrence to actual game data. Research is
now branching out into virtual environments such as realtime strategy games (Font and
Mahlmann 2019; Vinyals et al. 2019), and animal Olympic Games (Crosby, Beyret, and
Halina 2019) and hide-and-seek (compare Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)).
Justesen, Debus, and Risi (2019) caution against overly optimistic interpretations of the
results that are reported for game playing AIs. Some of the accomplishments recorded for
artificial agents competing with humans, they argue, are due to methodological issues in
the design and evaluation of fairness in competitions.
According to Guckelsberger et al. (2017) it may be possible to develop artificial game-
playing agents that feature a computational model of intrinsic motivation that allows them
to predict the player experience in procedurally generated environments. The gameplay
data collected from human players has been shown to be correlated with motivational
factors of player experience such as competence, autonomy, relatedness and presence
(Melhart et al. 2019).
9I have previously suggested that a certain complexity is needed to describe complex phenomena such as
play with sufficient precision (see the second requirement in Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)). The
explicit observation of these six distinctions, I contend, provides an example for this postulate.
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Designer Jason Huggins (2012) is teaching a machine how to play, with the additional
aspect of embodiment. The input is again the camera image from the game and the output
robotic arm movement, almost from the perspective of a human player. Ironically, this
project has a non-playful purpose, it is designed for automated user testing.
An embodied, virtual and fictional (see Virtual vs. Fictional (p. 84)) perspective is taken by
Jiang and Saxena, who let robots insert virtual humans into a room geometry provided
by their sensor data, and infer from synthetically generated movements of those “imag-
ined” humans possibilities for placing objects (Jiang and Saxena 2013). In their paper
titled “Hallucinating humans for learning robotic placement of objects” they are explicitly
referring to object affordances (Gibson 1977). Wells (2002) argues for a perspective on
affordances that links ecological psychology and formal computational models (see also
What Surrounds Play? (p. 123)). Gaina, Lucas, and Perez-Liebana (2019) contend that a
system should learn through continous interaction with human players. Their proposed
approach is comprised of several modules that combine planning and learning to improve
its performance.
In all these examples, machines are playing from the scientific point of view and for the
advancement of science (see Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)): they pretend, learn, imagine
and motivate themselves with and through play. I want to revisit the distinction between play
and purpose for a different kind of playing machines, those that are relocating boundaries
between humans and machines in liminal, surprising and artistic ways.
Rube Goldberg machines are mechanical devices that exemplify Suits’ definition of play
(see What Is Play? (p. 15)) by eschewing efficient means in favour of less efficient ones
(Berry and Goldberg 2001). Bruno Munari’s macchine inutili, useless but expressive
machines (Antonello 2009) and Jean Tinguely’s noisy, rattling installations (Tinguely 1978)
exhibit aesthetic qualities of machines devoid of external purposes and productivity. This
autotelic quality was apparently also present in Ross Ashby’s Homeostat, a cybernetic
device characterised as “unpurposeful machine” by Norbert Wiener (Pickering 2011,
p. 105). Likewise, Julia Zamboni’s Robot Ludens (Zamboni 2017) explores and exhibits
playful machines. Humour, fun and play in the context of software and algorithms are also
discussed from a multitude of perspectives in (Goriunova 2014).
New kinds of social systems (see New Social Systems (p. 161)) have appeared as well.
Umbilical Digital, a cybernetic installation by Dmitry Morozov (2018), shows a machine
109
that cares for Tamagotchi. Techne is a community of synthetic artists that produce
artworks and critique each other’s results (Pagnutti, Compton, and Whitehead 2016). In
the piece The New Artist by Axel Straschnoy et al. (2008) a robot that is producing art is
complemented by a second robot watching the process. Human spectators are observing
the machine audience which in turn observs the machine artist — we are in the process
of becoming second order observers. This points to a direction in which interactivity is
replaced by interpassivity, delegating the effort of play to machines (Fizek 2018). My
ongoing project KlingKlangKlong, discussed in the following sections, aims to investigate
these anthroponeutral perspectives (see Anthroponeutral Design (p. 157)) by inviting
humans and machines into a common playful environment.
4.4 Project: KlingKlangKlong
KlingKlangKlong is a work in progress locative multiplayer interaction designed for human
and non-human players (Straeubig 2014c). The human players move around outdoors
within a bounded geographic area. They are equipped with smartphones running the
KlingKlangKlong web app, which is linked to a central server over an internet connection.
The players’ locations are monitored by the GPS receivers on the phones, periodically
transmitted to the server and distributed to the other players. Latitude and longitude values
are translated into a normalised virtual space. This space is shared with a number of
virtual players that are created when a play session starts. Virtual players move with the
human players within the virtual space, and they can be spawned and removed during a
session. A third type of entities, to be added later during development, are reward objects
which are placed into the space at random and do not change their location during a
session.
The number of players can be configured in the parameters of KlingKlangKlong. Through
experimentation I settled on a fixed number and added a mechanism that automatically
adjusts the number of virtual players based on the number of human players. Therefore
KlingKlangKlong can be played alone. Actually it does not require any human players at
all (see Discussion). The algorithm removes a virtual when a human player enters the
playing area and adds a virtual when a player leaves.
The size of the area in which a KlingKlangKlong session is run depends on the number
of players. As a rule of thumb, human players should be able to move around without
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necessarily seeing each other most of the time. They should be able to follow each other
and meet. In practice, I chose approximately a square kilometre for 5–10 players. A play
session is not time limited; as long as the server is running, players can drop in and out
any time.
Virtual and human players receive the same location data. For the human players, the
locations are translated into sound. This is accomplished through a spatial metaphor
similar to a pattern sequencer.10 One dimension (the y-axis) translates into the pitch of
the sound while the other dimension (the x-axis) denotes the temporal position within
the sequence. Each time the looping timeline of the sequencer hits a player’s position,
a sound is triggered. There are three sounds11 that can be switched manually by the
humans and that are also switched by the virtual players.
The players and sequencer timeline are also displayed on the screen, however, the visuals
can be ignored for a purely auditive experience.12
4.4.1 Development
I have been continually developing KlingKlangKlong throughout the duration of this thesis.
There were several iterations during which I rewrote the complete application. This is
because of two separate reasons. The first one is technical. Initial work on KlingKlangKlong
began in summer 2014 to construct a laboratory for ideas about playful systems. The first
prototypes that I implemented rather hastily only worked on Android mobile devices, while
the synchronisation of real-time updates turned out to be a technical challenge. In the first
play tests, the application crashed frequently.
During the next iterations, I re-developed the application based on web technology. Benefits
are a single programming language for client and server (JavaScript), the availability of
libraries and frameworks and better support for real-time apps for both Android and
iPhone. Updating the app does not require access to the mobile devices, but can be done
while the application is running, which is an important aspect for rapid development and
experimentation.
A potential disadvantage is that code running in the browser adds some overhead that
10In a pattern sequencer, each row (the y–axis) holds a different instrument.
11The limitation to three sounds have inspired the name KlingKlangKlong, which is also a reminiscence
to Kling Klang/Klingklang, the name of the recording studio and of a track on the second studio album of
German electro pioneers Kraftwerk (1972).
12In this case the player would not be switching instruments.
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negatively affects the performance of the system. Web technology has been evolving
rapidly during the last years, and changes in policies are affecting the technical capabilities
that require frequent updates to the application in order to keep it operational.
KlingKlangKlong comprises a server component that runs in the cloud and clients that run
in a web browser. A human player loads a client into her web browser to start playing.
The main function of the server is to receive and redistribute the positions of the players.
The clients translate these positions into items on the screen and into sound. A special
client is available to manage the running system, start and stop virtual players, and set the
geographical area. The server also includes the implementation of artificial agents.
I am developing four different types of agents to be able to play and experiment with the
system:
• Static: Static agents can be placed at specific positions and do not move.
• Random: These agents perform a random walk. All of their movement is stochastic.
• Flocking: These agents exhibit group behaviour that is reminiscent of a swarm or a
flock of animals. It emerges from simple rules that were developed by Craig Reynolds
(1987). These rules govern the separation, alignment, and cohesion of the swarm.
• Virtual (work in progress): Virtuals are agents that exhibit behaviour between ran-
domness and purpose (compare Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)). They are currently being
implemented with a modified variant of reinforcement learning13 (Sutton and Barto
2018). In the generic version of reinforcement learning, the environment provides
rewards that the agents are supposed to maximise. My modification to this model
aims to develop agents that do not try to maximise their reward, but keep a balance
between going after the reward and exploring the environment. In section Game AI
vs. Playing Machines (p. 106) I have described this approach to play in terms of the
distinction between scientific and artistic machines.
I will discuss KlingKlangKlong’s exposition and its conceptual and performative aspects in
the next two sections.
13The code that I am currently developing is a re–implementation and modification of Karpathy (2015). As
the implementation of the “Virtuals” is work in progress and subject to future research, it is not included in the
distribution provided in the Appendix.
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4.4.2 Exposition
Figure 4.3: KlingKlangKlong at Playpublik Krakow
An early prototype of KlingKlangKlong was shown at Playpublik Festival Krakow in Septem-
ber 2014 and at the Plymouth Book Festival in October 2014. I showcased a further
iteration at playin’ Siegen in Siegen in April 2015. Another exposition took place at the Off
The Lip conference in Plymouth in October 2016.
The mode of presentation and observation at each of these events was similar to the
exposition of neurotic, described in section Exposition (p. 101). However, during the
artistic exposition of KlingKlangKlong I shifted from the human player oriented design to my
anthroponeutral approach (see Anthroponeutral Design (p. 157)). This had consequences
for the technical design, which now automatically adapts to human players. It also had
an impact on my development practice, which I have carried out without human player
intervention, focusing on the anthroponeutral approach since 2017.
In 2016 I also co-authored the article Playful Locative Ensembles in the Urban Sound-
scape with Sebastian Quack (Straeubig and Quack 2016), comparing and contrasting
KlingKlangKlong with two other urban sound ensembles: A Folded Path by circumstance
(Speakman, Anderson, and Grenier 2013) and Phantom Synchron — Soundtrack Weimar
by Daniel Ott, Sebastian Quack, Kirsten Reese and Enrico Stolzenburg (Ott et al. 2015).
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Figure 4.4: KlingKlangKlong session at Playpublik
In the context of urban sound art, these three projects have a common theme: the idea of
an ensemble moving through an urban environment while producing sound against the
background of the city. Yet they implement this concept in different ways. A Folded Path
consists of a human swarm where each player carries an instrument, contributing to a
changing, moving, polyphonic soundscape. Phantom Synchron — Soundtrack Weimar
creates a soundtrack in the streets, a choreographed space-time opera which requires
precise synchronisation from the members of the ensemble. KlingKlangKlong is based
on the notion of antropoponeutral play, gathering human and nonhuman players on an
ephemeral playground in dialogue with procedurally generated sound.
4.4.3 Discussion
The progress I made designing and developing KlingKlangKlong marks important steps
towards my creation of playful systems. I began building the first prototype a few weeks
into my PhD project. My rationale was to explore early ideas through practical iteration
and reflection. KlingKlangKlong was created as a laboratory and a playground that allows
approximations to playful systems, while the characteristics of these systems can be
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observed through distinctions. These would be guiding my design during a developing
methodology through devising, constructing, exposing playful artefacts and reflection
through sequences of distinctions. This poses the question of where to start.
Spencer Brown’s dictum “Draw a distinction”, discussed in section Spencer Brown: Draw a
Distinction, makes it explicit that in order to start any process, a primary distinction has to
be made. I will argue, similar to (Baraldi, Corsi, and Esposito 1997), that this initial choice
both does and doesn’t matter.
It does matter, because in an autopoietic system the primary distinction, its code, is
guiding subsequent differentiations (Luhmann 2009, p. 194-209). The scientific system
operates with the code true vs. false, this thesis has started with the code play vs. work
(compare Play vs. Work (p. 51)), this chapter opened with human vs. machine. The
original observation, when traced back, reveals a distinction that structures the space
of possibilities by selecting one side of it. Subsequent distinctions take place in that
sub-space and observing the same distinction again constitutes a re-entry — a concept
that Luhmann has adopted from Spencer-Brown (Luhmann 1993; Spencer-Brown 2008).
In a re-entry, the system observes its own code, that is the distinction on which it is based,
through this distinction. This requires reflection, the self-observation of a system as a
system against the background of its environment (compare A Third Culture? (p. 149)).
It also does not matter, because in practice it is possible to reset and start anew from a
different distinction. During the iterations of practice, reading, discussing and writing for this
thesis, my project has revealed itself gradually as a hyper-structure of interconnected texts,
performances, talks and artifacts. This may sound similar to the concept of the rhizome
described by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in that any distinction, any of the chapters,
can serve an entry point14. To transform such a structure into the form of academic
writing, it is necessary to serialise it. However, distinctions can be observed in a different
order, and the text can be read differently. The cross-referencing between sections is
an attempt to do justice to this structure by mirroring the underlying distinction-based
theory. Luhmann maintained over four decades an enormous hypertextual card index, the
Zettelkasten containing around 90.000 handwritten notes, while serialising its contents
into 600 publications, among them 40 monographs (Jahraus et al. 2012).
As psychic and social systems equipped with a memory, we cannot completely erase past
14For a fundamental critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome in its distinction from a tree,
see (Burger 1985).
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observations. This would require amnesia. Therefore, in contrast to Spencer-Brown’s
theoretical starting point from a tabula rasa (Spencer-Brown 2008, p. 3), in practice one
never begins from a completely empty space15 nor within an empty environment (as I
argue in section Architecting Environments (p. 126)). Every decision reflects on previous
impressions and experiences. In the case of KlingKlangKlong those include my previous
experiences as a designer of location based games such as Tidy City (Straeubig 2008;
Wetzel, Blum, and Oppermann 2012).
Thus the initial distinction I selected while constructing KlingKlangKlong is the one between
system and environment (see System vs. Environment (p. 123)) to explore the interaction
of a system (the players) with the environment (the city). This distinction creates practical
constraints for the design, for example considerations about the safety of players moving in
urban traffic. I assume that using audio as the primary medium for a locative experience is
less distracting than forcing the players to focus on the screen. The system vs. environment
distinction also leads to observations of mutual perceptions and expectations that are
taking place when players and non-players share public spaces. Sebastian Quack and I
further explore this topic in (Straeubig and Quack 2016).
With the initial distinction set in motion (see Spencer Brown: Draw a Distinction (p. 28)),
I undertook deeper research into Luhmann’s theories16 and subsequently based my
methods on distinctions, paired with iterative prototyping (Houde and Hill 1997), a design
method that encourages building artefacts from early stages of a project (see Towards
Play Design as Research (p. 154)).
During the development of KlingKlangKlong, I investigated the distinction between social
and other types of systems (see Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)). This led
me into two parallel directions of research. One was geared towards biological systems
and was largely inspired by previous work (Matthias 2013) (see Discussion (p. 102)). The
other direction led me to observe social systems as systems of communication, without
regard to the inner states of the participants. I began redesigning KlingKlangKlong in
a way that abstracts from human player experience (see Exposition (p. 113)), and from
this point focused solely on this perspective. In this selection, another distinction became
visible, the one between humans and machines.
15Even to read and comprehend Spencer–Brown’s injunction “Draw a distinction!”, one needs to have drawn
distinctions, a paradox that is discussed extensively in (Spencer-Brown 2008).
16I began reading Luhmann in the 1990s and was first exposed to (Luhmann 2000) in a theatre studies
seminar organised by Claus Just at the University of Erlangen–Nuremberg.
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Observed through the lens of the third person perspective (see Paradoxa of Play (p. 69)),
KlingKlangKlong is a machine, a computational process running on a computer hardware.
By introducing non-human players, it also includes entities that represent players. A
growing field of research is concerned with making these artificial players more human-like
both in appearance and in behaviour (compare Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)).
My goal became a similar one: to reduce the differences between humans and machines
(see Anthroponeutral Design (p. 157)). Paradoxically, I first had to introduce the human vs.
machine distinction in order to subsequently try to make it invisible in KlingKlangKlong.
In the next section I operate with the same pattern again, reversing the hiding of this
distinction in order to discuss its overcoming.
4.5 Beyond Humanism
In sharp contrast to the humanist perspectives towards play of Hannah Arendt (1998) and
Johan Huizinga (1955) are postmodern and post-human voices including Donna Haraway’s
Cyborg Manifesto (Haraway 1991) in which she deconstructs human essentialism from a
feminist perspective.
Similar perspectives are shared by a heterogeneous set of theories. Bruno Latour’s Actor-
Network theory postulates assemblages of humans, animals, robots, agents, animats,
hybrids, swarms (Latour 1998; Latour 1999a; Latour 2005) while Xenofeminism (Laboria
Cuboniks 2018) takes an almost agnostic perspective towards human nature, similar to
Michelle Westerlaken’s non-speciesm (Westerlaken 2017).
Meanwhile metaphysical theories such as object-oriented ontology, a recent philosophical
direction influenced by Heidegger, have put nonhuman objects into the discourse on
games and play (Bogost 2006) (see the footnote in Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning
(p. 33)).
My own project presented in this thesis with its foundations on cybernetics and systems
theory (see Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15)) proposes a fundamentally different approach
that relies on systems. The practice of anthroponeutral design, pursued in particular with
my project KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)) constitutes a critique
of distinctions between human and machines, and between virtual and actual participants
of play. I will return to the issue in the final chapter to discuss possible directions to pursue
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further (see Anthroponeutral Design (p. 157)). First, however, I will extend the speculative
research question “can machines play” into the ontological realm in the next section.
4.6 Counterpoint: Machines Play
In this section, I take up a speculative direction by discussing premises under which the
question “can machines play?” necessarily becomes true, purely by logical considera-
tions.17 I suggest that there are at least eight different sets of assumptions that would
validate this consequence, each of them having a different speculative nature. My goal
with this approach is to observe and question ontological assumptions that usually go
unchecked into statements about play.
1. The mind is a machine. The first of these positions is related to computationalism,
the idea that the mind is a machine. It has some proponents among computer
scientists and philosophers of mind. For example, Fodor (1975) suggests that mental
states are computational states and that the human mind is a machine. If this is the
case, then machines play because humans play.
2. Animals are machines. Descartes (1972) claimed in “De homine” that the lower
animals — unlike humans — are in principle automata. This in particular entails
that unlike humans, animals have no eternal soul and that their behaviour can be
completely reduced to physical explanations. Following Descartes’ argumentation,
if animals play as ethologists have established (see What Is Play? (p. 15)), and
animals are machines, then machines would play. From this we could conclude that
qualities which are unlikely to be reduced to physical descriptions, like consciousness,
ethics and aesthetics, are strictly not required for play.
3. Humans become machines. A scenario explored in transhumanism (see Beyond
Humanism) is that humans and machines will be converging into cyborgs, entities
where the distinction between the biological and the technical becomes increasingly
blurred (Haraway 1991). As a thought experiment, we might start with a 100%
biological human and gradually replace organ after organ with technological implants.
If at some point a sufficient amount of biological material is replaced, we might
observe a machine that is still playing.18 The medical boundaries of what can
17I began this line of inquiry in (Straeubig 2015a) and (Straeubig 2015b).
18This assumes that we carefully avoid to replace a part that is biologically responsible for play.
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be replaced or augmented are moving rapidly, radically questioning the distinction
between nature and technology towards a form of convergence (Fuller 2011).
4. Everything becomes play. Gamification, the principle of adding elements from games
to non-game contexts, is deployed to shape behaviour (see Play vs. Work (p. 51)).
Applying the distinction between virtual and real, Game designer Jane McGonigal
(2012) has strongly argued in favour of techniques that make everyday chores
more playful. Game scholars such as Ian Bogost (2011) have launched harsh
critique, likening gamification to a marketing gimmick solely deployed to incentivise
purchasing. Nevertheless, governments and commercial actors are widely deploying
these concepts, with the Chinese social scoring system just one widely discussed
example (Ramadan 2018). If we extrapolate this trend to its logical conclusion,
then we can image a society where all activities are gamified. Then the distinction
between play and work would break down and with it the notion that machines work
but do not play. Without a distinction play vs. non-play however, we would also find
ourselves in a situation where the notion of play has lost its meaning (see “Everything
is play” below).
5. The universe is computation. This metaphysical position seems related to the first
point, except that it does not specifically refer to the mind. A representative of this
direction is Wolfram (2002), postulating that the whole universe is a computational
machine.19 If we could observe entities that play in this scenario, it would entail that
machines play.
6. AGI is going to happen. AGI (artificial general intelligence) is the speculation that
artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence in all respects, the moment
of overtaking being dubbed as “singularity” (Kurzweil 2009). Scientists stress the
benefits of play for learning (see Play vs. Learning (p. 56)) and for creativity (see Play
vs. Learning (p. 56)), thus a potential superintelligence would have adopted playful
behaviour, except if it concludes that play is not useful (compare Play vs. Purpose
(p. 54)). In (Straeubig 2020a, (to appear)) I speculate how a continuously learning
AI (compare Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)) could approach a “singularity”,
by playing and communicating in virtual worlds while crossing boundaries into
other social systems and finally into physical space with the help of humans. The
19Floridi (2009) advises caution, by emphasizing the distinction between digital and informational ontology.
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science fiction author Daniel Suarez has explored a similar scenario with a dystopic
underpinning in his novels (Suarez 2011; Suarez 2010).
7. Machines always play. The characteristics of Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow
discussed in section Presence vs. Immersion (p. 127) have pointed me to the
idea that playful states should be in some sense simpler than non-playful states.
Intuitively, animals would be in flow states, undistracted, living in the here and now.
Why not machines, then? Panksepp’s research on play in deeper brain structures
adds some credibility to this speculation (see Discussion (p. 102)). Speculating
about the phenomenology of other psychic systems, I want to echo Nagel’s question
(see Exploring the Virtual (p. 91)): What is it like to be an artificial entity? Would a
machine be able to distinguish between work and play? And if so, would it see itself
working or playing? I think it is sound to assume that the machine would have both
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Therefore, when we observe machines as purely
working, for example assembling parts in a factory, we could be wrong. From their
first-person perspective, machines might not work, but play.
8. Everything is play. Based on his definition of a game (see What Is Play? (p. 15)),
Suits (1967) muses over the question if life could be a game altogether, although
one that is played unconsciously. Suits suggests that we might play two unconscious
games: one is the rule which forbids resorting to end one’s own life. 20 and
the other the zero-sum game of the maximisation of one’s own pleasure. Both
of Suits’ hypothetical games would also apply to machines. In Hinduism there is
the pantheistic, non-dualistic concept of Lila, the playful universe. Lila is a way of
describing all reality, including the cosmos, as the outcome of creative play. Play
is everywhere, strange loops (compare What Is Play? (p. 15)) disappear and all
distinctions finally vanish. Game over.
4.7 Summary: Deux Ex Machina
Whereas the previous chapter asked epistemological questions about play by looking at
different forms of experiences with reality and non-reality, this one has started with asking
questions about non-human players.
20Compare with Kolnai’s dilemma of winning vs. ceasing to play (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)).
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Extending the notion of a player from human to non-human and finally into the realm
of machines, has brought back questions about the reality of play, both from a post-
human evolutionary perspective (see Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)) and from a
speculative, ontological one (see Counterpoint: Machines Play (p. 118)). In this light, we
have to critically review Schiller’s exclamation quoted at the beginning of this chapter that
praises play as the highest expression of human qualities.
However, I would contend that Schillers “Spieltrieb” (Schiller 1795) has much more in
common with Panksepp’s “primary processes” (Panksepp and Biven 2012) in the sense
that they both postulate play as essential: Schiller from an idealistic standpoint and
Panksepp from a biological-evolutionary point of view. As a structurally more simple
biological function, Panksepp’s primary process would also be easier to implement than
the holy grail of artificial intelligence, human level intelligence or even consciousness.
Some research into AI, which has already relocated boundaries between humans and
machines (see Game AI vs. Playing Machines (p. 106)) tries to make sense of playing
machines as biological systems. By pointing to the “cognitive nonconscious”, Katherine
Hayles (2017) is looking at cognitive levels below consciousness, avoiding the “hard
problem” (see Can Machines Play? (p. 97)).
Based on distinctions between the different types of systems (see Luhmann: Distinctions
Create Meaning (p. 33)), I have taken a different route and proposed to extend Luh-
mann’s concept of social systems by inviting machines into them. Instead of focussing on
consciousness, I was observing communication. There I found play — within the social
system, not in the biological or psychic ones. I have delineated how my own practical
experiments to understand play have led me to experiment on both levels: with a biological
model for spiking neurons and with the concept of an interactive, playful system, manifest
in my projects neurotic (see Project: Neurotic (p. 100)) and KlingKlangKlong (see Project:
KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)).
In section Counterpoint: Machines Play (p. 118), I have visited several premises that
make the proposition “machines play” necessarily true. This marks a counterpoint to the
rest of this thesis, where I am trying to make my point by argumentation, description,
persuasion and rhetorics. Here, simple logical reasoning suffices.21 Yet the conclusion is
highly speculative: If any of the premises would be true, machines would play!
21All logical forms in that section are in the gestalt of Modus Ponens: If we accept the premise as true and if
we can deduce the conclusion from the premise, then we accept the conclusion as true as well.
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We can rephrase the question raised in section Can Machines Play? (p. 97) from “can
machines play”?” to “would machines play?”. Then we can start asking the machines.
Their possible answer might be found outside of play itself. This is where I will focus my
attention on in the next chapter: on the environments of play.
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Chapter 5
System vs. Environment
And all I want to do today
Is hang around with you and play
Like we were little kids again
And this big world is just a little playground
The world is our playground
Mikey McCleary (2014)
5.1 What Surrounds Play?
During the previous three chapters, I have observed play through various distinctions
as a phenomenon itself (see Play vs. Non-Play (p. 49)), in its relations to reality (see
Virtual vs. Real (p. 73)) and in terms of the playing subject (see Human vs. Machine
(p. 97)). In doing so, it was important to adopt a notion of systems that operate within
environments. This has enabled me to cross numerous distinctions into “the other side”,
observing other systems in the environment of play. Instead of dissecting play into the
constellation of elements as definitory methods attempt to do (compare What Is Play? (p.
15)), I have followed Luhmann’s and Bertalanffy’s approach to draw attention away from
systems as complex entities towards the distinction between a system and its environment
(see Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)).
This way of dealing with systems mirrors Ashby’s sentiment about the brain: “There can’t
be a proper theory of the brain until there is a proper theory of the environment as well
[. . . ] the subject has been hampered by our not paying sufficiently serious attention to the
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environmental half of the process. [. . . ] the ‘psychology’ of the environment will have to be
given almost as much thought as the psychology of the nerve network itself” (Pickering
2011, p. 105).
In the following sections I will apply this ecological thinking to play by asking about the
environments of play1As the environment is “everything else” apart from the system,
a system itself cannot observe it, it can only observe other systems in its environment
(Luhmann 1996, p. 176-209). This leaves the observation of an environment to an observer
who has made a distinction between a system and a specific environment. Second order
observers are capable of observing a multitude of environments, say legal, economic or
political environments of play. A distinction, for example, the one between play and work
(see Play vs. Work (p. 51)) or between play and reality (see Is Play Real? (p. 73)) guides
these observations.
Systems and environments also interact in terms of co-evolution (Bateson 2000a), which
raises questions about fitness, variety and survival, not only from the perspective of the
system but also for systems in its environment.
Interferences between systems of play and non-play can lead to unforeseen and serious
consequences. When the English government steeply raised taxes on playing cards
in 1710, the measure laid ground to a wave of forgeries and it led to protests that are
considered as one of the causes for the American pursuit for independence (Tosney 2008).
Ultimately, the tax was removed in 1960.
With the exception of a speculative angle like “everything is play” (see Counterpoint:
Machines Play (p. 118)), in order to play a player has to cross the boundary between play
and non-play twice, entering and leaving the “magic circle” (see Magic vs. Pervasive (p.
128)). This invites debate about the nature of these boundaries, about the ways to cross
them, and in the context of designing playful systems, about approaches to design these
borders (see Experiential Architecture (p. 160)).
Focussing on the distinction between system and environment produces many new
questions2. In this chapter I will approach the question of whether play can be understood
in terms of the environment rather than of the playing system itself? The notion of the
1Ecology is the study of interactions between systems and environments, a term coined by Ernst Haeckel
(1866) in 1866 in the context of biological systems.
2I want to mention again von Foerster’s ethical imperative that warrants creating new questions instead of
answering them (see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)).
124
playground, discussed in the next section, will be a useful starting point.
5.2 Playgrounds vs. Non-playgrounds
Questions about the environments of play raised in the previous section have to be
answered differently for different system references. Physical environments for play can
be playgrounds, sports stadia, billiard rooms, preschools, gambling halls and other places,
Spielwiesen (literally: play meadows) that signal that play is welcome to take place (Sicart
2014, p. 49-59). While playfulness does not require permission, those places invite and
encourage, but also limit the kinds of play that are expected and appropriate.
Thus the chess tables in New York City’s Central Park were not intended for the playfulness
of skateboarders. America’s Army, a video game commissioned by the United States
Army for recruitment purposes (Ubisoft 2002) did not anticipate a “gonzo gamer” who
would be texting soldiers’ names killed in the Iraq war to other players (Schrank 2014,
p. 127-133). Nor did inner cities ask for guerrilla gardeners to come and plant plants there
(see Project: Speed Gardening Guerrilla (p. 138)). Limits, rules and expectations do
not prevent players to appropriate, repurpose and subvert spaces for play (Sicart 2014,
p. 71-81), (Salen and Zimmerman 2003, p. 556-569).
This raises the question whether there are any “non-playgrounds” in a strict sense, places
where play behaviour should be absolute off-limits or is outright illegal? A few suggestions
come to mind like the operating theatre, a court hearing or the cockpit of an airplane. Yet
jokes, wordplay, acting and other playful behaviour is common in these places, despite the
serious issues involved. Other environments carry implicit protocols, such as the audience
hall in a contemporary theatre where it is expected for the visitors to sit in silence or
applaud while all play takes place on stage3. However, these are cultural agreements that
can be handled differently, say during plays for children, and have been handled differently
historically, e.g. in Shakespearean theatre. Breaking the “fourth wall” (Diderot 1994), the
invisible line that demarcates the magic circle (see Real vs. Imaginary (p. 80)) frequently
happens in theatre, but in contrast to the acts of playful appropriation depicted above it
has to be initiated by the performers.
3The house rules governing audience behaviour construct a virtual (see Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)) legal
environment that is set by the institution in which play is organised (compare Luhmann: Distinctions Create
Meaning (p. 33)).
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In 2008 during a visit at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City I witnessed a
fascinating exhibit of play as a risk to damage. A child in a corner was furiously scribbling on
a piece of paper with her crayons while a visibly nervous security guard kept a suspicious
eye on the scene, ready to intervene. The palpable tension was due to the fact that less
than a meter from the girl a very expensive artwork was on display. Finally, the father took
the child away to a safer space.
A categorical claim by scientists about play is that “the behaviour occurs in a protected
context where the player neither ill nor stressed” (Bateson and Martin 2013). By providing
social environments to rats, Bruce Alexander apparently has observed positive effects
regarding addiction (Gage and Sumnall 2019). Burghardt calls these requirements a
“relaxed field” and insists that it is a necessary criterion for play (Burghardt 2010, p. 16).
The most harrowing evidence against this view can be found in George Eisen’s grim
account how play took place even in the face of annihilation and sometimes literally meters
away from death in the ghettos and concentration camps of the Holocaust (Eisen 1990).
5.3 Architecting Environments
The notion of physical and digital playgrounds has not only implications for observing
playful systems (see The Meaning of “Meaning” (p. 87)), but also for their design. Video
games such as Minecraft (Mojang 2011) are created as digital playgrounds where players
literally construct a world that offers the material for its own creation. More subtly, games
like Proteus (Key and Kanaga 2013) relocate this world construction into the head of the
players — a playground for the mind4 (Sicart 2014, p. 49-59).
Ludic architecture requires designers to give up control over the system and encourages
them to deliberately shift their attention to the environment (Walz 2010). The concept of
affordances (Gibson 1977) can be used to design and place items in the environment that
signal ecological cues which encourage or discourage play (see also Game AI vs. Playing
Machines (p. 106) and Discussion (p. 42)). Miguel Sicart sums this idea up succinctly:
“The designer of games should not act as a provider of anything other than context” (Sicart
2014, p. 90).
I believe it is equally important to notice that architectural work begins from an existing
4The term “walking simulators” that has been attached to these games (Carbo-Mascarell 2016) is based
on a distinction that fails to observe this aspect.
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environment, not from a blank slate. Often it is necessary to clear the ground and to
remove obstacles first. In section Discussion (p. 42) I have discussed the impact of a
hostile, defensive architecture in the context of urban planning and design. Ellin and
Blakely (1997) proposes that in order to overcome those environments, one must rethink
privatisation, gated communities, protected spaces and replace “architectures of fear” with
methods of empowerment and place making. These practices are available to create
playful and inclusive physical and virtual spaces.
As initial points of departure, established guidelines for designing playful spaces can be
utilised (Shackell et al. 2008). They may result in playgrounds that allow risk, experi-
mentation and co-construction: a perspective that is beautifully illustrated in (Burkhalter
et al. 2016) which depicts playgrounds created between 1960 and the 1980s as creative
laboratories that invite players to be present, creative and alive.
5.4 Presence vs. Immersion
Residence in virtual realities is often related to the concept of immersion, the perception of
being physically present in a nonphysical world. To untangle the relationship of presence
and immersion, we can start from the distinction between first person and third person
perspective (see Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)). Immersion is inherently a first-
person phenomenon that renders the distinction between the virtual and the real invisible.
An external observer might register indications for immersion by measuring signals from a
biological system but cannot communicate with an immersed system without recourse to
its memory. Presence as being in the present moment therefore is incommunicable. This
relates to the concept of flow, brought forward by the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
(1991) also relates to immersion. Flow is characterised by the following six attributes
(Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura 2009):
1. concentration on the present moment
2. merging of action and awareness
3. loss of reflective self-consciousness
4. a sense of personal control over the situation
5. a distortion of temporal experience
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6. experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding
This is a description from a third person scientific perspective. Communicating the first
person experience of a flow moment requires metaphorical language. Similarly, Janet
Murray (1998, p. 99) describes immersion as a jump into the swimming pool: “the sensation
of being surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as water is from air, that
takes over all our attention, our whole perceptual apparatus”. Mel Slater (2003) suggests
that the term “immersive” should be reserved for properties of the technology and the
environment, while “presence” should be used for the corresponding properties of a user’s
subjective experience.
In digital games, physical presence is mediated through an avatar (Klevjer 2012). This
presence has to be carefully constructed by matching the perceptions and action of the
player with the visual and auditory presentation of the game (Swink 2009). Only then has
the player a chance to suspend disbelief and become immersed in it.
Richard Bartle (2004) proposes to distinguish between levels of immersion based on ways
the player is represented within the game world: The Spielfigur is a means to influence
the game world. An avatar represents the player in the game world and players refer to
their avatar in 3rd person language. Players identify in first person perspective with a
character. With a persona, the identity of the player and the Spielfigur merge. The player
inhabits the virtual world. I would critique Bartle’s interpretation of these concepts as
grades of immersion and ask if they can just denote different experiential qualities instead.
Daniel Vella (2016) takes the construction of identity further by analysing how the ludic
self constitutes itself. Vella (2015) also observes that it is through virtual embodied action
that a player becomes a subject in the game world.
5.5 Magic vs. Pervasive
In the previous section I gave an account of the system vs. environment distinction from
the perspective of the system, immersed within the boundaries of a magic circle. Now I
move on to observe playful phenomena that permeate this boundary: pervasive games.
According to Markus Montola (2005, p. 3), pervasive games have “[. . . ] one or more salient
features that expand the contractual magic circle of play socially, spatially or temporally”.
Pervasive games have been researched extensively (Montola 2012a; Montola 2009;
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Nieuwdorp 2007; Magerkurth 2007), and several subgenres have evolved since the early
2000s.
Locative games and artistic interventions take up the spatial dimension; they appropriate,
repurpose and sometimes irritate public spaces. Citing artistic practices like mapping,
geo-annotation and dislocation, Drew Hemment (2006) distinguishes locative arts and
the concept of mixed reality (compare Virtual vs. Physical (p. 79)): “Whereas ‘mixed
reality’ posits the virtual and physical as layered or intersecting, these projects suggest that
something else can be produced in between”. My projects neurotic (see Project: Neurotic
(p. 100)) and KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)) can be identified
as locative experiences. In addition, Speed Gardening Guerrilla pervades the invisible
and complex legal boundaries of guerrilla gardening (Reynolds 2009) (see Project: Speed
Gardening Guerrilla (p. 138)).
Live action role-playing games (LARP) constitute a second form of pervasive games
that create temporary immersive zones for players to experiment with fictional roles and
identities. The particular strong tradition of organising these events in Nordic countries has
established “Nordic LARP” as a genre designation (Stenros and Montola 2010). LARP
share characteristics with Alternate Reality Games by asserting a fictional reality to the
players while keeping the game veiled from surrounding non-players (compare Real vs.
Imaginary (p. 80)). Both ARG and LARP are run by groups of “game masters” who steer
the game while it is running, negotiating with and sometimes conceding control to the
players (Jonsson et al. 2007).
Eva Nieuwdorp (2005) has described the magic circle constructed by pervasive games in
terms of a “liminal” interface, where players cross both distinctions between playful and
serious — the paratelic interface — and play vs. games (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)),
the paraludic interface. The deep social and emotional impact of Live Action Role Playing
regularly persists beyond the boundaries of the events themselves, a phenomenon that
Annika Waern (2011) has called “bleed” between game and non-game contexts.
Bleed is one of the ethical issues that arise in the relation between pervasive games and
their environments. (Montola et al. 2006) have identified several other ones, in particular
involuntary participation of non-players, possible (ab-)use of power by organisers over
their participants, privacy concerns and issues staging games in public space. The latter
also relates to my discussion of Speed Gardening Guerrilla (see Discussion (p. 141)).
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Bleed also takes place in the “futuristically political” work of Omsk Social Club (2019b), a
collective of artists that is hacking Live Action Role Play, immersive action, modern day
culture and post-political futurism to reveal deeper social structures.5 Their experimentation
with phenomena such as rave culture, survivalism, catfishing, desire and sacrifice, positive
trolling, algorithmic strategies and decentralised cryptocurrency blurs realities into a
superposition of interfering magic circles.
5.6 Project: Non-Sense of Place
Non-Sense of Place is the name of an exhibition that consists of three of my projects:
Speed Gardening Guerrilla, Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth and CO2rnwall CO2
Challenge. These three projects address the distinction between system and environment.
I prepared Non-Sense of Place as a playful response to the theme of the Balance/
Unbalance conference held at the University of Plymouth in 2017. That event was called
“A Sense of Place”. I exhibited the three pieces simultaneously at a booth, parallel to the
conference tracks.
5.7 Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge
The CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge is an ironic take on environmental issues, climate change
discussions and post-truth politics. It was created during the Fascinate conference, a
week-long event organised at Falmouth University in Cornwall. It consists of performative,
ritualistic elements to reduce the level of CO2: breath constrictions, the covering of soil
with a napkin and the reduction of ocean volume by scooping water from the sea. The
project is documented in form of a website that includes a number of short video clips.
5.7.1 Development
The major part of my work for the CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge took place during the
Fascinate conference in August 2014. At first I researched carbon dioxide emissions and
wrote a short concept and the video clip scripts (see Appendix Dialogue), then I filmed on
location with participants of the GeoHack workshop led by Duncan Speakman. While still
5I took part in an near–future themed weekend event called Athame, where we explored and played with
topics around technologically mediated intimacy (Omsk Social Club 2019a).
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at Fascinate, I assembled text and film clips into a website and presented the result in the
workshop debriefing. After the conference, I kept editing the text.
5.7.2 Exposition
Figure 5.1: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge exercise suggestions
I presented the CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge at the GeoHack workshop summary of the
Fascinate Conference at Falmouth University in August 2014 and a second time three
years later as part of my Non-Sense of Place exhibition during the Balance/Unbalance
conference at the University of Plymouth.
5.7.3 Discussion
My initial impulse for developing the CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge came from a critical
response to the notion of artistic provocation. At the onset of the Falmouth workshop
we were exposed to a “provocation” that consisted of a prerecorded talk by author and
activist James Marriot, who has extensively traced the global oil economy in (Marriott and
Minio-Paluello 2013). In the video, Marriot deplored the state of environmental issues
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Figure 5.2: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge performer covering soil to fight erosion
caused by that industry. In particular, he mentioned the practice of parking tankers near
the Cornwall coast in order to wait for price surges in the market, upon which they would
then deliver the charge. At the end of the talk we were encouraged to “do something about
it”.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “provocation”, among other meanings, as an “[. . . ]
action of calling, inviting, or summoning”, an “action of inciting; incitement, impulse,
instigation; an incentive, a stimulus” (Murray 1970). I failed to feel provoked in the literal
sense by this intervention. Rather, the charging of art with purpose, even “for a good
cause” made me feel uneasy. Despite good intentions, art that is functionalised as a tool
for activism raises similar aesthetic and conceptual questions than the ones discussed in
Play vs. Purpose (p. 54).
Moral aspects aside, I could relate to the aesthetic side of the initiative. The next day I could
spot one of the ships waiting for a price hike, anchoring near the coast where our workshop
was held. Thanks to the induction the day before, the ship had acquired a new symbolic
meaning for me. Now, the unmoving tanker represented the multifarious wrongdoings of
the oil industry, but nevertheless radiated the aesthetic of the Anthropocene (Davis and
Turpin 2015).
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Drawing a distinction between hearing (hören) and listening (zuhören), German sound
artist Felix Kubin (2019) asserts that when one encounters noise, the perceiver has a
choice to actively re-interpret the experience away from noise with its negative impact
towards a potentially interesting sound structure. A sculptural analogue to this aesthetics
of noise6 can be seen in the installation Plastic Reef by Federico Uribe (see Discussion
(p. 141)). This was the sense in which I began to appreciate the beauty of the oil tanker
becoming part of the landscape. The ship is therefore visible in the frame of the video
clips that I shot for the project.
I decided to pick up on the theme of the workshop, called “GeoHack” that was framing
our contribution and try to “hack” the expectations of the organisers. Again, I choose to
deploy affirmation as an artistic tool instead of distancing and plain criticism. Artists that
work with this method are the Yes Men, who are often taking over the roles of their targets
(Bichlbaum and Bonanno 2009) and Front deutscher Äpfel, who are subverting neo-Nazi
symbolism in an exaggerated manner (Upravitelev 2014).
While this kind of ironical appropriation is at risk of being mistaken for the institutions
it criticises, it also becomes increasingly problematic against the backdrop of fading
distinctions between fiction and reality (compare The Meaning of “Meaning” (p. 87)) in
the context of a so-called “post truth”-society, in which public discourse is dominated by
corporate and political interests, lobbyism, conspiracy theories and professional influencing
tactics. Steve Fuller (2018), whose philosophical background includes Plato, Popper and
social constructionism but lacks any mention of constructivist epistemology, offers an
eloquent critique of the post-modern condition, but somewhat curiously clings to a pre-
modern absolutistic truth concept as a backdrop.
In section Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms, (p. 30) I argue for the radical construc-
tivist approach to an ontology that considers the constructed nature of reality without
denying a reality per se. According to these philosophies, the negotiation of truth is
inherently individual and social because it results from communication. It requires argu-
mentation, persuasion, discussion, and as such it is prone to power and authority. Those
dependencies have been analysed by Friedrich Nietzsche (2008) and by Michel Foucault
(1980). A question to consider within a theory of social systems is the following: if the
distinction between true and false can be undermined by the political system, in the form
6Andrew Prior (2015) investigates the aesthetics and mediality of noise through post–digital glitch practices,
modes of deliberate artistic disturbances introduced into analog media.
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of political messages devoid of any meaning, in which position does that put those social
systems that traditionally have dealt with the construction (science) and deconstruction
(art) of reality?
With the absurdity of some the public debates on climate change it would be easy to
mistake the presenter in the CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (me) for a climate denier arguing
in seriousness, instead of an artist delivering an ironic comment. Therefore my artistic
interpretation of the scientific findings and the design of the “climate-saving” exercises are
deliberately exaggerated and unreasonable.
However, in analogy to Spiel 1 (see Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57)), I developed the narrative
rooted in scientific facts and methods, which then takes its themes in a different, pretended
direction. I based the assertions about carbon dioxide emissions made in the CO2rnwall
CO2 Challenge on scientific research (Alley et al. 2007; Bernstein et al. 2007; U.S. DOE
2008). The ongoing public discussion on carbon dioxide emissions, the greenhouse effect
and climate change in general is pointing to a misalignment between the societal systems
of science and politics, for example, when scientists are prevented from publishing their
findings on grounds of political and economic interests (Kitcher 2010).
On the other hand, some researchers seek new sources of funding by taking advantage of
gamification. I derived the title “CO2 Challenge” from the “Ice Bucket Challenge”, a 2014
marketing stunt that successfully gamified social pressure for a fundraising campaign rally
(Sherman and Wedge 2017) (compare Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)).
While the CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge primarily addresses the system/environment distinc-
tion in a proverbial sense, a web of other meanings have come into play that make it a
piece of work for me that sits on quite complex grounds. The initial question that led me
into the project, was about the moral responsibility of artists to “do something”, as we were
told in the “artistic provocation”. As I am questioning the functionalisation of both play
(see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)) and art (see Games vs. Art (p. 63)), I am asking myself
whether concrete and direct actions, for example against the ties of art institutions with
oil, weapons, and surveillance industries through sponsorship and personal connections
(Evans 2015) could be more effective? Do art and play even have to be measured in terms
of effectiveness? Maybe they do, but only if the impetus is to “do something”: a strange
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loop of expectation and fulfilment.
5.8 Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth
Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (PFIP) (Straeubig 2015d) is a site-specific
intervention that juxtaposes satirically the theme of fitness and self-improvement with a
critique of the traffic policy in Plymouth, England. In substantial parts of the inner city, cars
are given high priority over pedestrian and bicycle traffic. Often pedestrians have to take
large detours or wait twice just to cross the street, while car lanes are built like fenced
racing tracks.
In PFIP, participants are encouraged to find locations in the city, where pedestrians have
been restricted from taking the direct route between two points and are forced to walk
detours to in favour of car traffic. The distance of the detour is to be measured, and the
additional required effort is re-interpreted as a deliberate action to increase the pedestrian’s
fitness.
5.8.1 Development
Initially, the project began as a collection of impressions around inner-city traffic, when
I started taking photos of intersections that caught my interest, as pedestrians had to
take absurd detours, while at the same time car traffic was given free voyage. With the
announcement and call to participation for the Mediacity 5 conference at the University of
Plymouth, I developed the material into a project.
I researched into the concept of walkability (see Discussion (p. 137)), developed the
concept for Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth and designed and prepared the ma-
terial in form of handouts, a website and props for the exposition. During that preparation,
filmmaker Johanna Ickert contributed additional material.
5.8.2 Exposition
I presented Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth initially at the Mediacity 5 conference,
that featured the theme of “social smart cities”, in May 2015.
In line with the distinction between system and environment, I also included it in the
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Figure 5.3: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth
Figure 5.4: PFIP presentation at Mediacity 5, University of Plymouth
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Non-Sense of Place exhibition during the Balance/Unbalance conference in August 2017.
Both events took part at the University of Plymouth.
5.8.3 Discussion
A few months before I applied for the position of a Marie Curie Fellow in the CogNovo
Doctoral Training Program, I followed an invitation by Emma Wittaker to give a talk at the
University of Plymouth. In that presentation I discussed different topological models for
location based urban games, mappings between the virtual space of the game and the
physical space of the city where it takes place (Straeubig 2013b).
Pokémon Go (Niantic 2016) for example uses trigger points, locations on the map where
players encounter Pokémons, find resources and train their protégés.7 I argued that since
the game layer that is cast over the physical world was virtual, there could be more diverse
topologies, for example, the world would stretch in one direction like a chewing gum while
in the perpendicular direction it would shrink.8 Thus it would be possible to reach some
places easily while struggling to arrive at others, based on where you are heading.
After I had spent a few days as a pedestrian in Plymouth, I felt the city was built on that
principle. You could walk longer distances as long as you did not need to cross the car
traffic, which ran in barricaded lanes built like racing circuits. To reach your goal, you
would constantly have to look out for tunnels, bridges, and heavily fenced crosswalks.
Pedestrian traffic light periods are miserably short and most of the time you have to press
the button and wait again in the middle between two tracks. I noticed that some routes
were absurdly far compared to the actual linear distance. This was the birth of Pedestrian
Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (PFIP).
Among the current challenges for our growing cities are the reduction of carbon-based
emissions (compare Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (p. 130)) and the management
of traffic. In this context, the term walkability, i.e. the degree of accommodation of a
city towards pedestrian movement, has been recognised as an important environmental,
economic, and social factor (Leinberger and Lynch 2014; Leyden 2003; Rogers, Gardner,
and Carlson 2013).
7In fact, it uses a trigger area, in order to deal with to inaccuracies in the measurement of the players’
position.
8The mathematical branch of topology conceptualises these kinds of “chewing gum” geometries (Mendel-
son 2009).
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Some cities have prioritised pedestrians, cyclists and public transport over car traffic.
Several artistically influenced projects have reflected this challenge to city planning and
management while utilising clever means of information visualisation to illustrate the
problems (Colville-Andersen 2014; Elledge 2014).
PFIP came alive twice as a pop-up booth during artistic conferences at the University
of Plymouth. I was showing examples of pedestrian-hostile locations in Plymouth, re-
imagined as “fitness challenges” for citizens. During the events, I engaged in discussions
with the visitors and encouraged them to look out for similar locations for themselves.
There was a handout for participants and measure tape was available to determine the
length of the forced detours. The temporary website that accompanied the piece featured
a calorie counter where the resulting fitness benefit could be determined.
PFIP is a site specific project, but it can be adopted to other pedestrian-hostile cities.
Whereas it grew out of rather personal observations or rather frustrations about a pedestrian-
hostile environment, it aims to challenge the perception of our ordinary surroundings and
to foster a discourse about urban planning, traffic and political priorities. Like the other
projects presented in Non-Sense of Place, it does so playfully.
5.9 Project: Speed Gardening Guerrilla
Speed Gardening Guerrilla is a competitive game for teams of players that uses planting
as its core game mechanic (Straeubig 2012). To win the game, players plant plants in an
urban environment, spy on their opponents, steal their plants and re-plant them in order to
create the largest planting spot. The game is usually played in a festival context over a
period of several days.
5.9.1 Development
I designed the precursor of Speed Gardening Guerrilla in spring 2012 under the name
“Gardening Guerilla”. This was done in preparation for a game design class at Leuphana
University Lüneburg. My motivation was to create a game that could be played by my
students during the whole semester. I also wanted the game to be pervasive, to create
some interference between ludic and non-ludic spaces (see Magic vs. Pervasive (p. 128)).
As the students were coming to campus only once or twice a week, the game was set to
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enable intermittent gameplay, allowing for short interactions at irregular intervals. Another
inspiration came from the dynamic nature of real-time strategy games like Starcraft, where
factions compete for domination on a map that is partially visible to the players (Blizzard
Entertainment 1998).
The original rules involved planting sunflower seedlings somewhere within the boundaries
of the university campus. The seeds would grow into plants and the teams were required
to look after them during a time 6 months. The winner would be the team that raised
the largest plant. Players could steal plants of the other teams and re-plant them at the
location of their own planting spot.
The growth of the plants automatically creates a game dynamic, and from this conflict
emerges naturally. Players are interested to keep the location of their planting spot secret,
but they also want to look after their plants, water and tend them to optimise growth.
Frequent visits are in risk of revealing the location for the other teams that might spy on
and follow their opponents. Also, larger plants are easier to spot and while growing is the
goal. I deployed these opposite goals as design elements to create playful tension.
I had to rethink and redesign the game mechanic when the game was commissioned for
the Playpublic Festival in Berlin 2012. It was supposed to be played in an inner city setting
and could only take three days.9 While I considered the growth mechanic to be central,
I finally had to abandon it towards an approach with small plants that could be provided
by me and by the participants at the beginning of each game. I modified the game rules
accordingly. Each time the game was exposed in public, I refined the rule set to adapt to
the situation and to the surrounding urban environment (Straeubig 2012).
During a residency at Medialab Prado in Madrid in 2013, I developed a mixed-reality
version of the game, by augmenting the plants with QR-codes and creating a smartphone
app that would send the GPS position of the plants to a server, displaying them as dots on
the facade of the Medialab (Straeubig 2013a).
5.9.2 Exposition
Speed Gardening Guerrilla was initially played in public during the Playpublik urban game
festival in Berlin, 2012. One year later I brought it to w00t, a similar festival that took place
9This is why I added “speed” to the name, indicating the relatively short running time of three days versus
the six months of the original game concept.
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Figure 5.5: Speed Gardening Guerrilla at Playpublik Berlin
Figure 5.6: Speed Gardening Guerrilla at w00t Kopenhagen
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in Kopenhagen. Also during 2013, I developed and presented the mixed-reality version
of the game at Medialab Prado in Madrid for the “Solid Interfaces and Urban Games:
Digital Games in the Public Spaces” project. In June 2014, Speed Gardening Guerrilla
was invited to the Malta Festival in Poznan´, Poland and to the Playful Arts Festival in
’s-Hertogenbosch in the Netherlands, where it was run by Frank Loesche.
I presented the project as part of my Non-Sense of Place exhibition during the Balance/
Unbalance conference at the University of Plymouth in August 2017.
The game rules are published under a non-commercial Creative Commons (2019) license.
This implies that everyone is permitted to stage and play Speed Gardening Guerrilla on
their own behalf, without further permission, restriction or fee, as long as the endeavour
itself is not commercial.
5.9.3 Discussion
Speed Gardening Guerrilla began as a pervasive game for students with physical plants
as some kind of unusual game material (see Magic vs. Pervasive (p. 128)). Similar
live games, some of which include role-playing and hide-and-seek elements, have been
played on university and school campuses, for example, the game Killer (Jackson 1998;
Davis 2009). Moving from the campus environment of the original game to various city
spaces in different cultural and legislative environments has exposed a set of new themes,
in particular issues concerning public/private space, legality of Guerrilla Gardening and
ethical considerations of playing with organisms.
Speed Gardening Guerrilla could be described a gamified variant of Guerrilla Gardening
(Reynolds 2009). Guerilla Gardening began as a movement in the early 70s in New York,
when Liz Christy and her Green Guerrilla group created a garden on an abandoned lot
(Wilson and Weinberg 1999). I would claim that Joseph Beuys’ 1982 piece 7000 Oak Trees
(Beuys 1982), where he playfully “blackmailed” the municipality of Kassel into planting
7000 trees in exchange of removing the same number of basalt stones from a central
square, one stone for each tree, also counts as a subverted form of urban gardening.
Beuys, however, was effectively using the art system as his executive arm.
Because it involves planting into public or private ground that is not in the gardener’s
possession, Guerilla Gardening per se is an illegal activity (Hardman 2011). However,
how severe is this illegality exactly? This was the question I discussed with my students in
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Lüneburg and during game sessions with players and concerned parties.
In Madrid I was told not to plant in plain sight of the police, while in Berlin an encounter
with state authorities went well after the players could credibly claim that they were not
attempting to steal plants from a nearby bed of roses, but adding plants to the city (Schuster
2012). The application to present Speed Gardening Guerrilla in central London during
the art game event Now Play This was rejected from the festival on grounds of concerns
about future public funding — staging the game was deemed too risky for that kind of
event (Gramazio 2018).
Then there is the question of whether it is ethical to play with plants, “just for play’s sake”,
hinting at an inferior role of play as opposed to activities which have external purposes (see
Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)). It seems less objectionable for plants to serve as construction
material, food or face cream. What difference does it make to play with game pieces that
are alive?
Some of these considerations led to practical design decisions. After the first occasions
I changed the material for marking the plants; it is now biodegradable. I also consulted
specialists to ensure that the plants that I selected for the game were sturdy against
replanting. The rules of the game remind the players to treat the plants with respect and
avoid any negative impact on the environment.
I think seeking an answer to the ethical questions posed above must go deeper. This
brings us back to the distinction between human and animal play and the one between
games and art (see Games vs. Art (p. 63)). Several contemporary artworks present living
beings as artworks, for example Eduardo Kac’s transgenic GFP Bunny (Kac 2000; Kac
1998), Anna Dumitriu’s bacterial textile Plague Dress (Dumitriu 2018), or Garnet Hertz’
Cockroach Controlled Mobile Robot (Hertz 2005).
On the surface these artworks present biological systems from conceptually different
angles: Dumitriu uses bacterial DNA and dried plants as historical and metaphorical
material. Kac plays artfully with the spectre of genetic engineering, the direct interference
with the genetic sphere of the living. And Hertz assembles an electro-mechanical-biological
machine-animal chimera.
While the emerging bioart movement is investigating living systems and the artistic handling
of various biotechnologies (Yetisen et al. 2015), it appears that the artists are not only
responding to ethical considerations about the scientific and technological developments
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they reflect but also anticipating possible controversies about the artworks themselves.
This form of self-awareness produces an artistic stance that brings along with the artwork
a form of already pre-formulated meta-ethics.
Kac (2005, p. 264), for example, frames his work in terms of its social environment by
stating that his “[. . . ] artwork ‘GFP Bunny’ comprises the creation of a green fluorescent
rabbit [. . . ], the public dialogue generated by the project, and the social integration of
the rabbit”. By re-imaging ethics committee debates as performances in “Trust me, I’m
an Artist: Towards an Ethics of Art and Science Collaboration”, Dumitriu and Farsides
(2014) address procedures around ethical responsibilities that usually remain opaque.
Hertz (2002) illuminates distinctions drawn in the context of the Canadian system of
research ethics, quoting from the respective guidelines: “On the other hand, insects,
crustaceans, and plant organisms don’t fall under the category of being an animal, and
therefore research involving these subjects do not to require any form of ethical review”.
That level of artistic appraisal for ethical concerns is in stark contrast to previous works of
art, which have produced scandals in regular intervals, using animal cadavers, mistreating
living animals or killing animals in the context of the artwork (Vilmer 2009).
Transgressions like Survival Research Laboratories’ machine-corpse installations (Juno,
Vale, and Ballard 1987, p. 6-17) or Joe Coleman biting off the heads of living rats during
performances (Juno, Vale, and Ballard 1987, p. 180-189) seem to point to the extreme
fringe of the art landscape, but established artists are certainly not less capable of staging
mayhem. An estimation of how many creatures were killed in the creation and display of
works by British artist Damien Hirst alone arrived at a total number of 913450, including a
few sharks, some sheep and a large number of houseflies (Goldstein 2017).
Controversial outcomes of artistic processes — scandals — make events within the art
system anschlussfähig for other events, as provocations (compare Discussion (p. 131)),
as topics of conversation between artists, curators and audience and as publications. They
also potentially irritate other subsystems of society like the legal system, mass media or
activist groups concerned with animal rights. This can be observed in the example of
Guggenheim’s exhibition “Art and China after 1989: Theater of the World” where in the
wake of a scandal first an attempt at communication is made (Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation 2017a) followed by an act of self-censoring after threats of violence (Solomon
R. Guggenheim Foundation 2017b). The art system itself can deal with negation as an
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enabler of new communication (Luhmann 2000, p. 283).
Some contributions from the field of design and human-computer interaction cross similiar
ethical boundaries (Sareen, Zheng, and Maes 2019). In this project, as well as in a
related one by (Stavrinidou et al. 2015), technological possibilities are investigated without
mentioning any possible concerns for the living research objects. Donna Haraway (1997,
p. 97) has identified this attitude in the established tradition of science: “Nineteenth
century scientists materially constituted the organism as a laboring system, structured by
a hierarchical division of labor, and an energetic system fueled by sugars and obeying
the laws of thermodynamics. For us, the living world has become a command, control,
communication, intelligence system [. . . ]”.
One difficulty in developing an ethical perspective towards plants may lie in the fact that
presently there is a wide disagreement about what would constitute “plant rights” based on
their cognitive and emotional faculties, exemplified in the diametrically opposed opinions
of (Pelizzon and Gagliano 2015) and (Taiz et al. 2019). As long as legislation makes
a distinction between animals and plants, researchers and artist can recourse on the
distinctions that the legal system and the respective ethics committees draw.
I would hold against this view that an ethical stance has to permeate any legalistic argu-
mentation, considering the distinction between legal vs. illegal and ethical vs. unethical.
I believe that in the wake of a growing body of findings about cognitive, emotional and
social qualities in plants (Wohlleben 2016), these kinds of experiments could at least
be discussed critically. As opposed to postmodern art or play for play’s sake, research
in human-plant interaction may claim beneficial purposes (Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)),
although I cannot see them in the projects referenced above.
The earliest recorded instance of bioart actually contributed to the welfare of society,
although it did so involuntarily. The biologist and physician Alexander Fleming painted with
bacteria in Petri dishes in between experiments, when he noticed that some of his works
had been destroyed by a fungus. This triggered the discovery of Penicillin (Yetisen et al.
2015). As the original intentions for Fleming’s “germ paintings” were of a frivolous kind,
would the accidental discovery still count as ethical or make up an act of “microslavery”
(Harvey et al. 2014)? Intention and effect can go in the other direction as well. When Hans
Haake (2010) set free ten turtles into the French wilderness in an attempt at an artistic
critique of the pet trade, he picked the wrong subspecies. As a result, his well-meant
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intervention “was likely to have compromised genetically distinct lineages of both tortoises
and threatened the biodiversity of Hermann’s tortoises” (Yetisen et al. 2015, p. 727). In
Luhmann’s terms, an act of irritation happened between the social system of environmental
art and the biological system of that population (Luhmann 1996, p. 210-254).
Thus, should we regard intention as an ethical measure for these projects? (van Eck
and Lamers 2018) argue that games involving organisms should either serve educational
purposes such as to “spark interest into biology in a playful way” or be “used as a medium
to express artistic statements about, among others, animal experimentation and the
relationships between species”10 (van Eck and Lamers 2018, p. 7). Undeniably, aside from
its playful and discursive aspects, playing Gardening Guerrilla results in more plants being
added to the urban landscape. This can be considered a positive ecological contribution,
albeit a small one.
Does Speed Gardening Guerrilla, events where players roam inner city streets to find
suitable planting spots, then rather qualify for educational value or as an artwork? In
general this is a difficult question (compare Games vs. Art (p. 63)), but it can be resolved
by observing the distinction between the first and third person perspective (see Paradoxa
of Play (p. 69)). The players might play for their frivolous pleasure, whereas the game
itself might reveal more serious themes that are reflected within the Guerrilla Gardening
movement.
Reynolds (2009) describes several motivations for this form of urban gardening. He
suggests that some gardeners like to improve the aesthetics and health of neglected
places, some prefer to plant edible varieties for increased self-sufficiency, and others
enjoy the identity-building expressiveness of rebellious gardening, support the movement
in its political aims or seek a community of like-minded people. These motives can be
considered playful, arguably even the goal of harvesting, considering Suits definition of a
game as a system where the rules prohibit the use of more efficient means (see What Is
Play? (p. 15)). In comparison to traditional gardening, a Guerrilla Gardener undertakes
additional effort and risk in order to reap benefits from urban plantations. Michael Hardman
(2011) illustrates the social process of group forming and disbanding, referring to models
of the social theorist Alberto Melucci (1996). Like other forms of play, Guerrilla Gardening
is a social system.
10In 2011 I presented a game called 20000 Nanometers under the Sea at the AR Devcamp in Düsseldorf
which involved yeast cells and Crustaceans (Straeubig 2011). My ethical self–vindication was that the species
that I bought in aquaria stores was used as fish food anyway.
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Can art give impulses for an audience to act in an environmentally aware manner? In
an empirical study, Laura Sommer and Christian Klöckner give a positive answer, noting
that artworks that represent “beautiful and colorful depictions of sublime nature that are
showing solutions to environmental problems” are most likely to stimulate positive action
(Sommer and Klöckner 2019). I think it is necessary to note that their conclusions are
based on answers that their participants gave in a questionnaire, not on actual actions
taken. Yet I cannot claim that any of my own projects would fit this description. In light of
the wide-scale destruction of the planet in the Anthropocene, a strategy for artworks like
(Uribe 2019) is to seek refuge in irony. It is rather this kind of artistic stance that is reflected
in both of the previously discussed projects, Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (see
Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (p. 135)) and CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge
(see Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (p. 130)). Next, I will discuss the three projects in
the context of systems playing with the system vs. environment distinction.
5.10 System vs. Environment in Practice
The three projects discussed in this chapter present playful systems that thematise the
distinction between system and environment. Each of them draws this distinction differently.
The streets, yards and buildings of a city are located in the physical environment of a
pervasive game like Speed Gardening Guerrilla, as much as the legal system is located in
its societal environment. The discourse around the lawfulness of planting in public ground
that is surrounding Guerrilla Gardening has accompanied the development of the game,
from the initial discussions with my students to the rejection from a festival for fear of losing
funding.
The CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge and Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth work with
an ironic reversal of positions, similar to Hostile Environment Facility Training (see Project:
Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40)). Instead of positioning themselves as a
predictable opposition, they offer critique through affirmation. This only works if the irony
can be observed by the audience, otherwise the pieces risk failure in the traditional sense
of the art system (Luhmann 2000, p. 5-53).
In this respect, the CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge is probably my most ambivalent piece. Its
interpretation of data on man-made CO2 production is close to the rhetoric of climate
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denial, and an observer could interpret it as such. However, in my opinion the production
of art is prone to be misunderstood, and in contrast to science, the artistic intention is to
keep this option as a selection for the audience.
5.11 Summary: Change of Perspective
In this chapter I have addressed how a system can be observed as a unit, through the
distinction between system and environment. I have discussed the significance of the
observation that phenomena of play may be a result not so much of the system that plays
but of its environments. This has some deep implications for designing playful systems, as
it shifts the focus from designing systems to architecting environments (see Architecting
Environments (p. 126)).
Furthermore, I have discussed examples of pervasive games that deliberately irritate
this distinction, and offered three of my own projects as examples for testing boundaries
between systems and environments in a playful manner (see Project: CO2rnwall CO2
Challenge (p. 130), Project: Pedestrian Fitness Initiative for Plymouth (p. 135) and Project:
Speed Gardening Guerrilla (p. 138)).
Throughout this thesis I have observed different observers of play, by means of analysis,
reference, quotation and through offering my critique, in other words: I have engaged in
second-order observation. Second-order observation was introduced into cybernetics
through the distinction between an observer and the observed (see Von Foerster: Second
Order Cybernetics (p. 29)). It provides a method to resolve contradictory accounts and to
make sense of play (see Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)). It does not, however,
open up to the phenomenological qualities of the immediate first-person perspective.
Reading about someone else’s experience is not equivalent to my own experience. To
encounter the qualities of direct experience, a different mode is required that brings us in
contact with the phenomena under investigation: practice.
In the medium of this text, however, I can only communicate my experience by describing
it in a self-referential second order observation: through reflection. In the following chapter
I therefore return to questions of observation, in particular to the distinction between
theoretical and practical ways of sense-making. This will also require this thesis to engage
in a critical observation of itself and to reintroduce the distinction between itself and its
147
environment (Vanderstraeten 2001).
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Chapter 6
Theory vs. Practice
Play transcends all disciplines, if not all discipline.
Mihai Spariosu (1989)
6.1 A Third Culture?
In his famous observation about “the two cultures”, C. P. Snow (1993) deplored the lack of
communication between the sciences and the humanities. He also expressed his hope that
some form of third culture would emerge, bridging the gap. This appeal has encouraged
others to engage in overcoming the disparity between intellectuals and scientists.
Some have argued for the emergence of a third culture, instigating discourse between
modern thinkers (Brockman 1996). However, their stated philosophy is rather science —
and US-centric than dialectical and interdisciplinary. The third culture that Snow envisioned,
I contend, cannot arise by acting out an inferiority complex towards the humanities, but by
enabling transdisciplinary discourses and by raising the potential for Anschlussfähigkeit
(see Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)).
This is the anti-entropic principle of von Foerster’s ethical imperative. It reminds us to
create more distinctions (see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p. 29)). Therefore
I caution against eliminating differences, be it under the umbrella of scientific grand unifying
theories, the postulate of pan-theistic principles or the simplistic dictum of reductionist
efforts.
I have discussed in section Definitions vs. Distinctions: What Is “Is”? (p. 23) that
dichotomies like science vs. humanities, cybernetics vs. AI, brain vs. mind, play vs. work
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and narratology vs. ludology provide these opportunities for communication, if they are
observed as distinctions. Then we can observe and cross them; they become available
for further discourse and they enable observing new distinctions, observers, systems and
environments.
In this chapter I am returning to the two modes of investigation in my project, its theoretical
and its practical side. I have argued from the outset that both are needed for a compre-
hensive description of play (compare Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)). Later I
have discussed how my own practice and theoretical thinking have informed each other
through the projects presented in sections Project: Hostile Environment Facility Training
(p. 40), Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57), Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74), Project: Neurotic (p. 100),
Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110) and Project: Non-Sense of Place (p. 130). Now I want
to reflect on the distinction between theory and practice itself.
Theory and practice also represent two cultures. One is a culture of thinking and reflecting,
the other a culture of making and experiencing. In my practice informed research /research
informed practice (see Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)), both are linked by communication:
lectures, discussions, documentation, exposition of practice and publications. In order to
observe theory and practice as a distinction in this chapter, via reflection, it is necessary
to mention two concepts: reflection and re-entry.
The first one is reflection itself. According to Luhmann, it involves a form of self-observation
that rests on the distinction between system and environment (see System vs. Environment
(p. 123)). With reflection, a system is able to observe itself as a unity (Luhmann 1996).
By observing the distinction between theory and practice through theoretical reflection, this
chapter also represents a re-entry (see Discussion (p. 114)). Here, this thesis represents
the system, observing its own code, which is the distinction on which it is based through
one side of this very same distinction, its theory. For this operation to succeed, it has to
reflect, that is to observe itself as a system against the background of its own environment.
The environment consists of the academic disciplines, their methods and practices, and
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how they are observing play. This is the topic of the next section.
6.2 Play and Discipline(s)
In previous chapters, I have both observed play and discussed how play is observed
by different academic disciplines. We can observe the development of a significant
number of theories and practices regarding play itself as an artefact of the processes that
produce knowledge within the humanities and the natural and social sciences (Luhmann
2009). These different disciplines also observe each other. The macrostructure of the
scientific system has been described as a dynamic process that is oscillating between
mainstream agreement, diverging observations and disrupting subversion (Kuhn 1962).
By observing scientists at work from a sociological perspective, Bruno Latour (1999b)
noticed that their operations are constructive rather than an “objective” analysis of empirical
observations. In the same tenor, I have argued in section Play vs. Purpose (p. 54) that
implicit assumptions permeate the mechanisms of observation. Scientific play research
still is strongly associated with its academic roots in psychology, ethology and anthropology.
Until now, its observation of human play also heavily leans towards children.1
Most importantly, science cannot escape its own methodology, which requires the prepara-
tion of experiments, including the physical environment, the laboratory, the experimenters,
the subjects, the protocol and the interpretation of the observations in form of observational
codes. Ostrov and Hart (2014) show how environments influence what can be observed
within their boundaries. This relates not only to the production but also to the consumption
of scientific results (Weisberg, Taylor, and Hopkins 2015). Based on the discussion in
chapter System vs. Environment (p. 123), we can understand science as a social system,
an environment for experiments, scholarship, discourse and interpretation. I have used
Tinbergen’s four questions to illustrate how scientific descriptions operate with the a priori
assumption of utility (see Play vs. Purpose (p. 54)). These programs remain highly
relevant as they are guiding a new wave of behaviourist research, with machines in place
of animals (Rahwan et al. 2019). Recent directions of research in both ethology (Reinhold
et al. 2019) and artificial play (Perotto 2013) show promising “confusions” between bio-
logical systems and machines: rats seem to enjoy play without being rewarded with food,
machines pick up complex tool use through multi-agent competition.
1This becomes evident considering that the first academic journal for adult play was only founded in 2019
(see https://www.journalofplayinadulthood.org.uk).
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In the following two sections, I will reaffirm my standpoint that in order to make sense
of these developments, the observation of different types of systems (see Luhmann:
Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)) is crucial. Not least because of my own practical
explorations (see Project: Neurotic (p. 100) and Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)), I
have come to the conclusion to put more focus on social systems instead of biological
ones. My scepticism towards the prevalent scientistic discourses, however, does not
fundamentally discard their utility. We can imagine for a moment that science would cease
to reaffirm the usefulness of play for the learning and development of children (see Play
vs. Learning). In the context of our current meritocratic system,2 would there be still
convincing arguments against abolishing play altogether? Why then not let children be
occupied and economically useful at the same time? Traveling further along this line
of argumentation, wouldn’t it be even a moral imperative to abandon play in favour of
productive work that would contribute tangible results to the welfare of society?
I do not promote to leave scientific views on play aside. Rather, I suggest moving towards
a transdisciplinary position (compare Requirements for a New Paradigm) which requires
observing the other side of the two cultures as well. Contributions from the humanities
(Schiller 1795; Huizinga 1955; Caillois 1961; Spariosu 1989; Sutton-Smith 1997) call for
the re-location of studies of play from their currently predominantly scientific boundaries.
As a cultural phenomenon and as an aesthetic dimension, play deserves to be reflected in
the humanities and the arts as much as in the explanation-seeking sciences.3
By providing “gaming literacy”, the ability to read games in a way the feuilleton would
traditionally interpret works of literature, music, performing arts and film (Zimmerman
2009), the fledgling field of game studies has promised an opportunity for interdisciplinarity.
Indeed, there is evidence that play as a subject of research is welcome in game studies.
For example, consider recent discourse manifest in a series of academic panels (Mäyrä,
Lammes, et al. 2015; Mäyrä, Arjoranta, et al. 2016). Yet the field’s rooting in media studies
still mainly focuses on the observation of games as cultural artefacts (for example: (Simons
2007)). This is considerably evident in the ongoing debate about the relationship between
video games and other forms of narrative (compare Ludus vs. Narratio (p. 85)).
2Meritocracy is the ideology of performance, a belief in the benefit of effort and achievement (Young 1994).
This concept is different from capitalism, where wealth is created without involving personal labour through
the inception and growth of capital.
3As long as we draw the distinction between the humanities and the sciences, scientific disciplines appear
monolithic through a shared understanding of methods. This observation breaks down when disciplines like
psychology and ethology observe each other (for an example see Pellegrini (2009)).
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In line with Kuhn (1962), the ludology vs. narratology debate can be interpreted as the
emancipation of game studies as a field in its own right, with the ludic position as the new
paradigm. In my view, the debate has served as a founding myth of game studies but
the field finally needs to decide if it accepts that distinction as its code (see Discussion (p.
114)) or if a more useful distinction like play vs. games can bring new insights instead of
continued repetition of arguments. Fresh perspectives also could be provided by critiquing
the transition from film as the previously dominant medium (Denson and Leyda 2016).
A second observation goes against the idea that game studies are embracing play studies:
discussions within the field are becoming even more particular which seems to have settled
on video games. Scholar Sebastian Deterding (2016, p. 1) is expressing this concern
explicitly: “[. . . ] instead of establishing themselves as the broad umbrella interdiscipline
of digital game research, they are becoming one narrow cultural studies multidiscipline
within the growing and diversifying field of game research and education”. It is notable
that Deterding is afraid that the game studies are not even capable of covering relevant
aspects of digital games. How would it then be able to discuss wider topics of games and
play?
Various scholars have attempted to clarify their positions towards games vs. play and digital
vs. analog media, but these accounts are often conflicting. Proclaiming the beginning of a
new discipline of modern game studies in July 2001, Espen Aarseth (2001) has insisted
on computer games exclusively. Gonzalo Frasca (2007) discusses play, games, video
games and toys, Miguel Sicart (2014) stresses the relevance of play. Mari Erika Koskela
(2016) proposes a model in which play sits at the centre of three overlapping concepts,
game, player and context. The Handbook of Computer Game Studies (Raessens and
Goldstein 2005), published in 2005, seeks to cover a wide range of aspects: history and
future of games, game design, reception and psychological effects of video games and
games as aesthetic, cultural and social phenomena. I doubt that nowadays it would still be
possible to fit the far more differentiated and controversial perspectives about games into
one volume.
Another fundamental aspect of a discipline other than its objects of study concerns its
methodologies. Lankoski and Björk (2015) enumerate qualitative methods to study games,
play and players, quantitative approaches, mixed methods and game development for
research. Most of the methods in the first two categories are empirical, and they are
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imported from the natural and social sciences, alternatively from media and cultural studies.
Mixed methods combine qualitative and quantitative approaches, yet do not transcend
their disciplinary toolbox. An important question for empirical methods is the location of
the collected data. Expanding on (Stevens, Satwicz, and McCarthy 2008), Lieberoth and
Roepstorff (2015) enumerate four different levels: in-game (avatar movement), in-body
(measuring biological signals from the player), in-room (observing the player) and in-world
(from the environments of play). In mixed methods, any of these observational approaches
can provide streams of information that then can be combined and analysed.
There are many issues, however, that these methods largely cannot address. This con-
cerns phenomenological access to the first person perspective, research through practice,
transdisciplinary approaches and exploratory research in which questions, methods and
answers are emerging during the process itself. To address these perspectives, I am
crossing to the issue of practice in the next section.
6.3 Towards Play Design as Research
Practice as a contribution to knowledge has found its place in certain academic disciplines
(Barrett and Bolt 2010), including art and design (Schwab and Borgdorff 2014). Corre-
sponding methodologies have been called “research by design” (Frayling 1993; Friedman
2008), “design-based research” (Herrington et al. 2007) or “performative research” (Hase-
man 2006). Practice-based methods are different both from scientific approaches and
from theoretical investigations undertaken in the humanities, but they are informed by
both (Mateas 2001). Essentially, only practice-based methods can expose phenomena
to the researcher in the first person perspective, where they are available for methods
such as autoethnography (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011). An example is Jarvinen’s
investigation of games via his own play practice that he calls “applied ludology” (Järvinen
2008).
I have described the paradoxical distinction between games and play in section Play
vs. Games (p. 65). By crossing this distinction with the distinction between theory and
practice, I can now view play design to denote practices that includes game design,
but also embraces designing toys, facilitating playful interactions and architecting playful
environments (see Architecting Environments (p. 126)). By understanding play as a
medium (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)) play design becomes an analogue to practices like
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visual design, audio design and object design. This raises questions about the availability
of knowledge for play design.
In the wake of the economic and cultural rise of video games, an extensive body of
knowledge on how to design and develop digital games has been produced (Salen and
Zimmerman 2003; Schell 2015; Hunicke, LeBlanc, and Zubek 2004). Game design
involves research, ideation, development of game mechanisms and narrative content,
prototyping (Houde and Hill 1997), simulation, playtesting, and documenting. Game
development transforms designs into physical or digital artefacts. Lankoski and Holopainen
(2017) have collected a variety of practice-based methods in game design research, where
game design appears both as a method and as the object of research.
In conclusion, play design still sits at the cracks between academic disciplines and design
practices. For a long time, play has been observed as a phenomenon in contrast to games
that are considered being artefacts to be designed and built. Salen and Zimmerman point
out that game design is the indirect design of a player experience through the game rules
(Salen and Zimmerman 2003). Complicating matters even further, games and play are
considered being in a paradoxical relationship, as discussed in section Play vs. Games
(p. 65). I contend that the methodology presented in this thesis has shed light on these
problems, as play can be observed from different angles in the environment of games,
while we can understand games as a medium for play (see Play vs. Games (p. 65)). A
description for my approach that has emerged from practices described in section Mateas
and Schwab: Artistic Research (p. 38), is research informed practice /practice informed
research, which denotes a dual nature without preference for one mode or the other.
With the conceptual frame of Friedman (2008), my practice can alternatively be described
as an inquiry into the reality of play (compare Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms (p. 30)).
I have approached research questions by designing and developing prototypes without a
complete analysis and discussion of underlying hypotheses, theories or models. Instead, I
let the prototypes (Houde and Hill 1997) and their expositions guide my further research
(compare Mateas and Schwab: Artistic Research (p. 38)). In this way I developed neurotic
(see Project: Neurotic (p. 100)), CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (see Project: CO2rnwall CO2
Challenge (p. 130)) and in particular KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong
(p. 110)). This approach leads to a (not necessarily asymptotic) approximation to my
research question and sometimes — as described in section Discussion (p. 102) — to a
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reorientation of both practical and theoretical assumptions.
While irritating (see Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)) both the game studies
and the practice of design for play and games in their own autopoietic processes of
differentiation, I propose a transdisciplinary stance, one that goes beyond a singular
discipline and keeps it connected to other disciplines via distinctions instead. This position,
I argue, has benefits to it, as it avoids the same, self-repeating discussions renegotiating
the identity of disciplines as encountered in section What Is Play? (p. 15). At the same
time is carries a risk, because the academic system normally does not foster directions
it cannot classify into established disciplinary compartments.4 One strand of hope rests
on a renaissance of the constructivist, cybernetic and systems-theoretic foundations that
have inspired and scaffolded my research (compare Distinction vs. Identity).
6.4 Designing Playful Systems
A central theme of this thesis is the methodological replacement of definitions by distinc-
tions. Instead of defining concepts in order to work within their boundaries (see Definitions
vs. Distinctions: What Is “Is”? (p. 23)), I am playing with a set of distinctions, following
a path through the space of possibilities, actualising some of them while virtualising oth-
ers (see Actual vs. Potential) while encountering contradictions and strange loops (see
Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)).
Eric Zimmerman (2014b) characterizes a playful system as “[. . . ] a human system, a
social system rife with contradictions and with possibility”. In consequence, designing
playful systems does not follow pre-written procedures. Instead, it can be construed as
a laboratory in the making, an environment for construction and experimentation (see
System vs. Environment (p. 123)) that is reproducing its own Anschlussfähigkeit (see
Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24)). Likely outcomes are rather a plurality of
projects, methods, publications, research, failed experiments (compare Project: Neurotic
(p. 100)), performances, hacks, strange loops.
The following seven directions for designing playful systems should therefore not be read
as a categorisation, but rather as potentials to be actualised, resulting from my current
constructions and decisions to observe particular distinctions and not others. These
4I therefore consider my own doctoral program, the EU–funded Marie Curie Initial Training Network
Cognovo as an exceptional effort in producing novel approaches to creativity and cognition.
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directions and the requirements set out in section Requirements for a New Paradigm
(p. 24) form another strange loop as both emerging from my practice informed research
/research informed practice.
6.4.1 Anthroponeutral Design
Mary Flanagan (2013) proposes radical game design as a methodology which is centred
around a set of values while keeping the process iterative and open for subversion. In
a similar vein, each playful system I designed as described in the previous chapters
has been constructed or re-contextualised based on distinctions. Through the distinction
between human and machine (see Human vs. Machine (p. 97)), I developed the concept
of anthroponeutral design for play that is intended for humans, animals and machines
alike.
This principle neither celebrates Schiller’s idealistic humanism of play (see Can Machines
Play? (p. 97)) nor denies human participation in a pure training environment for artificial
intelligence. Instead, it is agnostic about its players, observing play with a xenofeminist
distance (Laboria Cuboniks 2018) and aesthetics (Konior 2016). Michelle Westerlaken
(2017) is investigating the related concept of non-speciesm, developed from the distinction
between theory and practice and between human and animal players (Westerlaken 2016).
The design of KlingKlangKlong, discussed in section Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110),
has been deliberately anthroponeutral. This approach intentionally renders distinctions
between the virtual and human participants of play invisible. As the game takes place in
virtual and in physical space, it is still possible for human players to detect virtual players,
which a future design could strive to avoid.
6.4.2 Autopoietic Machines
Beginning in the mid-1970s (Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974), there have been attempts
to formalise the concept of autopoiesis in a minimal model (see Maturana and Varela:
Perception Is Distinction (p. 32)). Some of these approaches are developed in the context
of artificial chemistry (McMullin 2004).
Subsequent research has modelled further aspects of autopoiesis, such as the system vs.
environment distinction modelled in Conway’s Game of Life (Beer 2004). Game of Life is
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a formal system with a minimal set of rules that is Turing-complete, which means that it
has the same representational strength as any general computer (Rendell 2011). This
allows the observation of strange loops between genetic and developmental processes
(Caballero, Hodge, and Hernandez 2016). Beer’s critical discussion of the question of
whether a glider, a simple self-replicating structure, can be considered being autopoietic,
reveals the limits of formal models of solely biological systems.
As I have discussed in section Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33), Luhmann’s
concept of autopoiesis extends to minds and social systems. I believe that it is a promising
route to shift the paradigm in game design from complex to autopoietic systems. This
direction of research is actively investigated by (Iba 2010) and by (Bishop and Al-Rifaie
2016a; Bishop and Al-Rifaie 2016b), who apply autopoietic systems to various aspects of
creativity (compare Play vs. Learning (p. 56)).
6.4.3 Future Things
Designer Donald Norman (2007) discusses how technology and humans are becoming
increasingly intertwined. Distinguishing reflective, behavioural, and visceral levels of
reaction, Norman insists that designing for products and services involves developing a
psychology of people and machines. Future things in this sense can be toys, machines,
species or other systems that are designed to observe each other playfully.
Within a technoculture that approaches systems as artistic, ludic and playful, creating
opportunities for magic circles that may involve artificial and biological systems, like
reactive robotic toys for cats (Sprite Robotics 2015) or playful ecological social systems
like Biomodd by Angelo Vermeulen (2007): “Biomodd is a multifaceted socially engaged
art installation that finds meaningful relationships between biology, computers and people”.
Beyond the artefacts that are created in a project like Biomodd, social systems emerge
and develop, transcending and superseding the “thingness” of things5.
6.4.4 Imaginary Objects
Artist and Designer Bruno Munari (2008, p. 203-207) describes a method of “theoretical
reconstruction”, borrowed from archeologists who recreate missing parts of a find. Applied
5This is one reason why I have argued against thing–oriented ontologies (Bogost 2006; Bogost 2012) in
favour of system theories (see the footnote in section Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33))
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to imaginary objects, this approach involves starting from some given finding and then
extending it into our imagination. extendingThis is what I was attempting to do by re-
purposing the car-centred traffic ideology in Plymouth (see Project: Pedestrian Fitness
Initiative for Plymouth (p. 135)), reshaping concerns about the global climate crisis
into surreal exercises (see Project: CO2rnwall CO2 Challenge (p. 130)) or turning a
governmental Hostile Environment policy into a Hostile Environment Facility Training (see
Project: Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40)).
Munari’s design process is initiated by physical objects, whereas the findings in my projects
are actualisations of the virtual (compare Actual vs. Potential (p. 83)), constructions within
social systems rather than the material objects symbolising them. Some of these virtualized
things re-materialise in physical props like the metal barriers and tactical vests of HEFT
(see Exposition (p. 42)). In each of these projects, the re-construction is playful, liminal,
and keeps some distance from its subject through irony and shifts of perspective.
6.4.5 Expressive Design
I have described Michael Mateas’ concept of expressive AI (Mateas 2001) (see Mateas
and Schwab: Artistic Research (p. 38)). I propose to extend this idea to areas outside of
artificial intelligence: expressive design stands for applying disciplinary methods and tech-
niques while offering critique towards the purposes inherent in that disciplines (compare
Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)).
We can find related conceptual traits in Haseman’s performative research (Haseman
2006), Pickering’s mangle of practice (Pickering 1995), Schwab’s experimental systems
(Schwab 2014) and Marenko’s speculative FutureCrafting (Marenko 2018).
All these methodologies critique and subvert through a viewpoint of artistic practice that
playfully undermines both their targets and obsolete understandings of art (see Games vs.
Art (p. 63)). Once again (compare Future Things (p. 158)), they render the artwork as
artefact insufficient, the thing merely serves to reveal purpose, the subverted one as well as
the artistic one. These methods invite to play with the hiding and revealing of descriptions,
meta-information, explanations, and documentation of construction. Throughout my
project, I have been playing with expressive design as a form of research in order for my
theoretical and practical contributions to inform each other.
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6.4.6 Experiential Architecture
In chapter System vs. Environment (p. 123) I have pointed out the importance of
playgrounds, physical and experiential environments in which play takes place. I have also
emphasised that players are free to appropriate their surroundings for play even in the
face of a hostile environment.
Salen and Zimmerman argue that game design is indirect design, where the designers
create rules while anticipating the experience of the players (compare Towards Play
Design as Research (p. 154)). Similarly, the approach of architecting environments
(see Architecting Environments (p. 126)) attempts to anticipate forms of interaction that
allow for play, representing a shift from the focus on the game, player, or toy within the
environment.6 Rather, experiential architecture exemplified in the work of the collective
Omsk Social Club is concerned with the boundaries of playful systems, creating for
phenomena like pervasiveness, bleed and magic circles (see Magic vs. Pervasive (p.
128)). The constructive nature of perception (see Constructivisms vs. Constructionisms (p.
30)) enables experiments like The Unlimited Corridor (Matsumoto et al. 2016), a liminal
space where two distinctions are crossed in virtual visual and physical haptic perception.
Applying von Foerster’s ethical principle (see Von Foerster: Second Order Cybernetics (p.
29)), I believe that both mixed reality and pervasive environments (see Virtual vs. Physical
(p. 79) and Magic vs. Pervasive (p. 128)) are promising directions, allowing for novel
combinations of physical and digital elements to create rich experiential surfaces.
Both KlingKlangKlong (see Project: KlingKlangKlong (p. 110)) and neurotic (see Project:
Neurotic (p. 100)) combine physical space (more precisely: the relative location and
movement of the subset of physical players) with digitally constructed logic and aesthetics.
Spiel 1 (see Project: Spiel 1 (p. 57)) and Hostile Environment Facility Training (see
Project: Hostile Environment Facility Training (p. 40)) utilise technology to transform a
performative physical space into playful environments. And finally, Imperfect VR (see
Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74)) strives to enable a new generation of creators to become
experiential architects.
6Inevitably players will subvert these anticipations, which – if expected – creates new strange loops
between anticipantions.
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6.4.7 New Social Systems
I envision a future society that is not controlled by artificial intelligence, but one where
humans and machines can communicate with each other. Going back to the distinctions
between systems (see Luhmann: Distinctions Create Meaning (p. 33)), this means that
we must aim to construct new social systems. I have argued in (Straeubig 2017a) that
a large amount of work — creating agency-enabling ludic interfaces (Jahrmann 2011)
— and experimentation (Jahrmann and Felderer 2013) is necessary in order to enable
machines to take part in playful social systems.
Over 30 years ago, Steve Woolgar (1985) observed a substantial need for talks between
sociology and AI, an assessment that has lost none of its relevance. A practical effort
towards social systems has been made by the Hitchbot project (Smith and Zeller 2014) by
exposing a robot to extensive hitchhiking tours in three countries (Smith and Zeller 2016).
The project’s clever reversal of discourses about social trust is to investigate the question if
robots can trust humans (the answer is that they can’t, as the robot was vandalised during
its tour in the USA).
I argue that a key for future social systems that will include machines and humans is
research into communication, which I contrast with the prevalent focus on information
transmission and natural language processing within the field of computer science (Straeu-
big 2020b, (to appear)). A promising, practical approach in my opinion is the four-sided
communication model of Friedemann Schulz von Thun (1981) that integrates concepts
from Bühler’s Organon model (Bühler 2011) and Watzlawick’s distinction between content
and relationship of messages (Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson 2014). In this model,
each act of communication has four sides, both for the sender and for the receiver of
messages: facts, relationship, self-presentation and appeal. These four facets or subtexts
appear in almost every message and can be observed and analysed individually, regarding
their relative emphasis or in terms of their congruence.
From the perspective of the sender, the factual side contains the actual subject of the mes-
sage. The self-presentation side carries both intentional (self-promotions) and unintended
(self-revelations) expressions of the sender. These themes are elaborated further by Erv-
ing Goffman (1990b) in his observations about play and acting in social encounters. The
relationship side encodes how the sender views the receiver and the relationship between
them. Finally, each act of communication also carries appeals — these are actions that
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the sender intends for the receiver to carry out.7 Appeals can be communicated openly
(for example, advice or a command) or hidden (manipulation). I am convinced that only by
considering all four sides will we be able to construct communication with machines in the
future.
6.5 Summary: A Strange Loop
In this chapter, I have returned to the code (see A Third Culture? (p. 149) and Discussion
(p. 114)) of this thesis, the distinction between theory and practice. By re-entering this
distinction on the side of theory, I have proposed guidelines for a future anthroponeutral de-
sign, providing opportunities for Anschlussfähigkeit. Seen through the distinction between
theory and practice, they complement the seven requirements proposed in Requirements
for a New Paradigm (p. 24).
In other words: I have arrived again at my starting point, but the starting point itself has
transformed significantly. Through playing with numerous distinctions, it is now offering a
plethora of new connections that invite further investigation to be continued in theoretical
and practical ways. The journey itself now reveals itself as a strange loop, a Moebius strip
(see What Is Play? (p. 15)) that has “research informed practice informed” written on it
(see Meta-thetical Dialog (p. 165)). The apparent nonsense becomes meaningful through
the topology of the strip. It can then be read either way as “research informed practice” or
as “practice informed research”.
This conclusion suggests that I have reached a position where I can stop describing the
observations to be discussed in this thesis and look ahead instead. This is the final point I
will address in the following conclusion and outlook.
7In terms of Bogost (2010), this could be called the “persuasive content” of the message. It is crucial to
note that in Schulz von Thun’s model, every message includes this aspect.
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Conclusion and Outlook
Life is a game. Live accordingly.
Bernhard Suits (1967)
Coda: Making Sense of Play
How can we make sense of a complex and paradoxical phenomenon such as play? In this
thesis, I have undertaken a journey to find an answer to this question. My approach was
to develop a systems-theoretic approach to observe play in theory and practice from a
wide range of perspectives through the medium of distinctions.
In chapter Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15) I have argued that current discourses are in-
capable of reflecting the complex nature of play, contributing to its previously postulated
ambiguity. In the course of my PhD project I have constructed a methodology of observa-
tion on the fundament of prior contributions from systems theory, radical constructivism
and cybernetics. I have constructed a network of distinctions between distinction-based
theories from Spencer-Brown through cybernetics and radical constructivism to Maturana
/Varela and Niklas Luhmann.
I could have made different choices in the context of different epistemological traditions.
It would be interesting to compare and contrast other difference-based approaches from
proponents like Bateson and Derrida. Adopting terms from Jung (1961), Bateson and
Bateson (2005) locate distinctions in the mind (“creatura”), as opposed to the realm
of physics, a mindless nature operating with continuous forces and energy (“pleroma”).
Derrida (1973) has coined the notion of “differance” as an expression of the strange loops
introduced by it.8 Adorno has been characterised to emphasise the significance of “non-
identity of concept and object, mind and matter, the individual and society” (Cook 2008).
8Derrida (1973, p. 259) saw play not as difference, however: “The concept of play [jeu] remains beyond
this opposition[. . . ]”.
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May (1997) and Gangle (2013) point to a significant number of theories of difference.
My practical approach turns out to be similar to Laruelle’s claim for a performative non-
philosophy, although both origins and conclusions appear entirely different: critique of
philosophy leads Laruelle to non-philosophy while critique of disciplines takes me to
transdisciplinarity (compare Play and Discipline(s) (p. 151)). Both Laruelle and I start
from a critique of identities and definitions (see Definitions vs. Distinctions: What Is
“Is”? (p. 23)). However, driven by a desire to transform systems “alchemically” into more
playful ones (Slavin 2014), I am operating with and through distinctions whereas Laruelle
apparently attempts to deny them altogether (Galloway 2014). In a strange loop, he arrives
at an essentialist, immanent metaphysical, radical equality he calls “the One” (Laruelle
2010). With Laruelle I am convinced that practice is an absolute necessity; in contrast
to Laruelle I am backing up this necessity with a distinction. As I have argued in section
Requirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24), practice is the mode where the first person
perspective comes alive through playing, creating, observing, iterating on playful systems.
By discussing my approach versus Laruelle’s, I am observing distinctions. Each method-
ology necessarily requires and autopoietically creates its own distinctions, selections,
observers, practice, transdisciplinarity and Anschlussfähigkeit. The choices I made in my
PhD project enabled me to evolve a methodology of navigating distinctions, including the
distinction between theory and practice, in order to observe play through research and
performative practice. It would be informative to see how further research into various
phenomena of play like the ones discussed in chapter Play vs. Non-Play (p. 49) can be
undertaken. I would also be interested to see how the requirements set up in section Re-
quirements for a New Paradigm (p. 24) and the design directions envisioned in Designing
Playful Systems (p. 156) can evolve through subsequent critique.
It is fair to assume that the exploration of Virtual and Augmented Realities will continue,
hopefully not only under the conditions of economic interests from the entertainment and
other industries, but also in a playful and artistic way. The key to this is the diversity of future
creators, as I have discussed in chapter Virtual vs. Real (p. 73) and through my project
Imperfect VR (see Project: Imperfect VR (p. 74)). Research into artificial intelligence
and machine learning is developing at a breath-taking pace and the other disciplines
humanities and sociology are catching up. I would assume that play will continue to act
as a segue into the construction and observation of social systems between human and
164
machines as illustrated in chapter Human vs. Machine (p. 97). Understanding the world
through ecological perspectives is the topic of chapter System vs. Environment (p. 123).
With regard to designing playful systems, the notion of architecting around play rather than
designing for play (see Architecting Environments (p. 126)) seems a promising avenue to
me that needs further research and practice.
My contributions to knowledge that are summarised in section Contribution to Knowledge
(p. 5) have now come back in a strange loop of theory and practice. I have been playing
with distinctions from a general systems-theoretic perspective, created a bridge where
theory and practice are informing each other and designed or re-contextualised and
exposed my practice as research (see Mateas and Schwab: Artistic Research (p. 38))
in eight playful interactions. My requirements for a new paradigm (see Requirements
for a New Paradigm (p. 24)) have become directions for designing playful systems (see
Designing Playful Systems (p. 156)). By constructing a systems-theoretic approach as
research informed practice /practice informed research reflected in chapter Theory vs.
Practice (p. 149), I am contributing both to the studies of play and games and to the future
practice of playful design. This thesis marks a foundation step towards this goal;Both
theory and practice need to be developed further in future work. A lot remains to be done
and played.
Now finally, I come to play with the thesis itself.
Meta-thetical Dialog
A: So how did this thesis come about?
B: I began to look at play, the phenomenon, and realised that there are so many theories
about it! Everyone seems to have opinions, and there is so much conflict and contradiction.
So I decided to take a step back to first clarify how I was going to look at play. This became
chapter Distinction vs. Identity (p. 15).
A: And these “glasses” you are looking through are based on second-order cybernetics,
radical constructivism, autopoiesis and social systems theory?
B: Yes and most fundamentally. . .
A: . . . on distinctions. What makes a distinction more fundamental than an identity?
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B: Read the Bible, Genesis 1.
A: I am not that religious.
B: In a nutshell: God draws a lot of distinctions while creating everything. Ok, then. Let’s
say you want to express an identity, for example “A equals B”.
A: This is what definitions do?
B: Similar. A definition says “an A is a B”. However, both require that you first draw a
distinction, namely between “A” and “B” so you can put the “=”, “equals” or “is” between
them. So definitions requires distinctions.
A: But according to Luhmann distinctions also are holding together their sides in some
kind of identity?
B: They do. “Play vs. Work” says more than “Play” alone.
A: This sounds paradoxical to me. Also, some of this distinctive talk seems quite compli-
cated. I tried to read Laws of Form.
B: Don’t worry, you are not alone. We do not delve into the logical depths of it, yet we can
observe play and playfulness in all their paradoxes and contradictions. Let’s look at three
pictures.
A: This thesis in three pictures?
B: If you want. Here is the first one. I found it in Oxford where I gave my first talk outside
of Plymouth.
A: How Oxford-ish!
B: And here is the second one. I made it in Bristol during the Making the City Playable
conference.
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Figure 6.1: No Frisbee
A: How Bristolian!
B: And the third one you can make yourself. First take a strip of paper. Write on the
front: “Research informs”. Then turn it around, rotate by 180 degrees and write “Practice
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informs”.
B: Wait, wait, not so fast. Informs what? They certainly must inform something?
A: You sound like a supervisor. Trust me.
B: (scribbles)
A: Now make a Moebius strip (see What Is Play? (p. 15), footnote) and read.
Figure 6.2: A Strange Loop
B: (reads out loud) “RESEARCH INFORMS PRACTICE INFORMS RESEARCH IN-
FORMS. . . ” Ah, I see.
A: A strange loop.
B: Indeed and you found this out by doing — research by practice.
A: This becomes almost ethical.
B: A meta-ethical dialog?
B: Let’s stay with the meta-thethical dialog.
A: Yes, but I think von Foerster’s ethical imperative (see What Is Play? (p. 15)) makes it an
anti-reductionist thesis.
Q: Yes, but we need to make one reduction.
A: Go on.
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Q: During our discussion I discovered that you are talking to yourself.
A: Am I? But then you must be doing the same, don’t you?
B: I do. But doesn’t that mean that you and me are the same person? A equals B?
A and B: This is necessarily so. They won’t allow two people writing this thesis.
A and B: Then. . .
Back to Work
Between Schiller’s romanticism, Huizinga’s anthropocentrism and Bogost’s pragmatism, a
shared intent becomes manifest: to defend play against demands of a meritocratic society,
prerogative of utility and accusations of frivolity.
As King Midas had to learn in the case of gold, (Ovidius Naso 2008), I caution about
what we wish for play. Zimmerman’s quote in the Introduction (p. 1) and some of the
speculations discussed in section Counterpoint: Machines Play (p. 118) that suggest
everything might becomes play appear to give an optimistic outlook. But is no work and all
play the utopia we wish for?
For me, the now more than a decade-long pursuit of play came with a surprising twist.
Everything I touched regarding play became work. My projects, the ones that I did and
the ones that I did not include in this thesis certainly were work, where play appeared as
a result rather than as a foundation. A playful attitude often was key to continue under
difficult circumstances.
This is a vital realisation about play: you cannot do anything with it, except to play. Play
resists objectification, even the well-meant ones. You play or you don’t. Everything else is
work. The kid in the psychology lab watched over by the scientist eager to extract new
findings, the many students that are exposed to educational games, the scholars that
studying play — they do not play. At least not in these moments. Therefore, we need
space for play and for work.
That leaves a question: have I been working on my thesis or have I been playing with
distinctions? Could it be both at the same time as long as no one asks? Fundamentally,
the exploration of play has told me important things about the human condition. In my
memory about the Cold War (p. 1), I have described how my quest to understand play is
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rooted in my non-understanding of work. Now after some thorough research into play, I
realise that I have made my peace with work. Maybe play now needs to rest for a while. A
strange loop indeed.
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Appendix A
The Appendix is published in a separate ZIP file. It contains a brochure including photos,
sketches and product credits for each of the practical projects, in the order they appear in
the main text. For some of the projects, I included additional documentation.
01_HEFT/01_HostileEnvironmentFacilityTraining.pdf
01_HEFT/HEFT Concept.pdf
01_HEFT/HEFT Moods and Props.pdf
01_HEFT/HEFT Script.pdf
01_HEFT/heft_1.mp4
01_HEFT/heft_2.mp4
01_HEFT/heft_3.mp4
02_Spiel1/02_Spiel1.pdf
02_Spiel1/code.zip
03_ImperfectVR/03_ImperfectVR.pdf
03_ImperfectVR/imperfect-vr-master.zip
04_Neurotic/04_Neurotic.pdf
04_Neurotic/Mediacity5_Neurotic.pdf
04_Neurotic/code.zip
05_KlingKlangKlong/05_KlingKlangKlong.pdf
05_KlingKlangKlong/code.zip
06_CO2rnwallCO2Challenge/06_CO2rnwallCO2Challenge.pdf
06_CO2rnwallCO2Challenge/CO2rnwall Script.pdf
06_CO2rnwallCO2Challenge/CO2rnwall.mp4
06_CO2rnwallCO2Challenge/www.zip
07_PFIP/07_PedestrianFitnessInitiativeForPlymouth.pdf
07_PFIP/Mediacity5_Pedestrian_Fitness_Initiative_for_Plymouth.pdf
07_PFIP/Mediacity5_Pedestrian_Fitness_Initiative_for_Plymouth_Handout.pdf
07_PFIP/PFIP.mov
08_SpeedGardeningGuerrilla/08_SpeedGardeningGuerrilla.pdf
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